MCLC: Tiny Times and the xiaokang dream

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: kirk (denton.2 at osu.edu)
Subject: Tiny Times and the xiaokang dream
***********************************************************

Source: Economic and Political Weekly XLIX no. 21 (5/24/14):
http://www.epw.in/commentary/tiny-times-and-dream-xiaokang-society-china.ht
ml

Tiny Times and the Dream of a 'Xiaokang Society' in China
By Tansen Sen 

[The Chinese film Xiao Shidai or Tiny Times is a reflection of Chinese
attitudes and social aspirations in a market-oriented society. Despite
being panned by fi lm critics, it grossed a huge amount at the box-office
patronised by the post-1990 generation who saw themselves in the four
protagonists of the film. It has also set off a lively debate on
materialism and consumerism in Chinese society.]

The recent Chinese film Xiao Shidai (Tiny Times), a reflection of
contemporary Chinese attitudes in a market-oriented society, is also
telling in terms of the evolution of Chinese social aspirations over the
last 30 years. Tiny Times is also perhaps the worst Chinese film I have
ever seen. Other critics, including those writing on social media, are of
a similar opinion. The film has been universally ridiculed as “shallow” or
something that makes audiences feel “as if they’ve been trapped in a
boutique or furniture showroom for two hours” (Lee 2013). Yet, it made 800
million yuan ($133 million) in China. Its sequel, Tiny Times 2.0, grossed
over 47 million yuan ($7.8 million) in the first three weeks of screening
in August. Alarmingly (at least to some), Tiny Times 3.0 is scheduled for
release in 2014. The secret to the success of the Tiny Times franchise,
which is based on a novel by 30- something author-director Guo Jingming,
has been the young Chinese audience, especially those born after 1990.

Times: ‘Tiny’ and ‘Grand’

Set in Shanghai, the first instalment of Tiny Times tells the story of
friendship between four young girls as they transition from high school to
college life and into the job market. It is peppered with love interests,
workplace crushes, mutual jealousies, and materialistic pursuits. The
grand finale, where the four friends come together despite their
differences, revolves around a fashion show where the nouveau riche of
Shanghai society gathers to judge the best designer. The screenplay is no
better than a third-grade soap opera, the direction is horrendous, and the
acting is appalling.

There seems to have been two key reasons that the post-1990 generation
(commonly referred to as jiulinghou, literally “9-0 afters”) flocked to
the movie despite its poor quality. The first was the similarity in their
lifestyle, both imagined and lived, with those of the four young girls
depicted in the film. The second seems to be the presence of the popular
Chinese actress Yang Mi. Not very well-known overseas, Yang, who became
well-known through her roles in period dramas on Chinese television,
symbolises perfect beauty for the figure-conscious, face-shape sensitive,
bleached-skin preferring, high-heel trotting young girls of present-day
China.

Beyond the fan base, the film’s main contribution has been the lively
debate and discussion it triggered with regard to life in contemporary
China. The Chinese word xiao in the title of the film is translated as
“tiny”, but could also stand for “small” or “petty”. The state-run
People’s Daily, after initially praising the film’s success, subsequently
critiqued its materialistic narrative. “But if this exploration merely
stops at the level of the creation and ownership of these material goods
and turns them into the object of one’s life pursuit and abides by a
consumerist ethos”, the article noted, “this is ‘belittling’ one’s times,
narrowing one’s vision and lowering one’s thinking” (Tsui 2013). The more
sensational Global Times headlined its critique a few days later as
“Outrageous ‘Tiny’ Materialism” (Hu 2013). The official criticism and the
negative reviews generated vigorous debate in the blogosphere and on TV
channels and radio station. These discussions were also flamed by the
on-going cases of Li Tianyi, teenage son of famous People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) singers, who was accused and subsequently found guilty of rape,
and Bo Guagua, the “playboy” son of Bo Xilai. The deliberations did not
directly address the contradiction in today’s Chinese society between the
promotion of consumerism by the state and the party’s critique, at the
same time, of materialism, individualism, and the mall culture among the
youth. Nonetheless, everyone agreed that the Chinese are presently living
in xiaoshidai.

Da shidai, meaning “Big”, “Great”, or “Grand Times”, describes the
contrasting period when communal concerns, collective progress, and shared
aspirations defined Chinese society. Mao Zedong’s dictum of weirenminfuwu
(“serving the people”), his Great Leap Forward movement, and even the
Cultural Revolution represented the vision and implementation, often with
dreadful consequences, of the da shidai. Deng Xiaoping’s initiation of
market reforms in 1978 and his pronouncements of “to get rich is
praiseworthy” (zhifuguangrong) and “let some people get rich first” (rang
yibufenrenxianfuqilai) sparked the transition from “da shidai” to “xiao
shidai”. The clear watershed happened to be 1989, after which, connected
perhaps in some ways to the Tiananmen incident, the pace of reforms and
consumerism increased precipitously.

The contrast between the two periods was discussed in a brilliant cover
story in the Nanfengchuang (South Reviews), a liberal weekly published by
the Southern Media Group based in Guangzhou. The story, entitled “Da
shidai, xiao shidai”, asked several important questions about what it
called a “key period in China’s stride towards modernisation”. It noted,

<<The Chinese during the ‘Grand Times’ obviously rejected social isolation
and apathy, and value relativism. But the spiritual interests of the
people living during the Tiny Times, especially with regard to the ideas
of egotism, relativism, and hedonism that constitute the backdrop to the
period, are squarely in conflict with the spiritual interests of the Grand
Times. During the Grand Times, the assumption was that everyone had to
jointly bring about change to the society. But, how can a group of people
unconcerned and not involved in public affairs, accomplish this? The
answer by the people living in the Tiny Times is: ‘It is my free will.’
The only question, then, is, if during the Grand Times, free will was
extremely fragile, can free will be very robust during the Tiny Times?
(Shi Yong 2013: 41).>>

The Chinese word ziyou used here for “free will”, could also stand for
“freedom”, or “liberty”. It became popular with the translation of
Jean-Paul Sartre’s works in the 1980s and especially during the Tiananmen
demonstrations. Combined with the emerging awareness among the Chinese
public about their “rights” (quanli), the re-emergence of an ownership
society, a growing sense of individual space, as well as the increasingly
westernised views of aesthetics and beauty, an assertion of freedom could
eventually lead to demands for serious political reforms. It is perhaps
with the aim of attaining equilibrium between the Communist Party of China
(CPC)-led communal ideals of the Grand Times and the swelling of
individual aspirations during the Tiny Times that the new leadership in
China is propagating the dream of a “xiaokang” or “moderately prosperous
society”.

Tiny Times and the China Dream

There is some confusion about the English rendition of the term
“Zhongguomeng”, translated either as “China Dream” or “Chinese Dream”. No
matter how it is translated, the concept suggests a national dream rather
than the individual dreams of the Chinese people. “Only by integrating
individual dreams into the national cause can one finally make great
achievement”, the Chinese President Xi Jinping said in May 2013 when
meeting young students at the China Academy of Space Technology in Beijing
(Yang 2013). In his subsequent speeches and statements, Xi has made it
clear that while every person has dreams, ideals and individual pursuits,
the China Dream is for national glory, which can only be attained by
following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, developing a
national spirit with patriotism at its core, and by constructing a strong
China (Editorial Board 2013: 3-5; Feng and Ren ed. 2013; Callahan 2013).
Xi might have formulated his initial thoughts about the China dream when
he oversaw the organisation of the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Callahan 2013),
the motto of which was “One World, One Dream”.

Similar to most other state-initiated aphorisms, the “China dream” maxim
might also have no tangible impact. But, in many ways, the recent emphasis
on the China dream is intended to suggest to the Chinese people that
despite their individual dreams and pursuits, they have to contribute
towards the establishment of something greater, which is to construct by
the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, a
“xiaokang” society. Propagated in Confucian classics and invoked by Deng
Xiaoping, the “xiaokang” dream is to seek a balance between the
materialist pursuits of the people and attain sustainable growth under the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). “Xiaokang”, as one
Chinese publication on the achievement of the reforms points out,

<<refers to social circumstances where everybody is free from worries
about basic material needs, the family lives a peaceful life, and people
in different positions are well-disciplined in their behaviour and pay
attention to common courtesies.>>

The work also notes that the idea was “propounded” by Deng Xiaoping in
order to provide “a direct link between the objective of modernisation as
advocated by the CPC and the popular pursuit of a peaceful and prosperous
life” (Zhang 2012: 161).

Individual dreams have blossomed and changed over the course of the past
35 years as China has experienced political stability, economic
prosperity, and a growing sense of nationalism. During the first decade of
reforms, when foreign travel was loosened, many young people aspired to go
to the west, especially to the US. This is captured in another recent
Chinese film with the English title American Dreams in China
(Zhongguohehuoren or literally, “Chinese Partners”). The film tells the
story of three male college friends in the 1980s who plan to pursue
further studies in the US. While two of them are successful in getting US
visas, the application by the third is rejected. The latter eventually
starts teaching remedial English language classes at a Kentucky Fried
Chicken (KFC) outlet to Chinese students also aspiring to one day go to
the US. Eventually, when the number of students increases hugely, the
three friends come together to establish a school called “The New Dream”
that imparts English language training and prepares students for US visa
interviews. Through doses of sarcasm about the “Chinese dream” of the
1980s, the depiction of male bonding with the backdrop of an increasingly
materialistic society, and the framing of the story with nationalistic
fervour, the comedy pinched the nerves of some but delighted many more.
Similar to Tiny Times, American Dreams in Chinagrossed millions of yuan,
but unlike the former it received rave reviews and won the prestigious
Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film awards in China.

Not everyone in China wanted to go to the US in the 1980s and 1990s. Many
dreamt about becoming rich, owning an apartment, trying to get a city
residence certificate, and other aspirations that have been showcased in
the work of Helen Wang (2010). One person who tried to make the most out
of the system and pursue the glory of becoming rich was an illiterate
rural woman named Ding Shumiao. Ding, who could not even properly sign her
name, was a hardworking and amazingly entrepreneurial woman. She gradually
climbed from a poverty stricken life in a remote Shanxi province village
to become a multimillionaire. She started her entrepreneurial life as an
egg vendor, became the owner of a restaurant and coal freight wagons, and
finally founded a multimillion yuan corporation named Beijing Boyou
Investment Management Company.

Before being arrested in the famous bribery case involving Liu Zhijun, the
former Chinese railway minister who was eventually given a suspended death
sentence, Ding was also a respected philanthropist (Wei and Fu 2013). At
her trial in September 2013, Ding seemed bewildered when accused of
providing “bribes” of 49 million yuan ($8.1 million) to the State Council
Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development and for profiting
from connections that she had with the people at the railway ministry.
Bribery and “connections” (guanxi) were vital ingredients for many Chinese
who became wealthy during the 1980s and 1990s. Her crimes seemed so common
and widespread that Ding’s story drew a large number of sympathisers. But,
Ding and others are coming to the realisation that not all dreams during
the Tiny Times will be endorsed by the state.

Indeed, between the 18th national congress of the CCP (8-14 November 2012)
and the third plenum of the central committee (9-12 November 2013), 83
cadres of higher than “departmental-level” (tingji) rank were arrested on
corruption charges. Of these, 81 were members of the CPC (Liu, Liu and Xu
2013). While the list does not include Bo Xilai, who was already under
investigation before the party congress, it does include prominent
figures, the “tigers” (laohu) as they are called, such as Liao Shaohua,
the former member of the standing committee of the party committee of
south-west China’s Guizhou province, and Jiang Jiemin, the former chairman
of the China National Petroleum Corporation. The highest-ranking official,
not on the list but currently under investigation, is Zhou Yongkang, a
former member of the politburo standing committee, China’s top political
body. All of them were it appears, overcome by the quintessential moral
failure of the Tiny Times: greed.

Towards the Xiaokang Society?

In the future, the third plenum of the 18th party central committee held
in November 2013 may be seen as an important watershed, which either
succeeded or failed in harnessing the three main streams that constitute
the Tiny Times of present-day China: the market economy, corruption, and
individual aspirations. The third plenum seems to have focused on
providing the necessary structure and the required legal framework to the
reforms which have been implemented haphazardly since the 1990s. The
policy goals highlighted in the plenum’s communiqué are intended to chart
the way forward from what has developed into the Tiny Times to a
“moderately prosperous society”. It is also quite clearly a fervent effort
to create an enduring system of governance that amalgamates a strong
communist state with a vibrant capitalist society, a system that someday,
whenever the “Chinese century” dawns, might be called Xiaokangism.

The decisions reached at the third plenum are perhaps, additionally, an
attempt to reconcile Xi Jinping’s New Left leanings and his commitment to
the market-reform agenda. On the new left front, since taking office, Xi
has embraced several of Mao Zedong’s ideas, including bringing back the
dictum of “serving the people” and the practice of self-criticism. He has
also advocated austerity measures, and issued the so-called Document 9
that calls for, among other things, a ban on the discussion and
publication of issues related to universal rights, civil society,
independent justice systems, and mistakes made by the party in the past.
Xi is also said to have expressed support for celebrations marking the
120th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong.

At the third plenum, Xi reiterated his strong support for “further opening
up” China. The steps he plans to oversee range from creating a modern,
more competitive market system, improving the fiscal structure,
establishing efficient allocation of resources, and stimulating rural and
agricultural industries, to the streamlining of government involvement in
market management. The pilot free trade zone in Shanghai embraced in the
communiqué is an important experiment intended to accelerate the
integration of Chinese and world economies. In order to facilitate the
goal of an urbanised society – key to the consumer-driven economy – the
plenum decided to reform the hukou system and relaxed the one-child
policy. The “reform must be”, the communiqué noted, “comprehensively
deepened from a new historical starting point”.

At the same time, it is evident from the communiqué that the government
will take steps to address the moral concerns and failures of the Tiny
Times. In addition to establishing a mechanism to “identify corruption”
and “discipline” government officials, it will “speed up reform to fight
formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance” (communiqué). In order
to provide a sense of a strong China, decisions were taken to strengthen
the military forces and to create a new state security committee to
oversee domestic and international security affairs. And in trying to
differentiate itself from ideological authoritarianism of the past,
demonstrate the new emphasis on the rule of law, and to epitomise the
“harmonious” society which it hopes to create, the government also decided
to abolish the laojiao, or “re-education-through-labour”, system.

While the communiqué looks like a laundry list, the long-term objective of
the government is apparent. To blend the indispensable and acceptable
elements of the Grand Times and the Tiny Times, “in order to
comprehensively construct”, as the communiqué underscores, “a moderately
prosperous society, and thereby create a wealthy, strong, democratic,
civilised and harmonious Socialist country, and realise the China Dream of
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Communiqué, with slight
modification).

REFERENCES
Callahan, William A (2013): China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future (New
York: Oxford University Press).

Communiqué of the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, viewed on 30
November 2013 
(http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/11/12/communique-of-the..
. 
<http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/11/12/communique-of-the-3
rd-plenum-of-the-18th-party-congress/>).

Editorial Board (2013): Zhongguomeng: Zhongguo de fendouyufuxing (Beijing:
Renminchubanshe).

Feng Guoquan and Ren Liya, ed. (2013): Meili Zhongguomeng (Beijing:
Renminchubanshe).

Hu, Qingyun (2013): “Outrageous ‘Tiny’ Materialism”, Global Times, 18
July, viewed on 20 November 2013
(http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/797039.shtml).

Lee, Maggie (2013): “Film Review: ‘Tiny Times?’”, Variety, 17 July, viewed
on 30 November 2013
(http://variety.com/2013/more/reviews/film-review-tiny-times-1200563190/).

Liu Jun, Liu Youxian and Xu Jingzhe (2013): “Yibashoufubaishizuidawenti”,
Nanfangzhoumo, 14 November: 9-10 (Politics Section).

Shi, Yong (2013): “Zhongguoshidazhongshidai”, Nanfengchuang, 23 October-11
November, 38-41.

Tsui, Clearance (2013): “China’s State Media Lashes Out against Local
Blockbuster ‘Tiny Times’”, The Hollywood Reporter, 16 July, viewed on 28
November 2013 (http://www.hollywood <http://www.hollywood/>
reporter.com/news/chinese-blockbuster-tiny-times-gets-585765).

Wang, Helen (2010): The Chinese Dream: The Rise of the World’s Largest
Middle Class and What It Means to You(London: Bestseller Press).

Wei, Yiping and Fu Xiaoying (2013): “Ding Shumiaozhuanji”,
Sanlianshenghuozhoukan, 21 October, 38-55.

Yang Yi, ed. (2013): Youth Urged to Contribute to Realization of ‘Chinese
Dream’ , Xinhuanet, 5 May, viewed on 20 November 2013
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-05/04/ c_132359537.htm).

Zhang, Baijia (2012): The Path of the CPC: Revolution, Construction and
Reform (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press).