MCLC: criticism on social media

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: anne henochowicz (annemh at alumni.upenn.edu)
Subject: criticism on social media
***********************************************************

Source: Tea Leaf Nation (6/6/12):
http://tealeafnation.com/2012/06/harvard-researchers-you-really-can-critici
ze-the-government-on-chinas-social-media/

Harvard Researchers: Yes, You Really Can Criticize the Government on
China’s Social Media
By David Wertime

The ivory tower has turned its attention to Chinese social media. Harvard
Professor Gary King and Harvard PhD candidates Jennifer Pan and Margaret
Roberts (along with many others) have just released a fascinating new
study, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences
Collective Expression.” A 33-page PDF of the study can be found here
<http://gking.harvard.edu/gking/files/censored.pdf>.

As academic papers go, this one is surprisingly readable, offering one
very important insight into censorship in Chinese social media. Here’s the
money line:

“Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic,
criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely
to be censored. Instead, we show that the censorship program is aimed at
curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent,
reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content.”

To put their conclusion even more simply: Chinese netizens can criticize
the government all they want, and they won’t be censored for that reason
alone. What gets the censors’ attention is anything which looks like it
may actually mobilize netizens to take action in the real world, because
the government’s most important objective to is to maintain social
stability.

How did the authors reach this conclusion? They looked at topics which set
the blogosphere ablaze, creating what they call “volume bursts” of tweets.
It turns out that these volume bursts, which, the authors theorize, make
real-world collective action more likely, were where censorship mostly
occurred. It didn’t matter if the hot topic was not overtly political; for
example, the government heavily censored tweets about a 2011 rumor that
iodized salt could protect against Fukushima radiation wafting across the
sea.

And the tweets censored were equally likely to be “(1) against the state,
(2) for the state, or (3) irrelevant or factual reports about the events.”
The only topics regularly censored without “volume bursts” were
pornography and criticism of the (apparently thin-skinned) censors.

And what about criticisms of the powers that be? The authors write,
“Negative posts do not accidentally slip through a leaky or imperfect
system. The evidence indicates that the censors have no intention of
stopping them. Instead, they are focused on removing posts that have
collective action potential, regardless of whether or not they cast the
Chinese leadership and their policies in a favorable light.” Wow.

To be sure, the Chinese Internet’s use as a “steam valve” instead of a
true organizing ground is depressing to many observers. Then again, it’s a
far sight better than a Chinese Internet in which all free expression is
quashed–and as Tea Leaf Nation has always believed, such a blogosphere,
even a censored one, provides a valuable window into what Chinese people
are really thinking.

King, et al’s paper goes on to make a few other very interesting points.
Although we obviously cannot vouch for the academic and statistical rigor
of their conclusions, many of them square with our own experience as
Chinese social media watchers:

Social media chatter is a valuable resource that stands on its own: “In
the past, studies of Internet behavior were judged based on how well their
measures approximated ‘real world’ behavior; subsequently, online behavior
has become such a large and important part of human life that the
expressions observed in social media is now important in its own right,
regardless of whether it is a good measure of non-Internet freedoms and
behaviors.”

Social media chatter really is a good way to learn about public opinion:
“So long as collective action is prevented, social media can be an
excellent way to learn the views of the citizenry about specific public
policies and experiences with the government and public officials.”

Censorship is impressively efficient: Among those topics studied, “the
vast majority of censorship activity occurs within 24 hours of the
original posting, although a few deletions occur as long as five days
later. This is a stunning organizational accomplishment, requiring large
scale military-like precision.”

China’s censors often say they are censoring partly to go after “dirty”
content. That’s mostly true: “Similar to American politicians who talk
about pornography as undercutting the ‘moral fiber’ of the country, Chinese
leaders describe it as violating public morality and damaging the health
of young people, as well as promoting disorder and chaos; regardless,
censorship in one form or another is often the consequence.”

Then, there are a few conclusions and speculations that don’t sound quite
as convincing, but are certainly interesting and provocative:

Censorship hurts China’s economy: The authors speculate in their
concluding remarks that “censorship may also have major long term
depressive effects on the Chinese economy. That is, modern economies rely
on a form of ‘generalized trust’ and social capital, where people do not
have to spend large amounts of time and effort verifying the
trustworthiness of others before conducting business. In economies where
such trust exists, transaction costs are much lower, allowing for more
economic growth.” But is “social trust” between business partners and
neighbors the same as between strangers on the Internet? A more compelling
argument recently discussed by James Fallows of the Atlantic
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/is-chinas-interne
t-actually-slow-and-does-that-matter/257743/> and Stan Abrams of China
Hearsay 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/is-chinas-interne
t-actually-slow-and-does-that-matter/257743/> is whether the languorous
speed of China’s Internet undercuts its growth.

China’s leaders don’t care about looking bad, as long as they keep their
power: “The evidence suggests that when the leadership allowed social
media to flourish in the country, they also allowed the full range of
expression of negative and positive comments about the state, its
policies, and its leaders. As a result, government policies sometimes look
as bad and leaders can be as embarrassed as is often the case with elected
politicians in democratic countries, but, as they seem to recognize,
looking bad does not threaten their hold on power so long as they manage
to eliminate discussions with collective action potential.” Somehow, it’s
hard to believe that the absolute “full range” of comments about elected
officials is allowed.

Dear readers, do any of these argument strike you as particularly on the
mark? Or particularly silly and unbelievable? Feel free to hold forth in
the comments below.