MCLC: politics of rain

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: Anne Henochowicz <annemh at alumni.upenn.edu>
Subject: politics of rain
***********************************************************

Source: Useless Tree ():
http://uselesstree.typepad.com/useless_tree/2012/07/the-politics-of-rain-in
-beijing.html 

The Politics of Rain in Beijing
By Sam Crane

The first thing to do in response to the horrendous flooding in and around
Beijing over the weekend is to express condolences to the families of the
37 (at least) people who died.  It must be truly devastating to lose loved
ones in such a manner.  Also, concern must be expressed for the many, many
thousands of people who had to be evacuated, a good number of whom will
have lost their homes and possessions.  A terrible event all around.  My
in-laws were flooded out of their house last year, so I have some sense of
the difficulties involved.

Beyond the immediate human tragedy is a broader political dynamic,
however.  Already, complaints have surfaced
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2012/0723/Beijing-floods-unleas
h-online-criticism-of-government> on the Chinese internet, raising
questions about the competency of government authorities in handling the
crisis. China Real Time Report
<http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/07/23/anger-swells-after-floods-ki
ll-at-least-37-in-beijing/>states:

News of the storm spread rapidly on social media, where users posted video
footage <http://weibo.com/2365518460/ytBQMfjD7#1342969173791> of flooded
intersections and where messages of support appeared alongside pointed
questions about how a city that spent billions building facilities to host
the Olympics could struggle so badly in dealing with a thunderstorm.

Among the sharpest criticisms came in the form of a series of photos
<http://weibo.com/2152072603/ytwPRdpy0>, posted to Sina Weibo around
midnight, contrasting Beijing¹s flooded streets with images of sewer
systems in other famous capitals, including Tokyo¹s massive ³Underground
Temple 
<http://news.yahoo.com/photos/tokyo-s-gigantic-flood-prevention-system-slid
eshow/1-photo-1319757333.html>² flood prevention system.

³Sewers are not a face-giving infrastructure project,² artist Li Yijia
wrote <http://weibo.com/1273292533/ytBgUlRoU> in response to the images,
repeating a sentiment widely expressed elsewhere on the site.

Central authorities are sensitive to such criticism, since infrastructural
development is often held up as proof of the efficacy of Chinese style
authoritarianism. The Beijing Municipal Committee Department of Propaganda
has put out a directive
<http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/07/directives-ministry-truth-beijing-flo
ods/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+chinadi
gitaltimes%2FbKzO+%28China+Digital+Times+%28CDT%29%29> on how to spin the
story in the Chinese media to deflect criticism. They appear to be worried
about a political backlash.

That worry stems from the nature of regime legitimation under
authoritarianism.  without regular elections to provide a basis of
electoral legitimacy (i.e. there is no opportunity ever to "throw the bums
out"), an authoritarian regime has to rely, instead, on what has been
calledperformance legitimacy
<http://abs.sagepub.com/content/53/3/416.short>. The implicit pact of
domination enables the party to maintain political hegemony without
democratic opening and in return it will  provide for society certain
public goods, especially economic growth and social stability.  This has
seemed to work for the CCP over the past three decades.

The challenge, however, comes when public goods are shown to be
inadequate.  Slowing economic growth, as now seems to be happening
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-21/china-third-quarter-growth-may-sl
ow-to-7-4-percent-adviser-says.html>, is most often discussed in this
regard: slow growth could increase unemployment, causing more people to
question the efficacy of authoritarianism and call for some sort of
political change.  There have yet to be any significant system-challenging
political movements in the PRC, but the political elite seems nervous
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/world/asia/as-china-talks-of-change-fear
-rises-on-risks.html> about the growing pressure for some sort of
transformation.

This is where the rain and floods come in. The failure of Beijing's
drainage infrastructure, a public good, raises questions about the overall
efficacy of the regime.  If it cannot deliver the goods at this level,
then questions arise regarding broader ineffectiveness and corruption.  In
the context of a one-party authoritarian system such pressures are
exacerbated because the regime is the only plausible responsible party.
It claims authority for economic success and thus has to accept blame for
public goods failure, even in very specific circumstances like the Beijing
drainage system.

Performance legitimacy also operates in democratic regimes. The failure to
respond effectively and humanely to Hurricane Katrina didweaken the
administration of George W. Bush
<http://uselesstree.typepad.com/useless_tree/2006/08/hurricane_katrr.html>.
  But this kind of backlash can be more pronounced in authoritarian
systems, because to criticize the ruling party is to criticize the system
itself.  In the US, Bush could be blamed without endangering the political
system as a whole, because the system included other political parties and
actors.  Not so in the PRC, where the CCP systemically represses any other
significant political organization.

And there is, of course, that knotty traditional notion of the Mandate of
Heaven.  Natural disasters were historically taken as signs that a Chinese
emperor may have been losing the right to rule, as determined by a diffuse
sense of destiny and fate in the classical Chinese notion of "heaven."   I
wrote about this four years ago when epic snow storms shut down the rail
system during Spring Festival
<http://uselesstree.typepad.com/useless_tree/2008/02/why-snow-matter.html>,
 prompting an in-person apology from Primer Wen Jiabao.  I am not one for
ancient superstitions, but there could be a way in which people in China
conceptualize their frustration with ineffective provision of public goods
as a general sign that the regime is losing the Mandate of Heaven.  And if
that is the case, it could take more than media spin for the regime to
regain political momentum.

i imagine Hu Jintao and company are hoping for clear skys in the coming
days...