MCLC: Wang Yang, torchbearer of reform

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: kirk (denton.2 at osu.edu)
Subject: Wang Yang, torchbearer of reform
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Source: China Brief vol. 12, no. 11 (Jamestown Foundation):
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=39421&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=52a5efcd81f2d80da6f871e7ac7faec5

Wang Yang: The Future Torchbearer of Reform?
By: Willy Lam

With the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress a mere six months or
so away, the identity of senior cadres who will make the Politburo
Standing Committee (PBSC) has pretty much been settled. Apart from Vice
President Xi Jinping and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang—who are deemed
shoo-ins for the posts of general secretary and premier,
respectively—seven of the following eight current ordinary Politburo
members are tipped for elevation to the inner sanctum of power: Vice
Premiers Wang Qishan and Zhang Dejiang; Director of the Organization
Department Li Yuanchao; the Guangdong, Tianjin and Shanghai Party
Secretaries, respectively, Wang Yang, Zhang Gaoli and Yu Zhengsheng;
Director of the Propaganda Department Liu Yushan; and State Councilor Liu
Yandong (Ming Pao (Hong Kong), April 18; New York Times, May 17; Asia
Times, May 11). Of these ten cadres, Wang Yang, age 57, is the only one
who the past few years has consistently spoken out in favor of
reform—including some degree of political liberalization. The question on
the minds of China observers is whether Wang can pick up the threads of
political reform in his capacity as the leader of the much-attenuated
group of liberals within the CCP and among the nation’s intelligentsia.

Wang’s reformist track record has been thrown into sharp relief by the
downfall of former Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai, who engineered what
is considered the most ferocious Maoist political movement since the end
of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Much has been written about the
contrast between the crypto-Maoist, egalitarian and paternalistic approach
that the Chongqing leadership has taken in economic and political matters
on the one hand, and the pro-market, transparent and relatively liberal
policies in Guangdong on the other. While there is no evidence to suggest
Wang played a role in Bo’s disgrace, there seems little doubt that the
“Guangdong Model” has gained a lot more respectability at the expense of
the largely discredited “Chongqing Model” (Apple Daily [Hong Kong], May
19; Ming Pao, May 18; Straits Times [Singapore], May 17).

Since Wang, a former party secretary of Chongqing, assumed his current
post in late 2007, he has shared the limelight with Premier Wen Jiabao—who
is also a harsh critic of Bo—as one of only a handful of avid proponents
of political reform in the CCP’s upper echelons. There is, however, a
striking difference between Wen and Wang, whose nickname is “Young
Marshal.” The premier is given to voicing grand principles. He likes to
repeat famous dictums delivered by late patriarch Deng Xiaoping, such as
“without reform, there is only the road to perdition” and “political
reform must be implemented in lockstep with economic reform” (“Premier
Wen’s ‘Southern Tour’: Ideological Rifts in the CCP?” China Brief,
September 10, 2010). Yet the soon-to-retire Wen has failed to lay down
specific road maps for attaining liberalization. Wang, on the other hand,
has gone in considerably more depth regarding both the theory and practice
of reform.

More so that Premier Wen, Wang has put the emphasis on the masses’
participation in the political process. In a much-noted speech earlier
this month, Wang told Guangdong cadres that “we must shake off the wrong
idea that the people owe their welfare and happiness to some dispensation
from the party and government.” Wang added “We must safeguard the
initiative and creativity of the masses” (Xinhua, May 11; China News
Service, May 9). Moreover, the native of AnhuiProvince has given a
convincing explanation as to why it has become more difficult than ever to
resuscitate reform. Wang told Chinese and foreign reporters at the
National People’s Congress this spring, “At the early stage of reform, the
obstacles [to reform] were mainly due to ideological differences. Now, the
major problems faced by reform come from the configuration of interest
[groups at the top].” This tallies with the commonly held perception that
big clans and power blocs in the party—which control trillions of yuan in
assets—are opposed to political reform for fear that their monopoly on
wealth may be dented. Wang’s proposal for cracking this problem was bold:
“To solve the problem of vested interest groups holding up reform, we must
first perform surgery on the party and the government” (Ming Pao, May 10;
New Beijing Post, March 6).

Wang’s most notable contribution to liberalizing the political system is
his unorthodox handling of the Wukan Village crisis of late 2011. Early
last December, close to 20,000 peasants in Wukan, which is located in
southern Guangdong, threw out their local CCP cadres and set up their own
administration. The allegedly corrupt officials were accused of illegally
selling the villagers’ land to a Hong Kong developer without giving the
farmers adequate compensation. At first, the authorities surrounded the
village with thousands of police and People’s Armed Police. Wang, however,
decided to recognize the villagers’ rights and not to penalize the “rebel
leaders.” New elections were held in January this year and Lin Zulian, the
brains behind the “peasant insurrection,” was chosen as the new head of
Wukan. The initial land sale was nullified and several responsible
officials were detained on corruption charges (Ming Pao, January 16; Wall
Street Journal, January 15; Caixin, December 19, 2011).

Wang, who obviously wants to claim credit for having come up with a more
humane approach to the CCP’s foremost task of wei-wen (preserving
stability), has indicated that the “Wukan Model” will be applied to the
rest of the province. “The Wukan [Model] was not only meant to solve
problems in the village, but also to set a reference standard to reform
village governance across Guangdong,” he told the Chinese media. Wang
added “People’s democratic awareness is increasing significantly in this
changing society,” and “When their appeals for rights aren't getting
enough attention, that’s when mass incidents happen” (South China Morning
Post, January 5; China News Service, January 3). Not all problems in Wukan
have been solved. For example, only a small portion of the illegally
expropriated land has been returned to the peasants. A number of liberal
scholars, however, have pushed for the nationwide application of the
“Wukan Model.” “The Wukan experience has pushed forward the
democratization of farmers’ participation in village administration,” said
Beijing University social scientist Li Chengyan, “This successful example
of democratic self-rule at the grassroots level should be duplicated
elsewhere in China” (Sina.com, March 16; Phoenix TV [Hong Kong], March 15).

Guangdong also is ahead of most other provinces and major cities in
implementing “intra-party democracy.” Together with Jiangsu Province,
Guangdong has been a pioneer in the relatively open way in which
medium-ranked to relatively senior cadres are selected. Candidates for
positions up to the level of vice directors of provincial departments have
to pass a public-opinion test; short-listed candidates also must engage in
public debates that are sometimes broadcast on local television (The
Economist, November 26, 2011; Xinhua, November 23, 2010; SzNews.com
[Shenzhen], October 14, 2010). At the Guangdong Party Congress held early
this month, the Standing Committee members of the Guangdong Party
Committee were chosen through cha’e or competitive elections. Thus, the
906 congress delegates cast secret ballots to pick the 13 top
office-bearers out of 14 short-listed candidates. In the past, such senior
cadres in Guangdong as well as other regions were “elected” through deng’e
or non-competitive elections. (Xinhua, May 6;Nanfang Daily, May 6).

Equally significantly, “Young Marshal” Wang has allowed a civil society
with Chinese characteristics to play a relatively big role in provincial
affairs. Guangdong leads the country in the latitude that is granted
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to operate in areas, such as social
welfare and environmental protection. This follows Wang’s idea that his
administration should make the switch from “all-embracing governance” to
“limited governance.” He pointed out that social organizations and NGOs
should be allowed to “handle some areas of social management and social
services” (China Youth Daily, January 18; China News Service, July 12,
2011). Last year, Wang instructed the Guangdong Civil Affairs Department
and other units to simplify procedures for the registration of NGOs and
other minjian, or “people-sector.” organizations. According to public
administration Professor Hu Huihua in Guangzhou-based Jinan University,
Guangdong officials in charge of NGOs “have an open attitude” toward
non-governmental associations. “The future direction is clear,” he noted,
“The Guangdong government seems set to give more powers to minjian organs”
(Southern Metropolitan News [Guangzhou] May 3; People’s Daily, January 13).

Guangdong also has chalked up a reputation for a relatively high tolerance
for media criticism of the party and government. Such well-known
publications asSouthern Weekend and Southern Metropolitan News have won
praise for their daring treatment of controversial political figures and
topics. For example, these two papers have run articles about dissidents
and officially-censured public intellectuals ranging from rebel artist Ai
Weiwei to avant-garde journalist Li Datong (Sina.com, March 20; Southern
Weekend, March 8). Wang has often urged reporters to “give voice to the
masses.” Last month, the party chief raised eyebrows when he noted that he
would provide plainclothes police to protect journalists who did
muck-raking stories on fake and pirated products in the province (Wen Wei
Po [Hong Kong], May 8; Nanfang Daily, May 7).

Not long after Wang took up his post as Guangdong’s party chief in late
2007, he caused a stir by calling upon the nation’s cadres and
intellectuals to initiate the CCP’s “third wave of thought liberation.”
The first wave of thought liberation was a reference to Deng Xiaoping’s
dismantling of the Maoist “whateverism” (“whatever Mao Zedong said is
correct”) and the second wave consisted in Deng’s dictums on the
resumption of economic liberalization, which were given during his 1992
tour of southern China. The “third wave” referred to a judicious mixture
of economic as well as political reform (Sina.com, April 12, 2008; China
Newsweek [Beijing], April 11, 2008). It is apparent, however, that Wang
has in his four-and-half-year tenure only accomplished a small part of his
agenda. Take for example, popular participation in politics through
grassroots elections. When polls were held last summer to pick deputies to
town- and township-level people’s congresses—as well as district-level
parliaments in the cities—so-called independent candidates in Guangdong
were stripped of their eligibility to take part in the elections. This was
despite well-understood regulations that any Chinese citizen can run as
non-affiliated candidates after he or she has gathered signatures from 50
members of the relevant constituency (Chinaelections.org, August 7, 2011;
Radio Free Asia, May 27, 2011). Similar instances of the deprivation of
the electoral rights of independent candidates—which was implemented in an
apparent attempt to foster political stability—took place throughout China
(“Local Elections Open for All but the Independent Candidates,” China
Brief, September 16, 2011).

The crackdown on independent candidates shows even someone apparently as
reform-minded as Wang has had to make concessions to the wei-wen
imperative, and this has included taking a more direct hand in managing
Guangdong’s aggressive and courageous journalists. One recent indication
of this eroding press freedom is that a career commissar, the Deputy
Director of the Guangdong Propaganda Department Yang Jian, was named
earlier this month the party secretary of the Nanfang Daily Media Group,
which controls Southern Weekend and other outspoken Guangdong papers. Yang
replaced Yang Xingfeng, who began his journalistic career as a reporter at
Nanfang Daily in 1982 (Caixin.com [Beijing], May 3). Similarly, Chen
Zhong, the liberal chief editor of Guangzhou-based Nanfeng Chuang (“Window
of Southerly Wind”), a respected muck-raking journal, was replaced last
year by Zhou Chenghua, a propaganda cadre known for his rigorous
censorship (Sina.com, November 29, 2011; Radio Free Asia, August 19,
2011). These developments broke with the long-standing Guangdong media
tradition of naming former journalists and not commissars to positions of
news executives.

A keen concern of those interested in the future of reform not only in
Guangdong but nationwide is the extent to which Wang can persevere with
his taboo-smashing crusade after his expected promotion to the PBSC at the
18th Party Congress. “Much hinges on the portfolio that Wang will secure
after his entry to the PBSC,” said Beijing-based social scientist Liu
Junning, who previously worked at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
as a political scientist. Liu said “If Wang is in charge of areas not
having to do with ideology or party affairs, he may lack the clout to do
much about political reform” [1]. After all, such has been the case of
Premier Wen—who has authority over the economy, but not much else.
“Grandpa Wen” has often been criticized for merely talking about
liberalization—but without any follow-up action. Moreover, moves on
weighty issues—such as the direction of economic or political
reform—require a consensual decision by the entire PBSC. Yet the great
majority of the likely new PBSC members, including “crown prince” Xi
Jinping, are known as defenders of the status quo rather than risk-takers.
If, as is likely, the post-18th Party Congress PBSC will continue to take
wei-wen as the party’s overriding task, the chances of the nationwide
application of the reforms that Wang has so painstaking eked out in
Guangdong may be relatively slim.

Notes:

1. Author’s Interview with Liu Junning, May 2012.