MCLC: Bo Xilai and China's future

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: martin winter (dujuan99 at gmail.com)
Subject: Bo Xilai and China's future
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I am not posting this article because I like it. Poor english. No
imagination. But maybe it could provide a basis for some discussion. Li
says there is a consensus. There was a consensus in the 1980s, to move
away from the cultural revolution. From starving. From being used, via
ideology. Intellectuals like Qin Hui and He Weifang are worth studying in
this context. China does have a vibrant internet. I don't think most weibo
users support one-party rule, or the notion that prosperity was invented
by the party. Is it surprising a Shanghai venture-capitalist would value
stability and show his loyalty to important contacts? Who really thinks
the protesters in Wukan loved the communist party? They worked on a
compromise, yes. They did not just utter loyalist dribble, and certainly
not to an international audience. I lived most of the last 25 years in
china. Not among financiers, and not among party people, mostly.
environment is a big concern in china. accountability is a concern.
powerlessness of ordinary people is a concern. Conscience and spirituality
are concerns. And so tibet and religion in general continue to fascinate,
despite the conflicts. Being able to discuss the present and one's recent
past candidly is very important for an accountable future. for any
long-term venture, actually. More important than short-sighted concerns
for stability. Stability of what, for whom? I don't think most people in
China are ready for a bloody revolution. Thank god. But do you really
think China is stable? China is not very accountable at all. Volatile.
Fascinating. Worrying. Great. All at once. Playground for venture
capitalists, among other creatures.

Martin

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Source: Huffington Post (4/2/12):
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-x-li/china-bo-xilai-replaced_b_1396052.h
tml

Bo Xilai and China's Future
By Eric X. Li 

"All is not well in the People's Republic." So proclaim China-watching
Hamlets around the world. They seem to have ample evidence. Six months
before the 18th congress of the Chinese Communist Party when a major
transition of leadership is to take place, a political earthquake is
riveting the nation.

Bo Xilai, one of China's most prominent leaders, a member of the Politburo
and son of one of the founding fathers of modern China, was removed from
his position as party secretary of Chongqing. The actual circumstances
that led to Bo's fall, whether results of power struggle or illegal
conduct, are shrouded in secrecy; his ultimate fate remains in limbo -- he
has so far kept his membership on the Politburo. Yet, at this stage,
speculating about Bo's downfall or future is less productive than
understanding the two ideological forces that form the political context
in which the Bo incident could be at risk of becoming a perfect storm. So
far, neither has gained dominance. But if one of them should occupy the
center stage of Chinese politics, the consequences for China and the world
would be disastrous.

Two extreme ideological forces have been dismayed by China's tremendous
achievements since Deng Xiaoping launched his reform. On one side are the
leftists who believe China has lost its socialist way in its head-long
pursuit of market economics and want the nation to go back to its past of
a completely state-owned economy and dogmatic Leninist rule. On the other
side are the liberals who just cannot live with the fact that China is
succeeding without multi-party elections and a Bill of Rights. The noises
they are amplifying seem, at the moment, to be deflecting our attention
from the extraordinary progress China has gained in the last three decades
and the underlying consensus that made it possible.

The leftists are in tune with the general sentiments of the Chinese public
in its desire for political stability and equality. An abundance of
polling data show the Communist Party enjoys a high level of support among
the Chinese people for its remarkable performance. Its meritocratic
governance has earned substantial admiration for its leadership. During
the much reported protests in Wukan, the highest banner held up by the
rebelling villagers read, "Long Live the Chinese Communist Party!'

Yet, a virulent strand of populism infests their thinking. They seem to be
completely blind to the unprecedented accomplishments of market-oriented
reforms in recent decades and blame the byproducts of rapid economic
development, such as corruption and the wealth gap, on the market economy
itself. It matters little to them that even the worst-off in today's China
are better off than they were a generation ago. The leftists have
erroneously interpreted Bo's policies in Chongqing as a wholesale return
to the Leninist past. His apparent downfall has enraged them as they see
it as an ultimate betrayal by the Party.

The liberals are no less pathetic. Ever since the fall of the Soviet
Union, they have advocated the idea that no country can succeed without
multi-party elections and human rights. Year after year, they have
predicted the imminent collapse of China. Year after year, China has
continued to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, its
economy vaulting to the second largest in the world and its people living
in prosperity unprecedented in history.

The economists within the liberal ranks are in sync with the reality that
market economics forms the underlying foundation of China's success. Yet,
their economic position has been hijacked by political ideologues who
insist on linking market economics to the political system of liberal
democracy. They live in an ideological vacuum in which the market cannot
function without voting. They are completely blind to the fact that a most
vibrant market economy has been growing leaps and bounds under one-party
rule. These liberals are pre-maturely celebrating Bo's removal as a
precursor to a liberal democratic color revolution or at least a "peaceful
evolution" prescribed by John Foster Dulles for the former Soviet Union.
Through their euphoric celebrations of Bo's demise, it seems that they are
seeking to will their wish into reality.

There is only one thing amiss from the loud pronouncements being made in
the international media and Internet chat rooms by both sides: Vox Populi.
In the past three decades, a powerful consensus within Chinese society has
been forged: Continuous economic reforms that promote market forces is the
only path that will deliver prosperity to the Chinese people; political
stability grounded in one-party rule is the only guarantor against extreme
populism and national disintegration; a continuously reforming and
meritocratic Communist Party is the most viable political organization
that can lead the nation in its renaissance. China's political system may
not be ideal, but it is best among all realistic alternatives.

On the eve of Bo's removal, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao spoke to reporters
at the end of the National People's Congress. With the mentioning of
Cultural Revolution and political reform, his words stirred up sensational
eruptions in international newspapers and online forums. But of course,
such speculation is widely off the mark. Any sensible person could see
that, under the current political structure and social conditions, it is
nearly impossible for China to return to the Cultural Revolution. The
Prime Minister's reference to it actually reflects a widely shared fear of
chaos resulting from a potential subversion of the current system. The
Chinese term is zheteng -- ideological struggles that risk overturning the
ship. As to political reform, the Prime Minister said nothing of the sort.
He pointedly said "political structural reform". The wordstructural, in
the lexicon of Chinese politics, means reforms that make the current
system work better, not fundamentally changing it.

In this highly political season, an unexpected political drama has
intensified an ideological confrontation between two extreme ends of
China's political spectrum. Their voices are loud. Will their tempest be
allowed to disrupt China's path? If so, catastrophic consequences would
ensue: another Cultural Revolution could indeed be possible with
disastrous chaos worse than those that befell post-Soviet Russia. In such
a scenario China, instead of being the growth engine of the world, will
become its greatest burden. But this needs not be. In all likelihood,
talks of a pending political implosion in Beijing are greatly exaggerated.
The quiet and steady currents of China's mainstream, along with the common
sense of its leadership, will almost certainly continue to guide China on
its path of pragmatism and moderation. The tide of history favors the
large center. And the tide of history shall prevail.

This piece was published in the South China Morning Post on April 3rd,
2012.