MCLC: Hu Jintao draws blood with Wang Lijun scandal

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: kirk (denton.2 at osu.edu)
Subject: Hu Jintao draws blood with Wang Lijun scandal
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Source: China Brief (Jamestown Foundation) 12, no. 5 (3/2/12):
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=39092&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=4c9b60e4f8bf8dd6bc9f171a1e2a5e8c

Hu Jintao Draws Blood with the Wang Lijun Scandal
By: Willy Lam

After apparently engineering the contretemps that have hit Chongqing Party
Secretary Bo Xilai, President Hu Jintao is putting additional pressure on
other members of the Gang of Princelings‹the political faction composed of
senior cadres¹ offspring. The political fortunes of Bo, the high-profile
son of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elder Bo Yibo, have nosedived
following the recent detention of his key protégé, Wang Lijun, on alleged
³economic crimes.² Regardless of the veracity about the speculation that
the 62-year-old princeling offered to resign from the Politburo, Bo¹s
chances for making the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) at the 18th
Party Congress later this year seem over. Last week, Bo reportedly wrote a
³letter of self-criticism² to the PBSC in which he blamed himself for
failing to detect the alleged corruption and other misdemeanors of former
Chongqing Vice-Mayor Wang, who reportedly tried to seek political asymlum
in the United States Consulate in Chengdu earlier this month (Ming Pao
[Hong Kong], February 22; China Digital Times, February 21; Reuters,
February 15).

Political observers in Beijing are closely watching two related
developments. The first is which senior cadre will likely acquire the PBSC
seat which Bo seemed to have a high chance of filling. The second and
perhaps more significant issue is the fate of the so-called ³Chongqing
Model² associated with Bo, particularly the large-scale resuscitation of
Maoist values and culture that is symbolized by the popular ³singing red
songs² (changhong) campaign. Since the Wang Lijun saga, however, the
mainstream media has been replete with commentaries advocating ideological
and political liberalization. Particularly given that other pedigreed
cadres such as Vice President Xi Jinping also have taken part in the
changhong movement, are these pro-reformist articles yet another weapon
used by President Hu and his associates to lay into the Gang of
Princelings (Apple Daily [Hong Kong] February 27; Associated Press,
February 15)? Are there also possibilities that the recent outburst of
reformist sentiments will persist beyond the 18th CCP Congress?

Bad blood between the Hu-led Communist Youth League (CYL) faction and the
so-called Gang of Princelings goes back a long way. At the 17th Party
Congress in 2007, Hu¹s original plan of anointing Vice Premier Li
Keqiang‹a former CYL Party Secretary‹as his own successor was foiled by an
apparent collusion between the Gang of Princelings and the Shanghai
Faction, many of whom are also high-born officials. As a result of this
unexpected development, the 58-year-old Xi, son of the late Vice Premier
Xi Zhongxun, was confirmed ³crown prince² at the conclave. (See ³Xi
Jinping: China¹s Conservative Strongman-in-Waiting,² China Brief,
September 2, 2011). It is also well-known that Hu does not approve of the
changhong shenanigans in Chongqing. The general secretary has not visited
Chongqing since Bo¹s appointment as the party secretary of the western
metropolis in late 2007. That Hu had a hand in bringing down Wang‹and in
the process crippling Bo¹s promotion prospects‹was attested to by reports
in Beijing that last year the party General Secretary asked the Central
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) to investigate
corruption-related offences allegedly committed by Wang and his colleagues
when the latter served as a top police official in Tieling municipality
from 1995 to 2003. In January, Gu Fengjie, Wang¹s successor as Tieling
police chief, was sentenced to 12 years in jail on graft-related charges.
CCDI agents began questioning Wang himself early this year (Radio Free
Asia, February 14; Ming Pao, February 11). Moreover, Wang¹s replacement as
Chongqing Police Chief is 42-year-old Guan Haixiang. While Guan spent 15
years in the CYL¹s regional and central offices, he has no experience in
police or political-legal system (zhengfa xitong) work whatsoever (Apple
Daily [Hong Kong], February 24; China News Service, February 18; Financial
Times, February 8).

That Bo is now out of the running for the PBSC has afforded Hu an
opportunity to revise the ³tripartite division of the spoils² formula that
the CCP¹s disparate factions had been arrived at late last year. Under
this scheme, the CYL Faction and the Gang of Princelings would each get
three PBSC seats, with the remaining three positions to be allotted to
representatives from other cliques. It is understood that Hu wants the
slot for which Bo was once deemed a shoo-in to go either to a CYL Faction
member or a cadre with no obvious political affiliations. Before the Wang
Lijun scandal, heavyweight CYL Faction candidates for the PBSC included
Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang, Director of the CCP Organization
Department Li Yuanchao and Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, while the
three front-running princelings were Xi Jinping, Vice Premier Wang Qishan
and Bo Xilai. One possibility is that Hu may insinuate Inner Mongolia
Party Secretary Hu Chunhua, age 48, into the PBSC. A top member of the
Six-Generation leadership‹a reference to cadres born in the 1960s‹Hu, who
is not related to the president, is also a former party secretary of the
CYL (Bloomberg, February 14; Deutsche Welle [Berlin] February 8; Apple
Daily, October 15, 2011). However, it also is possible that the position
may be awarded to Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu. While Meng
lacks Politburo status, he has won the top leadership¹s praise for
cracking down hard on dissidents as well as ³splittists² in the Tibet and
Xinjiang regions (See, ³Security Chief¹s Efforts to Seal Up the
Political-Legal Chairmanship,² China Brief, February 21).

Of perhaps larger significance is the blow that the Wang scandal has dealt
the so-called Chongqing Model, which became famous due to the city¹s
efficacy in nabbing hardcore criminals and in revitalizing Maoist norms.
It is instructive that in a mid-February meeting of the Chongqing
municipal party committee, Bo heaped high praise on the ³contributions
that the scientific outlook on development has made to Chongqing¹s
developmemt.² The ³scientific outlook on development² is considered to be
President Hu and Premier Wen¹s most important contribution to
Communist-Chinese statecraft since they came to power in late 2002. It was
the first time that Bo, who usually preferred to dwell on his own
political and economic programs, had so lavishly eulogized the pet slogan
of the Hu-Wen leadership (South China Morning Post [Hong Kong], February
15; Chongqing Daily, February 13).

That Wang Lijun, the ³anti-triad national hero² is himself under
investigation for graft-related charges has undermined the entire
law-enforcement mechanism in Chongqing. Li Zhuang, a highly respected
lawyer who was briefly imprisoned in Chongqing for allegedly using illegal
means to defend one of the traid bosses arrested by Wang, told the Hong
Kong media that ³the Chongqing model is problematic because the city¹s
leaders do not follow the rule of law.² Yang Fan, a renowned ³New Left²
scholar who is co-author of the book The Chongqing Model, indicated in his
blog last week that he might have to reappraise the ³Chongqing way of
doing things.² Referring to the Wang case, Yang wrote ³since a big scandal
has hit Chongqing, it is imperative that we take a second look at the
Chongqing Model² (Cable TV News, Hong Kong, February 23; Yang Fan¹s Blog,
February 22; Sidney Morning Herald, February 11).

Bo¹s even more controversial crypto-Maoist campaign, which is symbolized
by the thousands of changhong concerts that have been held across China in
the past couple of years, probably is also against the ropes. The keen
advocate for political reform, Premier Wen, has criticized certain cadres¹
nostalgia for the Maoist era, stating, for example, last year ³A major
obstacle to reform is the remnant poison of the Cultural Revolution²
(Southern Metropolitan News, May 4, 2011; Ming Pao, April 28, 2011). It is
therefore probably not accidental that in the fortnight or so after Wang
Lijun sought refuge in the American Consulate in Chengdu, a rash of
reformist-oriented pieces has appeared in the official Beijing media. Last
Tuesday, the People¹s Daily ran a commentary entitled ³While reform
carries risk, abandoning reform will bring jeopardy to the party.² Wu
Jinglian, one of China¹s most famous liberal economists, wrote ³China is
at a new crossroads² and ³Above all, we must be careful not to go back to
the old road.² It is significant that a number of these articles cited
³vested interest blocs² as the most daunting impediment to reform. For
example, Sun Jian, a researcher at the party journal Seeking Truth, wrote
³we must not allow interest groups to block reform.² Finally, He Chuiyun,
a commentator for the China Business Times, pointed out that ³unless we
have the determination and courage to reform ourselves, it will be
difficult for us to break up the configuration of interest [groups] in the
country² (Chinese Economy Net [Beijing], February 26; People¹s Daily,
February 23; Global Times, February 17, February 13).

Given that the Gang of Princelings is perhaps the most well-known
³interest bloc² in China, there is a possibility that Hu and Wen are using
these liberalization-minded articles to cast indirect aspersions at the
sons and daughters of privilege for political advantage. At the very
least, Vice President Xi, who enthusiastically endorsed Bo¹s changhong
movement during a visit to Chongqing in early 2010, may be in the line of
fire. Almost as much as Bo, Xi has the past few years underscored the
imperative of heeding the Great Helmsman¹s instructions. For example, at
the opening of a Central Party School (CPS) semester last year, Xi, who is
also CPS President, urged his students to ³pay attention to the Marxist
canon,² especially Mao¹s classic writings. ³Cadres must seriously study
Marxist theory to ensure that they can maintain political resoluteness,²
he said. Xi added that since Marxist classics were voluminous, ³we should
focus on the salient points, and concentrate on studying the
quintessence‹particularly the important works of Mao Zedong² (China News
Service, May 15, 2011; People¹s Daily, May 14, 2011).

Before the Wang Lijun episode erupted, a number of illustrious party
liberals such as Hu Deping, the son of the liberal party chief Hu Yaobang,
had tried to resuscitate ideological and political reform through holding
a series of salons and seminars (See, ³China¹s Remnant Liberals Keep Flame
of Liberalization Alive,² China Brief, February 3). The theoretical
possibility exists that the dominant CYL Faction might seek the help of
these remnant liberals in consolidating their grip on post-18th Congress
elite politics. It is, however, instructive to note that the powers that
be in Zhongnanhai have a long tradition of using radical reformists and
genuine liberals as pawns in political intrigues ­ and then abandoning
them once the power struggle is over. A classic example is what took place
in 1979 and 1980, when Deng Xiaoping encouraged dissidents such as Wei
Jingsheng to attack the party¹s unrepentant followers of Chairman Mao.
Once he has been ensconced in power, however, Deng closed down the
Democracy Wall and threw Wei and a number of his close comrades into jail.
Irrespective of the outcome of the on-going contention between the CYL
Faction and the Gang of Princelings, the chances that the tattered threads
of political liberalization may be picked up again seem abysmally low.