MCLC: free trade/free speech in Shanghai

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: maghiel van crevel <m.van.crevel at hum.leidenuniv.nl>
Subject: free trade/free speech in Shanghai
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Source: The New Yorker (10/1/13):
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/10/free-trade-and-free-
speech-in-shanghai.html

OCTOBER 1, 2013
FREE TRADE AND FREE SPEECH IN SHANGHAI
POSTED BY JIAYANG FAN

The inauguration on Sunday of an eleven-square-mile free-trade zone in
Shanghai, an experiment in economic liberalization on the outskirts of the
thriving coastal city, will mean the loosening of regulations for eighteen
service industries, including banking, shipping, law, and engineering.
Foreign financial institutions will be permitted, for the first time, to
team up with domestic partners to set up banks. Foreign video games will
even be sold, as long as their makers register within the zone.

But the detail that attracted the most attention in some circles was a
report 
<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1316598/exclusive-china-lift-ban-fa
cebook-only-within-shanghai-free-trade-zone> from the South China Morning
Post that the country’s ban on Web sites that it considers politically
sensitive, such as Facebook, Twitter, and the Times, would be lifted
inside the zone. The People’s Daily, a newspaper that functions as the
Communist Party’s official mouthpiece, summarily denied this, insisting
that business will proceed as usual when it comes to “ideological issues.”
Later still, the Party withdrew the People’s Daily’s denial and replaced
it, in the State Council’s official release of rules for the zone, with
references to “special permissions” that foreign telecommunications
firms—which would include sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and the
like—may be granted. (The sites may operate as long as they receive a nod
of approval.)

Thirty-three years earlier, Deng Xiaoping, then the leader of China, began
his own regional experiment in quasi-capitalism: Mao’s policies had
rendered the economy stagnant and the population poor, and Deng, his
pragmatic successor, created the controversial Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone, whose policies encouraged foreign investors to open local factories
and hire workers to produce everything from shoes to electronics. Some of
the Shenzhen policies were so effective that they were put in place more
widely.

Capitalism proved to be a hit—and a mixed blessing. While Shenzhen, and
the policies that came out of it, contributed to an economic boom, it also
triggered inflationary spirals and corruption. By the mid-eighties, the
economic zone had made citizens aware of more fundamental problems with
the political system, such as a lack of transparency and accountability on
the part of the government. The Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, which
came at the end of a decade-long boom, showed that China’s newfound
prosperity had not been evenly distributed.

Shanghai’s pilot zone recalls Deng Xiaoping’s flagship regional
experiment. Once again, the Chinese economy is at a critical juncture:
following more than a decade of breakneck growth, its economy expanded by
only 7.7 per cent last year, its slowest pace in thirteen years. Once
again, a local experiment in a strategically important city is being
conducted—and with healthy servings of hype and controversy.

Some observers are focused on the experiment’s prospects for economic
success—but it’s equally important to consider the zone’s social and
political ramifications.

How will the zone’s architects handle political pushback from hard-liners
who seek to restrict foreign competition? Does the government have a plan
to accommodate the volatility, both economic and social, that could
accompany greater exposure to the outside world? And will the loosening of
restrictions for some foreign Web sites eventually extend to online
comments from China’s own citizens?

On the first two questions, the Chinese government can look to Shenzhen
for some historical perspective. But the third question raises a uniquely
twenty-first-century concern—and, judging from the past few years, the
answer appears to be no. The government has recently intensified its
ongoing crackdown on influential micro-bloggers—many of whom speak
reprovingly of Communist officials—as evidenced by the disturbing arrest
of a sixteen-year-old who publicly questioned the mysterious death of a
karaoke-club manager in northwest China. Mounting regulations have
curtailed the politically edged commentary of cultural critics and
ordinary citizens alike, and have sent a sharp message that the government
will censure those who speak out too loudly against it.

In the coming days and months, the Shanghai free-trade zone will aim to
prove itself as a transformative model of development that stimulates and
inspires the rest of China. Will the government allow the rest of the
country to emulate the ethos of digital freedom within its borders?

Photograph by Peter Parks/AFP/Getty.