MCLC: ditch Taiwan

Denton, Kirk denton.2 at osu.edu
Sat Nov 12 07:55:38 EST 2011


MCLC LIST
From: Anne Henochowicz <annemh2 at gmail.com>
Subject: ditch Taiwan
***********************************************************

I can understand toning down our arms sales, but not at all for these
reasons. I'm also confused as to how letting go of our policy towards
Taiwan would encourage Beijing to stop supporting "pariah states." Yes, I
see the tit-for-tat of it, but more than that, I think China would be
emboldened by a U.S. ready to "open a clearer path for the gradual,
orderly integration of Taiwan into China."

Kane seeks to provoke, and he has certainly succeeded. What do other list
members think of this proposal and the argument behind it?

Anne

==========================================================

Source: NYT (11/10/11):
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/opinion/to-save-our-economy-ditch-taiwan.
html

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan
By PAUL V. KANE

WITH a single bold act, President Obama could correct the country¹s
course, help assure his re-election, and preserve our children¹s future.

He needs to redefine America¹s mindset about national security away from
the old defense mentality that American power derives predominantly from
our military might, rather than from the strength, agility and
competitiveness of our economy. He should make it clear that today
American jobs and wealth matter more than military prowess.

As Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared
last year, ³The most significant threat to our national security is our
debt.²

There are dozens of initiatives President Obama could undertake to
strengthen our economic security. Here is one: He should enter into
closed-door negotiations with Chinese leaders to write off the $1.14
trillion of American debt currently held by China in exchange for a deal
to end American military assistance and arms sales to Taiwan and terminate
the current United States-Taiwan defense arrangement by 2015.

This would be a most precious prize to the cautious men in Beijing, one
they would give dearly to achieve. After all, our relationship with
Taiwan, as revised in 1979, is a vestige of the cold war.

Today, America has little strategic interest in Taiwan, which is gradually
integrating with China economically by investing in and forming joint
ventures with mainland Chinese firms. The island¹s absorption into
mainland China is inevitable.

But the status quo is dangerous; if Taiwanese nationalist politicians
decided to declare independence or if Beijing¹s hawks tired of waiting for
integration and moved to take Taiwan by force, America could suddenly be
drawn into a multitrillion-dollar war.

There will be ³China hawks² who denounce any deal on Taiwan as American
capitulation, but their fear of a Red China menacing Asia is
anachronistic. Portraying the United States as a democratic Athens
threatened by China¹s autocratic Sparta makes for sensational imagery, but
nothing could be further from reality.

The battle today is between competing balance sheets, and it is fought in
board rooms; it is not a geopolitical struggle to militarily or
ideologically ³dominate² the Pacific.

In fact, China and the United States have interlocking economic interests.
China¹s greatest military asset is actually the United States Navy, which
keeps the sea lanes safe for China¹s resources and products to flow freely.

China would want a deal on Taiwan for several reasons. First, Taiwan is
Beijing¹s unspoken but hard-to-hide top priority for symbolic and
strategic reasons; only access to water and energy mean more to Chinese
leaders.

Second, a deal would open a clearer path for the gradual, orderly
integration of Taiwan into China.

Third, it would undermine hard-line militarists who use the Taiwan issue
to stoke nationalist flames, sideline pro-Western technocrats and extract
larger military budgets. And finally, it would save China the considerable
sums it has been spending on a vast military buildup.

Jeffrey Lewis, an East Asia expert at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, estimated that one-fourth to one-third of China¹s
defense spending goes to forces in the vicinity of Taiwan ‹ at a cost of
$30 billion to $50 billion a year. A deal for the resolution of Taiwan¹s
status could save China $500 billion in defense spending by 2020 and allow
Beijing to break even by 2030, while reducing America¹s debt and serving
our broader economic interests.

The Chinese leadership would be startled ‹ for a change ‹ if the United
States were to adopt such a savvy negotiating posture. Beyond reducing our
debt, a Taiwan deal could pressure Beijing to end its political and
economic support for pariah states like Iran, North Korea and Syria and to
exert a moderating influence over an unstable Pakistan. It would be a game
changer.
The deal would eliminate almost 10 percent of our national debt without
raising taxes or cutting spending; it would redirect American foreign
policy away from dated cold-war-era entanglements and toward our
contemporary economic and strategic interests; and it would eliminate the
risk of involvement in a costly war with China.

Critics will call this proposal impractical, even absurd. They will say it
doesn¹t have a prayer of passing Congress, and doesn¹t acknowledge
political realities. They might be right ‹ today.

But by pursuing this agenda, Mr. Obama would change the calculus and
political reality. And Congress should see a deal with China as an
opportunity to make itself credible again.

Debt is not in itself bad, when managed, but today¹s unsustainable debt
will suffocate our economy, our democracy and our children¹s futures.

By tackling the issue of Taiwan, Mr. Obama could address much of what ails
him today, sending a message of bold foreign policy thinking and fiscal
responsibility that would benefit every citizen and be understood by every
voter.
Paul V. Kane, a former international security fellow at the Harvard
Kennedy School, is a Marine who served in Iraq.








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