MCLC: Beijing's fight against HK democracy

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: kirk (denton.2 at osu.edu)
Subject: Beijing's fight against HK democracy
***********************************************************

Source: China Brief, Jamestown Foundation 14, no. 4 (2/20/14):
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=41984&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=53bfed89d38ab2465b1a00792e4bb7cb#.Uw
ZyukJdXuU

Beijing’s Fight Against Democracy Activism in Hong Kong
By: Mark C. Eades 

Nearly seventeen years after handover of Hong Kong from British to Chinese
control, tensions with Beijing are higher than ever. Resentment toward
Beijing is rising in Hong Kong due to Beijing’s persistent efforts to
impose mainland-style policy aimed at limiting democratic rights for Hong
Kong residents, silencing critics and assimilating Hong Kong into China.
Given the unwillingness of many Hong Kongers to submit to
“mainlandization,” these tensions seem destined to continue rising absent
significant concessions from Beijing.

This state of affairs has not only pitted Hong Kongers against Beijing,
but also the pro-democracy majority in Hong Kong against a vocal and
influential pro-Beijing minority, including pro-Beijing leaders in the
Hong Kong government and business community. The United States has also
given vocal support to Hong Kong democracy, sparking accusations from
Beijing and its allies in Hong Kong of U.S. interference in China’s
internal affairs, and conspiracy theories alleging U.S. plots to divide
and weaken China.

‘Mainlandization’ and the Democracy Movement in Hong Kong

Following the 1997 handover, Hong Kong was politically re-established as a
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). As such, Hong Kong was guaranteed “a high degree of autonomy” in
its internal political, economic, social, and legal affairs under the “one
country, two systems” formulation (Basic Law of Hong Kong, Articles 1 and
12). Nonetheless, Beijing has undertaken a subtle program of
“mainlandization,” designed to make Hong Kong politically and economically
more dependent on the PRC, socially more patriotic toward the PRC and
legally more reliant on PRC interpretations of the Basic Law of Hong Kong
(China Post, September 9, 2011; The Independent, October 8, 2012). [1]

Beijing’s program of mainlandization includes persistent efforts to limit
voting and nomination rights in Hong Kong elections; restrict civil
liberties and press freedom; and culturally assimilate Hong Kong into
China. These efforts have met with stiff resistance from Hong Kongers.
Polls by the University of Hong Kong (UHK) in 2012 and 2013 found that
more than 60 percent of Hong Kong residents—including almost 90 percent in
the 18-29 age group—identify themselves as “Hong Kongers” rather than as
“Chinese,” angering Beijing (Hong Kong University [HKU]
<http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/hkbroad/poll/eid_
poll_chart.html >). Trust in the Beijing government has fallen from a high
of 59 percent in 2007 to 36.8 percent in December 2013, while trust in the
pro-Beijing HKSAR government has dropped from a high of 68.8 percent in
2006 to 43.9 percent (HKU
<http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/trust/trusthkgov/overall/chart_pol
l/overall_poll_chart.html>). Like self-identification as “Hong Konger”
rather than “Chinese,” distrust of Beijing has been highest in the 18-29
age group, indicating that Beijing’s message of Chinese national unity is
not getting through to Hong Kong’s youth (HKU,
<http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release858.html >).

2012 saw protests in Hong Kong as Beijing sought to impose mainland-style
“patriotic education” on Hong Kong schoolchildren, viewed as
“brainwashing” by many in Hong Kong. Pro-Beijing local officials backed
down from this effort, demonstrating for Hong Kongers that Beijing can be
beaten (South China Morning Post [SCMP], September 8, 2012). In 2013
attacks by pro-Beijing thugs on news organizations and activists raised
fears that Beijing is willing to resort to violence to bring Hong Kong
under firmer control (See Epoch Times, June 21, 2013; SCMP, July 1, 2013).
Pro-democracy protests have continued, often featuring Hong Kong’s former
British colonial flag as a symbol of resistance to mainlandization,
further angering Beijing (See SCMP, March 7, 2013).

Currently at issue are nomination and voting rights ahead of a planned
HKSAR Legislative Council (LegCo) election in 2016 and executive election
in 2017. At present, Hong Kong’s chief executive is elected by a
1,200-member Election Committee dominated by Beijing loyalists and highly
unrepresentative of the general Hong Kong public. While Beijing has agreed
in theory to universal suffrage for the 2017 election, it has rejected
calls for open public nomination of candidates, insisting that candidates
can be nominated only by a pro-Beijing nominating committee, and that no
candidate Beijing considers disloyal can be nominated. A five-month public
consultation on voting and nomination rights was launched in December and
is currently underway. Future LegCo composition and participation in LegCo
elections, as described below, are also under consultation. After public
consultation closes in May, its results will be included in a formal
proposal which must then be passed by LegCo and approved by Beijing.
Beijing’s current attitude is not encouraging (See Global Times, November
28, 2013; HKSAR Government
<http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/consult/highlights.html> <
http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/consult/highlights.html >;SCMP, December 4,
2013; Xinhua, December 4, 2013; see also  <
www.scmp.com/topics/universal-suffrage
<http://www.scmp.com/topics/universal-suffrage> >).

Division and Factionalism in Hong Kong

The “pro-democracy camp” in Hong Kong includes “pan-democratic” parties
such as the Hong Kong Democratic Party and Civic Party, popular
pro-democracy media such as Next Media and its newspaper Apple Daily, and
grassroots pro-democracy groups such as Occupy Central, now also known as
“Occupy Central with Love and Peace.”

The “pro-Beijing camp” includes current chief executive C.Y. Leung and the
pro-Beijing majority in LegCo—including the Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) party, which holds the largest
number of seats and has close ties to the Chinese Communist Party. Leung’s
ties to Beijing are so close as to have drawn criticism even from DAB
leadership (SCMP, October 15, 2012). This camp also includes a number of
pro-Beijing newspapers (see below) and grassroots or “astroturf”
pro-Beijing groups, which appear to have strong mainland ties. Among the
latter are the Hong Kong Youth Care Association and Caring Hong Kong
Power, which are noted for inflammatory rhetoric and have been accused of
“Cultural Revolution tactics” including violent attacks on their political
opponents (See Apple Daily, August 12, 2013; Epoch Times, December 19,
2012; SCMP, April 27 and June 13, 2013; Taipei Times, September 9, 2013).

Pro-Beijing parties currently hold a sizeable majority in LegCo. This
legislature has limited powers vis-à-vis the chief executive. Seats are
split between geographical constituencies directly elected through
universal suffrage, and functional constituencies elected by designated
members of Hong Kong’s business community. Functional constituencies
enable pro-Beijing parties to hold a majority of seats without winning the
majority of popular votes in LegCo elections. As in mainland China,
Beijing’s pro-business but anti-democratic policies seem popular among the
rich and powerful in Hong Kong, many of whom also have mainland interests.
An aim of pan-democrats, along with public nomination and universal
suffrage in chief executive elections, is to abolish functional
constituencies in favor of universal suffrage for all LegCo seats (See
Civic Party, February 19, 2010; Congressional Research Service, September
14, 2012; SCMP, August 3, 2013 and February 6). [2]

Beijing’s shared interest with the Hong Kong elite in maintaining the
present system was recently expressed in starkly anti-majoritarian
statements by the dean of Beijing’s Qinghua University law school, Wang
Zhenmin, at a seminar on constitutional reform in Hong Kong. Wang said
that the present system of nominating the chief executive and functional
constituencies in LegCo were necessary to “maintain the political elite”
and to “protect the interests of the business community” from “populism”
and “welfarism” (Apple Daily, January 20; Sing Pao, January 19; Wen Wei
Po, January 19; World Journal, January 19).

In the 2012 LegCo Election, pan-democratic parties won 56 percent of the
popular vote while pro-Beijing parties won 44 percent. This would have
given pan-democrats a majority of seats without functional constituencies,
but was still less than expected given the level of dissatisfaction with
Beijing following the protests over “patriotic education.” The
pan-democrats’ poorer-than-expected showing in the popular vote was blamed
on division, infighting and lack of coordination among the various
pan-democratic parties, which were up against a well-funded and
coordinated pro-Beijing electoral machine (East Asia Forum, October 7,
2012); SCMP, September 11, 2012).

With the support of the Democratic Party and Next Media, Occupy Central
has taken the lead in grassroots organizing for Hong Kong democracy.
Occupy Central is a mass civil disobedience campaign planned for July 2014
in the city’s Central district if democratic demands are not met following
the current consultation. The campaign was launched in January 2013 by
University of Hong Kong law professor Benny Tai Yiu-Ting with his article,
“Civil Disobedience as a Weapon of Mass Destruction” (Hong Kong Economic
Journal, January 16, 2013; see also DW News Hong Kong-Macao, March 15,
2013). In the article Tai called for a critical mass of demonstrators to
descend on Central and force Beijing to change its position on Hong Kong
democracy by paralyzing the city’s political and economic center through
sustained non-violent civil disobedience. Occupy Central’s activities thus
far have concentrated on building public support for the movement and
backing from pan-democratic parties in LegCo. Much of Occupy Central’s
popular support will likely come from Hong Kong’s youth (See Apple Daily,
December 5 and 24, 2013; January 14, 20, 26, and 28; see also
<http://www.scmp.com/topics/occupy-central >).

Beijing and its allies in Hong Kong have worked overtime to discredit the
pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, taking special aim at Occupy Central.
PRC representative have warned that the movement threatens to become an
“enemy of the state,” accusing its leaders of collaboration with
“separatists” in Taiwan. In response, Beijing has threatened “to impose
tough measures to maintain Hong Kong’s stability.” The latter statement
suggests a mainland-style crackdown on democracy activists in Hong Kong
under the guise of a “state of emergency” (Global Times, October 24, 2013;
see also July 18 and November 4, 2013; January 2; Apple Daily, January
20). Wang Zhimin, deputy director of Beijing’s liaison office in Hong
Kong, blamed the city’s youth for the threat to social order posed by
Occupy Central, warning young Hong Kongers instead “to treasure and
safeguard Hong Kong’s stability and to reject and prevent chaos” (SCMP,
September 5, 2013)

Pro-Beijing newspapers in Hong Kong have likewise accused Occupy Central
of being in league with U.S., British, and Taiwanese “anti-China forces”
and of inciting a violent “color revolution” or “jasmine revolution” in
Hong Kong to divide and weaken China. These attacks rely heavily on fear
of chaos in the streets, Chinese nationalism, links to “Taiwan
independence” forces, and xenophobic references to hostile foreign
powers—particularly the United States—supposedly anxious for any
opportunity to inflict harm on China (See Sing Pao, January 8, 2014; Ta
Kung Pao, May 20 and December 30, 2013;Wen Wei Po, July 12 and November 4,
2013).

The U.S. Role

The United States has vocally supported Hong Kong democracy, enraging
Beijing and its allies in Hong Kong. Shortly after taking up his post in
July 2013, U.S. Consul General Clifford Hart remarked that he looked
forward to “genuine democratic suffrage” in Hong Kong. Beijing immediately
reacted through its foreign ministry commissioner in Hong Kong, who warned
Hart against any further “interference in Hong Kong’s affairs.” This was
only the latest of many such warnings to U.S. representatives since the
territory’s handover from British to Chinese control (Global Times, August
30, 2013; Special Commissioner of the PRC Foreign Ministry in the HKSAR,
August 27, 2013; SCMP, August 28 and September 11, 2013).

Despite Beijing’s displeasure, Hart re-iterated his previous statement in
a September 2013 speech: “The United States Government has repeatedly made
clear that it supports Hong Kong’s progress toward genuine universal
suffrage as laid out in the Basic Law and the National People’s Congress’s
2007 decision. This U.S. policy is unchanged. We believe that an open
society, with the highest possible degree of autonomy and governed by the
rule of law, is essential to maintaining Hong Kong’s stability and
prosperity…. Let me also be clear that the United States will always stand
for our core democratic values” (U.S. Consulate, Hong Kong, September 24,
2013).

Beijing and its allies in Hong Kong reacted to these remarks by Hart with
predictable fury. China’s foreign ministry lashed out at Hart: “The
development of political system [sic] is the internal affair of Hong Kong
and China. The Chinese government is firmly opposed to any country’s
interference in Hong Kong’s internal affairs by making irresponsible
remarks in this regard” (PRC Foreign Ministry, September 25, 2013).

The pro-Beijing press in Hong Kong reacted with even more vitriol to
Hart’s remarks. Hart was accused of “sinister” and “malevolent” intentions
by one commentator, who called on “all levels of society across Hong Kong
[to] stay on their guard while resisting U.S. interference and sabotage of
Hong Kong’s general elections.” This author further accused the United
States and Hart of promoting independence from China for both Hong Kong
and Taiwan as a means of splitting China in the interests of U.S.
imperialism. (Wen Wei Po, September 26, 2013).

Pro-democracy media reacted very differently to Hart’s remarks. Apple
Daily ran several articles enthusiastically reporting his remarks and
characterizing Beijing’s reaction as little but impotent rage. In Apple
Daily, Hart’s pro-democracy statements were extensively quoted and
presented as balanced and reasonable, while Beijing’s reaction was
characterized as overheated, showing a lack of confidence in its ability
to manage Hong Kong’s political affairs (Apple Daily, September 25, 26,
27, 2013).

2014 and Beyond for Hong Kong Democracy

Events to watch in Hong Kong in 2014 include the outcome of the current
consultation on voting and nomination rights, actions by Occupy Central
and Beijing’s response. In the likely event that pro-democracy demands are
not met, actions by Occupy Central and its allies will be key to the
future of Hong Kong democracy. Given sufficient numbers and sustained
strength, Occupy Central may well succeed in forcing concessions from
Beijing, just as protesters against “patriotic education” succeeded in
2012. If the movement falters, Beijing will have the upper hand.

In the longer term, further “mainlandization” efforts by Beijing can be
expected, and continued vigilance by the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong
will be necessary. In 2014 and in the longer term, U.S. and international
attention and support may also be an important factor. The more global
attention and support Hong Kong’s democracy movement can raise, the more
difficult it may be for Beijing to impose its will on Hong Kong.

Notes

1. See also Lo, Sonny, “The Mainlandization and Recolonization of Hong
Kong: a Triumph of Convergence over Divergence with Mainland China
<http://books.google.com/books?id=hzCFjiByOvcC&pg=PA179&lpg=PA179&dq=%22The
+Mainlandization+and+Recolonization+of+Hong+Kong:+a+Triumph+of+Convergence+
over+Divergence+with+Mainland+China%22&source=bl&ots=3HnLfSfmsf&sig=ysjBMoF
6_CDLcuFTJ9lirrFWZgo&hl=en&sa=X&>.” Joseph Y.S. Cheng (ed.), The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region in its First Decade, pp. 179-231. City
University of Hong Kong Press, 2007.

2. See also Loh, Christine (ed.), Functional Constituencies: A Unique
Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council
<http://books.google.com/books?id=10XDGJLrTK0C&printsec=frontcover&source=g
bs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false>. Hong Kong University Press,
2006.