MCLC: Trump speaks with Tsai Ing-wen (2,3)

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Trump speaks with Tsai Ing-wen (2,3)
Thanks for posting the Osnos piece; Walter Russell Mead has published a more measured, and I think more judicious, reaction:
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/12/04/what-the-taiwan-call-means/
A. E. Clark <aec at raggedbanner.com>
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So many commentaries on the Trump-Tsai Ing-wen phone call. This one by Andrew Browne seems a little more even-handed than the previously posted Osnos piece.
Terry Russell <Terry.Russell at umanitoba.ca>
Source: WSJ (12/4/16)
Dispensing With Tip-Toeing, Trump Puts Taiwan in Play
The future of U.S.-China relations depends on Trump’s intentions with Tsai phone call
By Andrew Browne
TAIPEI—Donald Trump took the call. The voice on the other end of the line was Taiwan’s president congratulating him. They chatted for a few minutes about economic matters and security—the normal business of politics. Why all the fuss?
After all, China didn’t object too strenuously, directing its displeasure primarily toward Taiwan for what it called a “petty trick.” That’s far from the explosion Beijing’s past behavior may have indicated for such a breach of protocol: No president-elect, or president, has spoken to a Taiwan leader since Washington cut formal diplomatic ties with Taipei and recognized the People’s Republic in 1979.
Yet the future of U.S.-China relations, and the stability of East Asia, depends in large part on what Mr. Trump meant by the exchange.
Some China hands in Washington think it was devoid of meaning—a sign of incompetence. He blundered into the call, oblivious to the potential risks of challenging a delicate status quo that has largely kept the peace across the Taiwan Strait since Chiang Kai-shek and his defeated Kuomintang fled to the island in 1949 after years of Chinese civil war.
This precarious balance relies on the U.S. and other countries accepting an elaborate pretense, one that Beijing insists upon: that Taiwan is part of “one China,” not the independent country it so clearly has become. U.S. president-elects have traditionally played along with this; declining calls from Taiwan leaders is part of the charade.
Mr. Trump’s call with President Tsai Ing-wen, however, seems to have been anything but an accident. It was planned in advance after several of his senior aides and proxies visited Taipei, according to people on both sides.
Some of his more hawkish advisers are clear about their goals: an end to all the tip-toeing around Beijing’s sensitivities, and unambiguous U.S. support for Taiwan, backed up by enhanced military cooperation. They want America to deal with Taiwan on its own terms, not Beijing’s.
In the more extreme version of this view, the island would revert to its Cold War role as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to contain China.
Writing earlier this year in The Wall Street Journal, John Bolton, the former U.N. ambassador who is in the frame for a senior job in the Trump White House, suggested that the U.S. should play the “Taiwan card” in response to aggressive Chinese moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea, “even jettisoning the ambiguous ‘one China’ mantra.” If China doesn’t back down, he argued, the U.S. should ramp up its official engagement with Taiwan, “ultimately restoring full diplomatic recognition.”
For China, Taiwan is a “core interest”; nothing is more important. Beijing’s restrained response to the call could reflect its concern not to provoke a temperamental Mr. Trump into going along this path, which would likely precipitate a meltdown in U.S.-China relations and foreclose the possibility of gaining Beijing’s cooperation in other areas, including North Korea and trade.
With his politically incorrect phone call, though, Mr. Trump seems to be threatening a move in precisely that direction. In doing so, he would be reversing a long history of U.S. administrations sacrificing Taiwan’s interests in exchange for strategic and commercial benefits with Beijing.
That trade-off has looked increasingly questionable anyway as Beijing challenges the U.S. for dominance in East Asia, and closes its markets to U.S. tech companies. On the trade side, Mr. Trump has already pledged punitive tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S.
Yet a sudden shift in Washington’s approach to cross-Straits relations could leave Taiwan even more vulnerable. Beijing has never dropped its threat to grab Taiwan by force. It is now trying to strong-arm Ms. Tsai into stating her support for “one China.”
She refuses, but nevertheless tolerates the muddled status quo in the interests of friendly ties with Beijing.
Having barged into the most sensitive area of U.S.-China relations, Mr. Trump must now expect Beijing to test his resolve. How would he respond as president to a provocation, perhaps a military one, aimed at Taiwan? If he backs down, he will have damaged his credibility with both sides, along with friends and allies in the region.
Nonetheless, “one China” is increasingly anachronistic. After nearly seven decades, it is realistic for Taiwan to demand a more secure basis for its existence than a make-believe political arrangement that won’t permit presidential telephone calls, high-level visits or other normal exchanges between friendly countries.
A policy reset is long overdue, both in Beijing, which needs to come up with an approach to Taiwan that accommodates the reality that it is a flourishing democracy—with no desire to come under Beijing’s authoritarian sway—and in Washington.
There’s a world of difference, however, between causing gratuitous offense to Beijing and building on a longstanding friendship with Taiwan. As president, Mr. Trump will have to distinguish with utmost care. Clumsiness could trigger more than a diplomatic rebuke from Beijing. It could mean a choice between peace and conflict.
by denton.2 at osu.edu on December 6, 2016
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