MCLC: another Lei Feng revival

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: kirk (denton.2 at osu.edu)
Subject: another Lei Feng revival
***********************************************************

Source: China Brief (Jamestown Foundation) 12, no. 5 (3/2/12):
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=39091&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=004f169fa675b5370f16042eebf39216

Another Lei Feng Revival: Making Maoism Safe for China
By: Peter Mattis

Chinese political culture contains a lot of dangerous ideas for the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This may go a long ways toward explaining
Beijing¹s fickle relationship with Confucius as a symbol of Chinese
culture and, now, with the trappings of Maoism. While criticism of
Chongqing¹s ³Singing Red Songs² (changhong) campaign highlights the
growing disfavor of the city¹s party secretary, Politburo member Bo Xilai,
the CCP Propaganda Department announced on February 27‹a week before
National Lei Feng Day‹the revival of a campaign to promote ³the spirit of
Lei Feng,² the selfless if obedient hero of the Chinese revolution
(People¹s Daily, February 28; China News Service, February 27). The
campaign highlights the latest contradiction facing a Leninist party
bereft of communist spirit, living on nationalist credentials gained
through economic development and patriotic education. How does a governing
party based on a foreign ideology find native symbols that encourage
support for the regime that do not support the principle of regime change?
The answer, as it has been since 1963, is once again Lei Feng.

The problem with once again dusting off the old hero is that Lei Feng may
not be prepared for the modern age. Even online editors for the People¹s
Daily asked only a couple of years ago if learning from Lei Feng is
outdated. The answer earlier this week, of course, was an emphatic ³no²
(Xinhua, February 29; People¹s Daily, February 28; People¹s Net, March 8,
2010). The Global Times also reposted an Internet witticism showing how
little sticking power Lei Feng has, ³the post-1970¹s generation learned
form Lei Feng, the post-1980¹s generation revolted against Lei Feng, and
the post-1990¹s generation has forgotten about Lei Feng.² Repeated in
other CCP-run papers, the words seem to indict widespread public cynicism
about Beijing¹s promotion of values.

Although the Propaganda Department announced the campaign on Monday, the
campaign seems to have been in the works for some time. Last fall, the
Sixth Plenum report‹known for its focus on cultural issues‹mentioned
normalizing the study of Lei Feng, but only in passing (Xinhua, February
29; Guangming Daily, February 26). The China Media Project also tracked a
steady and increasing stream of Lei Feng articles through February that
peaked at the Propaganda Department¹s announcement. The first real hint of
a serious campaign came on February 23 when The Complete Works of Lei Feng
was published in a massive 200,000 Chinese character-long anthology
(Xinhua, February 23).

The campaign to normalize learning from Lei Feng¹s activities contains a
nine-fold approach, ranging from regular activities to major annual forums
and from CCP cadres to school children. The Propaganda Department directed
grassroots organs and cultural associations to produce Lei Feng pamphlets,
television and radio programs, scholarly essays and more. Even CCP cadre
are not immune, because they need to study Lei Feng to maintain their
ideological purity to retain their vanguard status (People¹s Daily, March
1, February 28; China News Service, February 27). The Ministry of
Education also has directed Lei Feng-inspired activities be included in
elementary and middle school curriculums as part of moral education
(Xinhua, February 28). Apart from the moral considerations, Lei Feng also
is being billed as a nationalist and a symbol of the spirit of the Chinese
people.

The new Lei Feng campaign is a safer and more politically palatable
version of Bo¹s ³singing red songs² effort‹both in terms of factional
politics and the CCP¹s right to govern‹which is a throwback to the days of
Mao Zedong. On the former, the princeling Bo has tried to lead a
neo-Maoist revival presumably to bolster his standing. ³Singing red songs²
joined Bo¹s campaign against organized crime and corruption that may have
threatened the political prospects of Hu Jintao ally, Guangdong party
chief Wang Yang, who preceded Bo in Chongqing. Bo¹s ³success² in cleaning
out Chongqing could be seen as tarnishing Wang for letting such corruption
run free (³Bo Xilai's Campaign for the Standing Committee and the Future
of Chinese Politicking,² China Brief, November 11, 2011; ³The CCP's
Disturbing Revival of Maoism,² China Brief, November 19, 2009). The
dangers to Beijing of Bo¹s invocation of China¹s Maoist past however go
beyond factional politics. Last year, one Chinese academic opined to the
New York Times that the so-called ³red songs² were really pink, because
Mao¹s revolutionary zeal to destroy established centers of power could not
be found among Bo¹s hymn selection (June 29, 2011). In other words, for
every song proclaiming ³Socialism is Good² there is a song declaring ³It
is Right to Rebel,² making the changhong campaign a slippery slope toward
potentially rejecting the CCP¹s legitimacy, or at least Hu¹s vision of a
³harmonious society.²

The same slippery slope also is present in state-run Confucianism, denying
the CCP unrestricted use as last year¹s placement and removal of a statue
of Confucius on Tiananmen Square symbolized (Xinhua, January 12, 2011;
Economic Observer [China], April 21, 2011). Outsiders have long
misconstrued the emphasis of Confucian thinking with the tame state-run
version, which emasculated Chinese society and justified state oppression.
Although forms of filial piety in state-led Confucianism have been used to
justify subordination to the government for hundreds of years, Confucius¹
emphasis on virtue far outweighs obedience: ³in the face of a wrong or
unrighteousness, it is the duty of the son to oppose his father, and the
duty of the servant to oppose his superior.² In an explicitly political
context, Confucius was even more clear, pointing out ³tyrannical
government is more dangerous than man-eating tigers.² Mencius combined
these ideas into the Mandate of Heaven, which justified rebellion against
incompetent or malignant governments. He wrote ³when a ruler treats his
subjects like grass and dirt, then the subjects should treat him as a
bandit and an enemy.² Mao, a thorough student of the power of principles,
understood this, which is why he sought to destroy Confucianism as a
Chinese challenger to the foreign-born Marxist-Leninist ideology he
espoused. Due to Chinese disenchantment with foreign rule after the Qing
Dynasty, Confucian thought in the hands of nationalists would have been
dangerous to the revolution.

These points illustrate the precariousness of the CCP position in living
off of nationalism while trying to generate new ways to promote social
stability. Beijing has to use Chinese, rather than foreign, ideas;
however, important and recognizable strands of political thought,
Confucianism and Maoism, explicitly endorse rebellion. Lei Feng is at
least obedient as a tame Maoist relic that the Propaganda Department can
pitch as a symbol of the Chinese people (Xinhua, March 1; People¹s Daily,
February 27). The problem, however, is that few people are likely to live
the ³Lei Feng spirit² as such, because of mistrust of the government and
widespread cynicism‹a point even Chinese press concede. As Renmin
University sociologist Zhou Xiaozheng said, ³If the upper levels of
society do not learn from Lei and become good examples to follow, how are
the regular people supposed to be willing to?² (Global Times, February 23).