MCLC: Chongqing model

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: Kevin Carrico <carricok at stanford.edu>
Subject: Chongqing model
***********************************************************

Having visited Chongqing during Bo's reign, I found myself puzzled at the
celebration of a unique "Chongqing model." Three years later, this article
by Mo Zhixu seems to sum up the much discussed Chongqing experience quite
well.

Kevin

==========================================================

Source: China Change (9/30/13):
http://chinachange.org/2013/09/30/bo-xilai-might-be-done-with-but-chongqing
-model-lives-on/

Bo Xilai Might Be Done with but Chongqing Model Lives on
By Mo Zhixu

On Sunday, September 22, 2013, Jinan Intermediate Court sentenced Bo Xilai
to life imprisonment while stripping him of his political rights for life.
As such, the incident begun by Wang Lijun (王立军) entering the US Consulate
in Chengdu on February 6, 2012, has come to an end nineteen months later.
However, the political debate, sparked by Bo Xilai’s “singing red and
striking black” campaign in Chongqing from 2007 to his fall, continues.

When Bo Xilai was elected a member of the CCP Political Bureau during the
17th CCP Congress, he was in effect excluded from the future lineup for
top leadership of the party and the country. He was not appointed to be
one of the deputy prime ministers of the State Council as he had desired;
he wasn’t even appointed the party secretary of a more important area such
as Shanghai or Guangdong. Instead, he was sent to Chongqing to replace
Wang Yang, while Wang Yang was appointed to be the party secretary of
Guangdong province. For Bo Xilai, proud and ambitious, it was no doubt a
humiliation.

The political practices he introduced in Chongqing, in my opinion, were
not about vying for a top leadership position in Beijing but an act of
resentment meant to showcase his unique political ideas and his personal
charisma.

But a close look at Bo Xilai’s work in Chongqing, especially in the highly
controversial “singing red and striking black” campaign, one will find
that, the so-called Chongqing Model is in keeping with the “China Model”
initiated by Deng Xiaoping: use two hands and keep both strong. In terms
of developing the economy on the one hand and maintaining stability on the
other, Chongqing under Bo Xilai was not really any different from anywhere
else in China, nor was the conduct there more egregious than anywhere
else. Liberals in China made loud complaints about many incidents in
Chongqing, such as the crackdown on private entrepreneurs (striking black)
and many gratuitous re-education-through-labor cases. But keep in mind
that the nation-wide clampdown during the so-called “Jasmine Revolution”
in 2011 against dissidents and activists was just as harsh, if not worse,
whether in terms of legal abuses or the extent of torture. Chongqing Model
was at most an alternative version of the stability-maintenance system,
not something different.

Similarly, “singing red” was not a return to the orthodox Maoism as the
Maoists on the left had fancied, nor was it a revival of the Cultural
Revolution as the reformists had worried. It was merely a red surface. The
ideological mobilizations in relation to “singing red” was done level by
level in the structure of the system, and it didn’t “kick out the Party
committees and stage a revolution” as was the case during the Cultural
Revolution. Chongqing didn’t stir up any social turmoil during the
“singing red” period. On the contrary, it was rather oppressive as though
under a tight lid.

Nationwide, from “Five Nos” (五不搞, “no multi-party election, no
diversification of guiding principles, no separation of powers, no federal
system, and no privatization”) avowed in the 2011 NPC session by then
chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Wu Bangguo  around the period as
“singing red” in Chongqing, to the “seven no mentions” earlier this year,
and to the ongoing anti-constitutionalism propaganda campaign, none is a
mass mobilization in the style of the Cultural Revolution. Instead, they
are an attempt to give ideological fuel to the rigid, hardline stability
maintenance apparatus. In the end, these too are just skins.

Precisely because the Chongqing Model was highly isomorphic to Deng
Xiaoping’s “China Model,” during the four years of its practice, it had
never been criticized by the top leadership. Instead, it received many
endorsements. Several members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo,
including Xi Jinping, visited Chongqing to show support for the “striking
black” campaign and other actions. As for “singing red,” it has since
spread to more places and is very much alive today.

On the other hand, Bo Xilai’s outlandish gig in Chongqing indeed
exasperated the central leadership, especially Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao,
sowing the seeds for future punishment. But such irritation was more
towards Bo Xilai’s personal style, not a political disagreement. Precisely
because of their political sameness, the trial of Bo Xilai completely
avoided anything having to do with the “singing red and striking black”
campaign. It was not a political trial against the Chongqing model. It was
merely a procedure to drive Bo Xilai out of the political arena once for
all.  

Bo Xilai may have been done over, but the incubator of the Chongqing model
is very much alive. The political choices unfolding right now are nothing
but a brother of the Chongqing model born by the same mother: on the one
hand, both stick to the maintenance of overpowering authoritarianism; on
the other, both are keen on keeping up economic development. Bo Xilai
expressed this Deng Xiaoping doctrine rather nakedly in “singing red and
striking black” whereas Xi Jinping affirms it indirectly with his
statement that “We cannot negate the history of the decades before the
reform and opening-up with that of the decades since the reform and
opening-up, nor can we negate the history of the decades since the reform
and opening-up with that of the decades before the reform and opening-up.”
Xi Jinping, and Bo Xilai before him, are seeking to integrate Mao Zedong’s
dictatorship and Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up.

Even though Bo Xilai’s political career is over, as long as the China
Model, which he has attempted to mark with a personal signature, continues
to live, similar thinking and practices will continue to exist and even
flourish without Bo Xilai.


Mo Zhixu (莫之许), pen name of Zhao Hui (赵晖), is a Beijing-based Chinese
dissident intellectual and a frequent contributor of Chinese-language
publications known for his incisive views of Chinese politics and
opposition. He is the co-author of “China at the Tipping Point?
Authoritarianism and Contestation” in the January, 2013, issue of Journal
of Democracy.

(Translation by ChinaChange.org)

Original source: http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130923/18434542

薄熙來完了　重慶模式還活着
（內地獨立評論人　莫之許）

一年半之後，濟南中級人民法院判處薄熙來無期徒刑，剝奪政治權利終身。這個自2012
年2月6日王立軍進入美國駐成都總領事館引發的風波，自此畫上句點。但自
2007年薄熙來入主重慶以來因「唱紅打黑」所帶來的政治爭論，卻仍在繼續。

2007年中共十七大上，薄熙來當選政治局委員，事實上被排除了日後進入最高領導職務的
序列，不僅並未獲任其意中的國務院副總理，甚至也未獲任諸如上海、廣東等
更為重要地區的一把手，而是赴重慶接任市委書記，汪洋則離開重慶接任廣東省委書記，對
於心高氣傲的薄而言，這不啻是一種羞辱。基於此，其在重慶所展開的獨具一格
的施政實踐，與其說是企圖染指最高權力的圖謀，不如說是負氣之舉，刻意展現自己的獨特
施政理念和個人魅力。

但是，仔細分析其施政實踐，尤其是具有高度爭議的「唱紅打黑」等內容，就會發現，所謂
重慶模式，其實仍是鄧小平一手開創的「中國模式」，依舊堅持所謂的兩手抓、
兩手硬。在一手發展經濟、一手維持穩定上面，重慶與全國任何地方並無本質區別，也沒
有特別突出的惡劣之舉。自由派刻意放大重慶在打黑和任意勞教的許多舉動，但是
別忘了，2011年針對所謂「茉莉花革命」的全國性打壓行動，無論在超越法制還是任意嚴
酷方面，都有過之而無不及，這表明，重慶模式最多也就是維穩體制的一個另
類版本，而並未超出其範圍。

同樣，所謂唱紅，既不是毛左派臆想的回歸毛式正統路線，也不是改革派所擔憂的那樣文革
重來，而只是一層紅色表皮。所有與唱紅相關的意識形態舉動，都是沿着體制的
軌道層層動員，而不是如同文革那樣「踢開黨委鬧革命」，在其唱紅期間，重慶並未出現如
同文革似的社會動盪，相反，卻在某種意識形態高壓下，顯得更加沉悶壓抑。這
表明，唱紅與同時期的「五不搞」，以及最近的「七不講」、反憲政一樣，與其說是文革式
的群眾運動，不如說是體制本位的運動群眾，試圖為僵化強硬的維穩路線增添意
識形態動力，而最終，也是淪為一種塗抹而已。

正因為重慶模式與鄧小平式「中國模式」的高度同構，在其推行的四年多時間裏，並沒有
遭到來自最高層的非議，相反，卻得到了相當多的背書，包括習近平在內的多位政
治局常委都親臨重慶，對打黑以及其他動作表示支持，唱紅之類甚至廣為流傳到了更多的
地方，直到今天。

當然，薄熙來在重慶的另類表演，確實令當時的最高層尤其是胡、溫有所不滿，埋下了其最
終被清算的伏筆，然而，這種不滿更多是一種針對個人的厭惡，而不是政治性的
分歧。也正是由於路線上的同構，針對薄熙來的審判完全迴避了「唱紅打黑」等內容，並
非一場針對重慶路線或模式的政治審判，而不過是一道將薄熙來個人徹底趕出政治
舞台的手續。

薄熙來已矣，但所謂重慶模式的母體還活着。當下正在展開的政治路線，與所謂的重慶模
式更像是一奶雙胞，一方面，都堅持專政的壓倒性存在；一方面，都堅持發展經
濟，在薄熙來那裏，這通過「唱紅打黑」赤裸裸地表示；而在習近平那裏，則通過「兩個互
不否定」*曲折地加以肯定，總括而言，都是將毛澤東的專政與鄧小平的改革開
放加以融合。因此，儘管薄熙來本人的政治生命已經結束，但只要其試圖注入其個人特點
的「中國模式」還繼續存在，沒有薄熙來，類似薄熙來的路線也必將改頭換面繼續
存在，甚至發揚光大。

*編者按：即「不能用改革開放後的歷史時期否定改革開放前的歷史時期，也不能用改革開
放前的歷史時期否定改革開放後的歷史時期」。

莫之許
內地獨立評論人
--
Kevin Carrico
Postdoctoral Fellow
Center for East Asian Studies
Stanford University
521 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Email: carricok at stanford.edu
http://stanford.academia.edu/KevinCarrico