MCLC: parochial limits to China's world view

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: sean macdonald <smacdon2005 at gmail.com>
Subject: parochial limits to China's world view
*********************************************************

Source: Asia Times (9/24/13):
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-01-240913.html

SINOGRAPH
Parochial limits to China's world view
By Francesco Sisci

China's responses to the political crisis in Taiwan and to the Syrian
malaise reflect distinctly different approaches; Taiwan prompting
rumblings over the limits of democracy, and events in Damascus bringing
stoic, non-interventionist silence. The common thread through both is a
parochial approach to politics that suggests nationalism keeps Beijing out
of touch with international destiny. - Francesco Sisci

BEIJING - Three separate events evolving in the past few days are showing
different angles of one problem for Beijing - its difficulty in coping
with sudden crises. This should demand deeper cultural changes even before
structures are modified.

With growing perplexity and surprise, Beijing is following the political
crisis unfolding at the moment in Taipei. Very briefly, President Ma
Ying-jiu has expelled popular parliament speaker Wang Jin-pyng, who is
accused of having pressured the judiciary into investigating Ma's friend
in the DPP, caucus whip Ker Chien-ming. The crisis is portrayed in
Taiwanese newspapers as a fight between Ma, whose popularity is at a
historic low, and the large families controlling the nationalist party,
the KMT: the Liens (honorary KMT chairman Lien Chan and his eldest son,
former Taipei EasyCard Corp chairman Sean Lien), the Wus (honorary KMT
chairman Wu Po-hsiung), the Haus (Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin), and the Chus
(New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu).

All in all, it seems that Taiwan's politics are dominated by a few
political strongholds that hijack policies on the island. In this fight,
the goals and objectives are confused through pressure on the judiciary,
investigations, mudslinging, etc. Those are all things that don't give a
very good image of democracy at work in a part of China. The situation in
Taiwan objectively dampens the already low enthusiasm for a process toward
democratic reforms in Beijing. One-party rule at least guarantees that
these face-losing power struggles take place behind closed doors, and at
least appearances, so extremely important in China, can be saved in order
to rule the country.

During the same days, China was a silent player in a political show that
is very important for its future: Syria. China is objectively the country
most interested in development in the Middle East, and the future of Syria
could bode well or ill for that development. China is extremely dependent
on energy imports from the Middle East. The United States plans to become
energy self-sufficient in a few years, thanks to shale gas, and therefore
is no longer interested in what happens in the Middle East.

Russia is indirectly interested in development in the Middle East, as calm
or chaos in the region could create a global energy crisis or eliminate
one, and thus influence its own energy exports. Because of its high
extraction costs, Russia could be forced out of the market by low oil
prices, which could happen if there is no chaos in Middle East, where they
have lower extraction costs.

Therefore, China should have had a greater interest in advancing a
solution in the Middle East, especially since its economy is over four
times the size of Russia's.

China disliked the idea of the United States intervening with missiles in
Syria, as that could have started a chain reaction, creating more chaos in
the region and spiking oil prices worldwide. Russia objectively has less
interest in preventing an American intervention. Chaos and energy price
hikes would benefit Russian oil and gas exports. Yet it was Russia that
intervened in the Middle East, offering to mediate and dismantle Syria's
chemical weapons and creating great difficulty for the Obama
administration. The Pope, heading a global Catholic movement calling for
one day of prayer and fasting for peace in the Middle East, also
contributed to America's decision to renounce an intervention in Syria.

This whole situation, though, showed that China seems unable to take
charge of its own international destiny.

This may be good news for those who are scared of Chinese global
intervention and China's ambition to become number one in the world. But
actually, this enthusiasm should be deeply reconsidered. If China does not
have a position in the world that is in accord with other countries, it
means Beijing is de facto isolated - something that doesn't bode well for
Beijing's future. Furthermore this isolation objectively could help
nationalist thinking in the country, as these people consider the
interests of China with no concern for the interest of other countries.

Russia, despite being an economic midget nowadays, was able to propose an
initiative that garnered vast support in the world and actually helped
America. This proves that the quest for political influence before moving
on to military might and economic prowess depends on the ability to
propose political plans and ideas that can be shared by a large number of
countries. Russia seems very capable of multiplying the weight of its
economy and military by using true strategic ideas.

China, conversely, seems intent on undercutting its economic and military
muscle by producing no political initiatives or very naive ones. China
should not in fact think of its economic interest alone. Considering one's
national or personal interests alone, without taking into account the
interests of others, moves into nationalism, it leads to a desire of
conquest and annihilation. Conversely considering one's interests together
with the interests of the other brings to the exchange of market economy,
where both buyer and seller have to gain to repeat the transaction and be
happy.

China can strengthen its growing economic and political muscle by
proposing plans shared by the largest number of countries possible - that
is, through China finding common ground between its national interest and
the interests of the world. Having no international profile or a negative
international profile only isolates China.

Russia, possibly also because of the heritage of the international
communist system, which claimed a global ideal besides the narrow national
view, was able to offer a proposal that cut a lot of ice in the world.

What do the Taiwan and Syria issues have in common? A parochial look at
politics. China didn't want to put forth a proposal on Syria because
Beijing feared making a mistake and it didn't know what to do or say that
would be welcomed by the world. Similarly, it thinks political power
struggles kept behind closed doors are better than power struggles in the
open, which makes all of the leaders lose face.

Besides being held back by those who have an interest in preserving the
political status quo, Beijing also believes it does not know how to move
from its own present political system to a more open one. But an open
power struggle, showing the transparency of the political debate, enhances
the international profile of the country. All in all, despite all the
scandals, the present political fight in Taiwan has drawn global political
attention and much of it is good, as it shows a greater attention to the
rule of law in the island. Moreover, internal political isolation may have
a direct impact on the pace of domestic reforms (see US hurdles strew
China's reform path).

But in both cases, China is projecting an image in the world that does not
help it. And this is not just a projection; in the past year or so, it has
become a matter of reality. Nobody has clear numbers, but many people in
Beijing and Shanghai tell stories of huge capital flights. Many people
with money are looking for safe havens outside of China, taking billions
out of the country.

The common explanation for all this is that people are growing uncertain
about China's long-term objective. They do not know what China will do in
the future, so they are scared. This is a direct consequence of China's
inability to move on the path of political reforms, which would
demonstrate to investors in and out of China a clear long-term path.
China's timidity on the global scene makes the country appear as a
political dwarf.

The deep reason for all this is possibly in the third event of the past
days. On Sunday China gave Bo Xilai, standard bearer of the neo-Maoists,
ex-party chief in Chongqing, a life sentence. It was milder than his wife,
Gu Kailai, who got death sentence with reprieve, but heavier than his
former henchman Wang Lijun, who is to be in prison for 15 years. The
sentence then indicates that, according to the court, the responsibility
of this whole affair is mostly given to the wife, the husband covered up
for her and the henchman was just the loyal executioner.

For Bo Xilai it is heavier than the 20 years sentence many people were
talking about, and it seems to mean that Bo was punished for his defiance
during the trial, when he did not admit his guilt and was challenging the
court thus apparently rejecting a previous political agreement for his
public confession. (see Bo breaks from script, but sticks to role, Asia
Times Online, Sep 3, 2013).

Yet the issue of the resurgence of new nationalist trends, disguised as
neo Maoist thought, is not solved as it remained out of the trial and out
of the ongoing debate on the Chinese internet. The political issues may be
too complicated to discuss in a public forum in China, but they might be
addressed in the forthcoming Party Plenum in November.

The nationalist mindset seems to be the root of the problem. It is
conservative at home and unable to take a global view of international
affairs. Then it cannot manage to propose solutions which many countries
see as reasonable. It considers Chinese interests in isolation, as if
Beijing was still the capital of the old empire where everything stemmed
from the Forbidden City. But that imperial dream is no longer, and no one
in the world supports it.

Francesco Sisci is a columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore. His
e-mail is fsisci at gmail.com