MCLC: Xi Jinping's inner circle

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: kirk (denton.2 at osu.edu)
Subject: Xi Jinping's inner circle
***********************************************************

Source: China Brief, Jamestown Foundation 13, 4 (Feb. 15, 2013):
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=40461&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=a2948d5ab8d0b3e6c8a29033e263839a

All the General Secretary’s Men: Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle Revealed
By: Willy Lam 

Barely three months after assuming the posts of Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) general secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman, Xi
Jinping has done well in buttressing his authority within the party’s
upper echelons. Xi’s remarkable consolidation comes in spite of the fact
that he is not associated with any comparably powerful clique within the
party apparatus—unlike predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who are
heads of the Shanghai Faction and the Communist Youth League (CYL)
Faction, respectively. Apart from being the premier arbiter of party
affairs, Xi has secured control over foreign and national security
policies by virtue of becoming the chair of the Foreign Affairs Leading
Small Group. Equally significant, the 59-year-old supremo has seized hold
of the country’s “political-legal” (zhengfa) machinery, which oversees the
police, state intelligence, the procuratorate and the courts. Moreover,
since both Hu and Jiang have made at least rhetorical pledges that they
would not interfere with the new leadership that was confirmed at the 18th
Party Congress last November, Xi could go about running the country
without fear of party elders breathing down his neck (Liberty Times
[Taipei], February 3; Ming Pao [Hong Kong] January 31).

While Xi is sometimes called a leader of the “Princelings Faction”—a
reference to the offspring of party elders—it is noteworthy that
particularly for those born in the 1950s and after, most gaogan zidi (sons
of top cadres) have gone into business rather than politics. The exception
is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which boasts several dozen
princeling officers with the rank of major general or above. It is not
surprising, then, that the military has remained princeling Xi’s premier
power base ( “Communist Youth League Clique Maintains Clout Despite
Congress Setback,”China Brief, November 30, 2012). After graduation from
Tsinghua University in 1979, Xi worked for three years as the personal
secretary of then-Minister of Defense Geng Biao. He got this plum job
through the recommendation of his father, liberal party elder Xi Zhongxun
(1913–2002). The PLA being a bastion of gaoganzidi, Xi has maintained good
ties with an elite corps of princeling generals through his long career as
a senior cadre in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces (China Review News [Hong
Kong], February 2; South China Morning Post [Hong Kong], November 27,
2012).

At least three CMC members have revolutionary bloodlines. For example, Air
Force Commander General Ma Xiaotian is the son of a former senior cadre in
the PLA Political Academy, Senior Colonel Ma Zaiyao. Navy Commander
Admiral Wu Shengli is the son of Wu Xian, a former vice governor of
Zhejiang Province. Yet the princeling-general within the CMC that is
closest to Xi is undoubtedly Director of the General Armaments Department
General Zhang Youxia. Zhang is the son of former General Logistics
Department (GLD) commander General Zhang Zongxun, who served with Xi
Zhongxun in China’s northwestern region before 1949. It is not surprising
that General Zhang was one of the first members of the top brass to
profess allegiance to “Chairman Xi.” In his Chinese New Year message last
week, General Zhang told staff in his department to “implement Chairman
Xi’s important policy instruction” of “fulfilling the China dream and the
dream of a strong army” (PLA Daily, February 7; People’s Daily, October
25, 2012).

Several princeling generals who failed to be promoted in the run-up to the
18th Party Congress also are considered advisers to Xi on foreign and
military affairs. Foremost among them is GLD Political Commissar Liu Yuan,
the son of China’s first state president Liu Shaoqi. General Liu is a
much-published theoretician on geopolitical issues, including how to
tackle Washington’s alleged “anti-China containment policy.” Other members
of Xi’s informal network of military strategists include General Liu
Yazhou, who is Political Commissar of the National Defense University, and
Chen Zhiya, a senior researcher in a PLA think tank on international
strategy. Liu and Chen are the son-in-law of state president Li Xiannian
and the son of former Deputy Defense Minister General Chen Geng,
respectively. Xi is also on good terms with generals who had spent time in
the Nanjing Military Region (MR), which covers Zhejiang and Fujian.
Foremost among this group is GLD Commander General Zhao Keshi, who worked
in this strategically important MR from 1988 to 2012. In addition, General
Zhao, who was Nanjing MR commander from 2007 to 2012, is close to senior
members of the Shanghai Faction, such as former Vice President Zeng
Qinghong, who remains one of Xi’s high-level mentors (Apple Daily[Hong
Kong] February 5; Ming Pao, February 3; Sina.com, February 13, 2012).

That Xi has taken over the political-legal apparatus was revealed
indirectly during his high-profile inspection of a Beijing-based division
of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) late last month. Xi indicated that the
PAP must remain “an armed force that is under the absolute leadership of
the party.” For the first time after he became general secretary, Xi
raised the imperative of upholding political stability (weiwen). “The PAP
must have a deep understanding of the complexity of the
wei-wensituation—as well as the important role that the PAP plays in
weiwen work,” he said, “The PAP must seize the initiative and remain on a
high degree of alertness. It must be ready when called upon, be prepared
to fight and to score victories.” Accompanying Xi on this pivotal trip
were Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Political-Legal
Commission (CPLC), Meng Jianzhu as well as the newly appointed Minister of
Public Security Guo Shengkun, who doubles as the First Political Commissar
of the PAP (China News Service, January 29; People’s Daily, January 29).
Under the Hu Jintao administration, when the PBSC consisted of nine
members, the CPLC was headed by former PBSC members Luo Gan and later,
Zhou Yongkang. Now that the PBSC has been reduced to seven cadres, CPLC
Secretary Meng, who is an ordinary Politburo member, reports directly to
Xi (Liberty Times, February 6; Ming Pao, January 30).

While Xi appears to have succeeded in bolstering his authority over the
military and police forces, his networking skills seem surprisingly weak
within the party and government apparatuses. Having spent the better half
of his career in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, the princeling does not
seem to have built up a large coterie of associates and followers in the
party-state hierarchy. This is evidenced by the fact that Xi’s trusted
aides in the party’s inner sanctum of power are cadres whoseguanxi or
relationship with the general secretary cannot be said to be intimate.
Take for example, Director of the General Office Li Zhanshu and Director
of the Organization Department Zhao Leji, both of whom were inducted into
the Politburo at the 18th Party Congress.

Xi first got to know the 62-year-old Li during the former’s stint as
deputy party secretary and then party secretary of Zhengding County, Hebei
Province, from 1982 to 1985. During much of this period, Li, who is a
Hebei native, was party boss of neighboring Wuji County. After Xi left
Hebei, however, the two have pursued careers in different professional and
geographical settings. In fact, due to his having served as head of the
Hebei branch of the CYL for four years in the late 1980s, Li sometimes is
identified as an affiliate of the CYL Faction. Xi and Li were able to
renew their old friendship when the latter served in Shaanxi from 1998 to
2003 in posts including party secretary of Xi’an, the provincial capital.
Although Xi has never worked in his home province, he paid regular visits
to Xi’an and other Shaanxi cities to keep up ties with his relatives
(Oriental Daily News [Hong Kong] November 16, 2012; South China Morning
Post, September 2, 2012). Much of Xi’s relationship with the 55-year-old
Zhao is based on their being fellow natives of Shaanxi. Zhao, who spent
the bulk of his career in the remote western Qinghai Province, was party
boss of Shaanxi from 2007 to 2012. During these five years, Zhao
apparently won Xi’s gratitude by taking very good care of members of the
labyrinthine Xi Zhongxun clan (People’s Daily, November 21, 2012; Xinhua,
July 1, 2011).

The relative paucity of Xi’s guanxi network also is evidenced by the fact
that several of his policy advisers were introduced to him by trusted
party elders such as Shanghai Faction stalwart Zeng Qinghong. Foremost
among them are the two deputy directors of the Central Committee Policy
Research Office, Shi Zhihong and He Yiting. Shi, whose specialty is
drafting party documents, served as Zeng’s personal secretary when the
latter was director of the Central Committee General Office from 1993 to
1999. Another key adviser and speechwriter is Li Shulei, who served as
Xi’s deputy when the latter was president of the Central Party School from
2007 to 2012. Yet compared to his predecessors Jiang and Hu, Xi seems to
lack close aides whose personal loyalty to the party boss has been
anchored upon decades of service (China Review News [Hong Kong], February
3; Ta Kung Pao[Hong Kong], November 11, 2012).
A sizeable proportion of the members of ex-president Jiang and President
Hu’s inner circles were made up of their colleagues and underlings. By
contrast, surprisingly few of Xi’s former associates in Fujian and
Zhejiang Provinces had made it into the senior ranks of the party or
state. Take, for example, long-time Tianjin cadre He Lifeng, who was just
named the Chairman of the municipal Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He served together with Xi when the
latter was vice mayor of Xiamen in the mid-1980s. At the 18th Party
Congress, however, Mr. He merely retained his slot as an alternate member
of the Central Committee—a sign that the 57-year-old’s upward trajectory
may be dented (Ifeng.com [Beijing], January 28; Ta Kung Pao, January 23).
The newly-appointed Governor of Guizhou Chen Min’er, who headed Zhejiang’s
Department of Propaganda when Xi was party boss there, may have more
potential for promotion. Chen, age 58, was one of only nine Sixth
Generation cadres to have been appointed full Central Committee members at
the 18th Party Congress (China News Service, February 2; China
Times[Taipei], December 19, 2011). Yet the chances are not high that Chen
could snatch a Politburo-level post before Xi’s expected retirement at the
20th Party Congress in 2022.

Xi’s connections with academics, public intellectuals and other
professionals who might help the supremo think outside the box also seem
scant relative to his peers and predecessors. Former Vice President Zeng
often sought the advice of scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences or editors from Beijing-based official newspapers. Former premier
Zhu Rongji is known to have tapped the views of nationally-known
economists such as Professor Wu Jinglian. Premier-in-waiting and CYL
Faction stalwart Li Keqiang reportedly has put together a large personal
think tank that consists of professors and former classmates from Peking
University, his alma mater (China Review News, December 23, 2012;
CNTV.com, May 5, 2011). A couple of months before the 18th CCP Party, Xi
held a long session with the son of late party chief Hu Yaobang, Hu
Deping, on ways and means to resuscitate economic and political reforms. A
retired vice ministerial-level official, Hu is a public intellectual who
is well-respected for his untiring advocacy of political reform. Apart
from the 70-year-old Hu, whom he knew due to the closeness of their
fathers, however, Xi does not seem to have an extensive circle of experts
who are well-placed to offer him fresh or unorthodox ideas (Ming Pao,
October 29, 2012; Sina.com [Hong Kong], September 8, 2012).

It is probably too early to say in what ways the composition of Xi’s power
base and support network may affect China’s policymaking. The
preponderance of military figures within his inner circle, coupled with
the country’s increasingly tense confrontation with Japan and the United
States, could predispose the commander-in-chief toward pursuing more
pugilistic foreign and military policies. The dearth of relatively liberal
aides among his corps of advisers could affect the extent to which Xi
might be pushing political liberalization. During his tour of Guangdong
Province in December, Xi pointed out that he was looking for
“high-caliber” cadres who “have confidence in the [socialist] road, as
well as confidence in [the party’s] theories and systems” (People’s Daily,
December 11, 2012; Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong] December 11, 2012). The onus is
on Xi to show Chinese as well as foreign observers that his team is
capable of not only holding the fort of CCP supremacy but also hacking out
new pathways for reform.