MCLC: Xi's rectification campaign

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: kirk (denton.2 at osu.edu)
Subject: Xi's rectification campaign
***********************************************************

Source: China Brief, Jamestown Foundation vol. 13, no. 14 (7/12/13):
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=41118&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=dd1f6afd64be471c16631a4104c6b302#.Ue
CFQ2TwJgJ

Rectification Campaign to Boost Cadres with ³Red DNA²
By: Willy Lam

President Xi Jinping has given the clearest indication to date of his
political orientation and policy preferences by launching a Maoist-style
rectification campaign to ³thoroughly clean up the work style² of the
Chinese Communist Party¹s (CCP) 85 million members. In the coming year,
officials in civilian and military departments who fail to rid themselves
of the undesirable traits of ³formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and
extravagance² will be penalized or even removed from the party. The
year-long rectification (zhengfeng) exercise, formally called a ³Campaign
on Mass Line Education and Practice² is the largest-scale purge launched
by the CCP leadership since the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966­76)
(People¹s Daily (June 19); Ming Pao [Hong Kong], June 19; China Times
[Taipei], June 19). Additionally, a companion ³thought education² movement
³to boost grassroots-level cultural construction in the military forces²
is being launched within the People¹s Liberation Army (PLA) and the
People¹s Armed Police. Regulations promulgated by the four PLA general
departments last month urged officers to ³nurture the core values of the
contemporary revolutionary soldier² by ³doing a better job in educating,
nurturing and molding [the character of military personnel]² (Xinhua, June
2; PLA Daily, June 2).

In language that is reminiscent of the Great Helmsman¹s masterly blend of
the vernacular and the metaphysical, Xi urged cadres and party members to
³purify themselves, and [work on] self-perfection, self-reformation and
self-elevation.² ³We must closely rely on the people and fully mobilize
the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the broad masses,² he said in
the nationally-televised speech on June 18 that formally opened the
zhengfeng crusade. ³We must look in the mirror, tidy our attire, take a
bath and cure our sickness,² added Xi, who is also CCP General Secretary
and Chairman of the policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC). In a
commentary on the zhengfeng crusade, Xinhua pointed out that the Mao-style
purge would serve the purpose of ³bolstering the cohesiveness of the
hearts of the party and people and consolidating the blood-and-flesh ties
between the party and the people² (Xinhua, June 20; People¹s Daily, June
20).

Given that the campaign will run for at least 12 months, it is premature
to assess whether it will live up to the billing of winnowing out bad
sheep who are responsible for the alarming deterioration of cadres¹
morality and competence. It is significant, however, that, in the
footsteps of the Great Helmsman, Xi is resorting to Cultural
Revolution-era ideological and propaganda campaigns to change of mindset
of cadres rather than establishing institutions such as universal-style
checks and balances. As legal expert Guo Wenjing pointed out in a
commentary in the official Legal Daily, ³critical to the success [of
zhengfeng] is establishing solid institutions.² Guo cited late patriarch
Deng Xiaoping¹s famous dictum about ³the decisive role of institutions,²
namely, that ³bad people cannot do evil within a good system, whereas it
is possible for good people to do bad things within an evil system.²
Similarly, U.S.-based dissident scholar He Qinglian, who specializes in
party history and institutions, faulted Xi for ³going after pleasing
appearances rather than doing solid work.² ³The rectification exercise is
itself a manifestation of formalism and bureaucracy,² she said, ³what the
CCP needs is reform of political systems² (Legal Daily, June 20; Voice of
America, June 19).

In his speeches relating to the zhengfeng movement, Xi surprisingly has
shied away from concrete measures to eradicate corruption, which former
presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao deemed ³a matter of life and death
for the party² (CNTV.com, December 22, 2011; Xinhua, July 1, 2011).
Shortly upon becoming general secretary last November, Xi waxed eloquent
about cracking down on ³tigers as well as flies² among venal cadres. He,
however, made only one reference to tackling graft in his June 18 address:
³We must deeply implant in the thoughts and actions of all comrades of the
party the value of serving the people, sticking to reality and being
non-corrupt.² Neither Xi nor other members of the Politburo have said
anything about the status of a number of solid anti-graft measures
proposed by liberal cadres as well as public intellectuals. One is a
so-called ³sunshine regulation² that will oblige mid- to senior-ranked
officials to disclose their assets as well as those of their spouses and
children. While the assets disclosure regulation was a hot topic during
the National People¹s Congress (NPC) last March, it has disappeared from
public discourse, apparently due to entrenched opposition from power blocs
in the party (People.com, June 28; Huanqiu.com, June 10).

Xi¹s failure to address the corruption scourge properly has drawn at least
indirect flak even from academics within the party establishment. For
example, Yao Huan, a politics professor at the Beijing Municipal Party
School pointed out in an interview with People¹s Daily that ³without clean
governance, adopting the mass line becomes an empty phrase² (People¹s
Daily, June 29; Sina.com, June 29). More than six months after he became
party chief, Xi has little to show on the clean government front. The two
most senior officials nabbed for alleged economic crimes are the Vice
Minister at the National Development and Reform Commission Liu Tienan and
the former Vice Governor of Sichuan Province Guo Yongxiang (China News
Service, June 24; Xinhua, May 13). Moreover, Xi seems to have difficulty
wrapping up the case of former Politburo member and Chongqing Party
Secretary Bo Xilai. First detained by authorities in March last year, Bo
is alleged to have pocketed at least a few tens of millions of yuan in
addition to laundering money overseas (People¹s Daily, January 19;
China.com, January 9).

If the zhengfeng movement has little to do with urgent tasks such as
combating corruption, is it a foil for an old-style intra-party power
struggle that is aimed at boosting the authority of Xi, the putative
³core² of the Fifth-Generation leadership? Zhang Lifan, a well-known party
historian, pointed out that ³political campaigns waged in the name of the
mass line are often symptomatic of factional strife within the party.² ³It
is possible that an internal power struggle is shaping up,² he said (Ta
Kung Pao[Hong Kong], June 22; Ming Pao, June 19). Deng Yuwen, a respected
media commentator who used to be a senior editor at the Central Party
School, also thinks Xi might be using the rectification exercise to rid
himself of political foes at both the central and local levels. Deng
suggests ³The zhengfeng crusade may become a loyalty drive which will
enable Xi to establish his authority and flush out ideological opponents²
[1].

A remarkable article in the PLA Daily last month seemed to lend credence
to Zhang and Deng¹s views. In a piece entitled ³Self-consciously Uphold
the Authority of Chairman Xi Jinping,² the commander and political
commissar of the Second Artillery Corps, respectively, Wei Fenghe and
Zhang Haiyang, called upon officers and the rank and file to ³heed at any
time and under any circumstances the instructions of the party central
authorities, the CMC and Chairman Xi.² The two generals saluted the
contributions made by Chairman Mao in ³formulating and constructing the
objectives for modernizing [China¹s] revolutionary army.² They went on to
note that in order to ³ensure the army¹s superior nature, goals and
essence,² military personnel must ³meet the challenges of reality and the
needs of inheriting Œred genes¹² (PLA Daily, June 17; China News Service,
June 17).

It was the first time that senior cadres in either civilian or military
sectors had underscored the imperative of nurturing and developing the
party¹s ³red DNA.² Given the commonly held beliefs among conservative
sectors in the party and army that ³red genes² are found in most abundance
among cadres with ³revolutionary bloodline²‹a reference to princelings or
the kin of party elders‹the likes of Generals Wei and Zhang are in effect
waging a loyalist campaign to enhance the status of Xi, who is the son of
the late Vice Premier Xi Zhongxun, as unquestioned supremo of the party,
state and military apparatus (Apple Daily [Hong Kong], June 27; Voice of
America, March 12). Moreover, a number of close Xi associates at the
uppermost echelons of the party and army, including Politburo Standing
Committee members Yu Zhengsheng and Wang Qishan as well as the General
Zhang himself are the sons of illustrious party elders.

The apparent veneration of ³red genes² also has manifested itself in the
decision by a number of princelings in their twenties and forties to
forego relatively lucrative business careers for the world of politics.
This is despite an internal instruction given by late patriarch Deng in
the 1980s that the offspring of party elders should seek to distinguish
themselves in the commercial rather than the political arena (Hong Kong
Economic Journal, June 16; Apple Daily, June 10). Foremost among these
cadres with revolutionary bloodline is Deng Xiaoping¹s grandson Deng
Zhuodi, aged 28, who became Deputy Head of Pingguo County, Guangxi
Province, earlier this year. Other examples have included the 41-year-old
son of ex-President Hu Jintao, Hu Haifeng, who was named Deputy Party
Secretary of the city of Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province last May; and the
36-year-old son of former NPC chairman Wu Bangguo, Wu Lei, who was
recently appointed Deputy Director of Shanghai¹s Economic and Information
Technology Commission (South China Morning Post, May 25; Liberation Daily
[Shanghai], May 13).

Irrespective of the extent to which President Xi is committed to blowing
the trumpet for cadres with ³red genes,² his adoption of Maoist values has
been criticized by the CCP¹s remnant liberal wing, which includes party
elders as well as their offspring (³China¹s Reform summed up: Politics,
No; Economics, Yes (Sort ofŠ),² China Brief, May 23). Beijing¹s political
circles have the past few weeks been abuzz with the publication of the
candid views of a number of liberal retired cadres during a Chinese New
Year intellectual salon organized by the respected monthly Yanhuang
Chunqiu. The second son of late party general secretary Hu Yaobang, Hu
Dehua, laid into Xi¹s embrace of ultra-conservative ideas, especially his
apparent refusal to push forward universal-style political reform. Hu
Dehua noted, instead of harboring nostalgia for the Cultural Revolution,
Xi should emulate the Taiwan¹s late President Chiang Ching-kuo, who
instituted political reforms in 1986. Zhong Peizhang, a former senior
cadre at the party¹s Propaganda Department, urged Xi to take immediate
steps to ³reform the lawless party and state systems laid down by Mao
Zedong² (Frontline [Hong Kong], July 1; Ming Pao, June 23). While Xi has
impressed observers in and out of China with the speed with which he has
consolidated his power base, the 60-year-old princeling has to convince
his countrymen that he is committed to overhauling old-dated institutions
which underpin party members¹ fast-worsening ³work style.²
 
Notes:
 

1. Author¹s interview with Deng Yuwen, June 28.