MCLC: Party bristles at military's push

[Denton, Kirk]

MCLC LIST
From: kirk (denton.2 at osu.edu)
Subject: Party bristles at military's push
***********************************************************

Source: NYT (8/7/12):
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/asia/chinas-military-seeks-more-swa
y-worrying-communist-party.html

CHANGING OF THE GUARD
Party Bristles at Military¹s Push for More Sway in China
By EDWARD WONG and JONATHAN ANSFIELD

BEIJING ‹ During a holiday banquet for China¹s military leadership early
this year, a powerful general lashed out in a drunken rage against what he
believed was a backhanded move to keep him from being promoted to the
military¹s top ruling body.

The general, Zhang Qinsheng, vented his fury in front of President Hu
Jintao, according to four people with knowledge of the event. At the
banquet, he even shoved a commanding general making toasts; Mr. Hu walked
out in disgust.

The general¹s tirade was one of a series of events this year that have
fueled concerns among Communist Party leaders over the level of control
they exercise over military officials, who are growing more outspoken and
desire greater influence over policy and politics.

With China¹s once-a-decade leadership transition only months away, the
party is pushing back with a highly visible campaign against disloyalty
and corruption, even requiring all officers to report financial assets.

³Party authorities have come to realize that the military is encroaching
on political affairs,² said one political scientist with high-level party
ties. ³Although the party controls the gun, the expression of viewpoints
from within the military on political issues has aroused a high level of
alarm.² He, like others who agreed to discuss internal party affairs,
spoke on the condition of anonymity because of fear of reprisals.

Some generals and admirals have loudly called for the government to assert
control over the South China Sea, the focus of increasingly rancorous
territorial disputes between several Southeast Asian countries and China,
where nationalist spirits are on the rise among the public and politicians
as well. And earlier this year, leaders in Beijing became alarmed over
ties between generals and the disgraced Politburo member Bo Xilai.

The party¹s need to maintain stable rule over an increasingly vocal
military is one reason Mr. Hu, its top civilian leader, is expected to
hold on to his position as chairman of the Central Military Commission for
up to two years after he gives up his party chief title in the fall,
according to people briefed on political discussions. His anointed
successor, Xi Jinping, would still take over Mr. Hu¹s posts as head of the
party and head of state, but would have to wait to become China¹s military
boss.

Mr. Hu¹s two predecessors both exercised control of the military after
they gave up their other civilian titles. But some party insiders have
argued that a staggered handover can lead to rival centers of power,
splitting generals¹ loyalties. No final decision has been made on whether
Mr. Hu will stay on. But if he does, then Mr. Xi could find himself with
limited room to expand his power base, even though he has more of a
military background than Mr. Hu.

Mr. Hu has been building a network of army loyalists by promoting generals
in waves. At least 45 officers have been promoted to full general by Mr.
Hu since September 2004, when he became head of the military commission.
Just over half the promotions have taken place since July 2010. Four of
the 45 are now among the 10 generals who sit on the commission. One
officer who rose quickly with Mr. Hu¹s support was General Zhang, who
could still be in contention for a commission seat despite his drunken
tantrum.

When Mr. Hu¹s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, held on to his military post from
2002 to 2004, factional enmity arose over many issues. The same could
happen with Mr. Hu and Mr. Xi, who was promoted to a vice chairmanship of
the military commission in 2010. Mr. Jiang yielded his post to Mr. Hu only
after conflicts between the two had intensified.

³The way it goes in the military is: whoever promotes me is my daddy,²
said one member of the party elite who meets with generals regularly.

Such divisions need not be debilitating in an increasingly professional
military, analysts say.

³They prefer to work out these differences in a consensus-building
process,² said Dennis J. Blasko, a retired United States Army intelligence
officer and former military attaché at the American Embassy in Beijing. ³I
see the P.L.A. leadership as rational, pragmatic and realistic,² he added,
referring to the People¹s Liberation Army.

Nonetheless, conversations with officers suggest that some may feel an
affinity for the incoming Mr. Xi they do not share with Mr. Hu, a tea
trader¹s son who has struggled in Mr. Jiang¹s shadow to win respect. Mr.
Xi, 59, is the ³princeling² son of a revered Communist guerrilla leader
who grew up in Beijing with military families. He is stepping into the
leadership role with closer military relationships than anyone since Deng
Xiaoping.

³When those from the Œred second generation¹ move up, there will be a
personal feeling, a traditional bond,² a senior officer said.

Mr. Xi¹s first job was as an aide to Geng Biao, a guerrilla comrade of his
father¹s who became China¹s defense minister in 1981. Mr. Xi later held
political command offices over military units while serving as a civilian
leader in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces opposite Taiwan, which China still
considers part of its country. And he is married to Peng Liyuan, a
celebrity singer from an army performance troupe who holds the equivalent
rank of major general.

Even before taking his post on the military commission, Mr. Xi had
occasional informal meetings in Beijing with several generals, including
the outspoken princelings Liu Yuan and Liu Yazhou, according to Li
Mingjiang, an expert in Chinese politics now in Singapore.

When it comes to ideology, Mr. Xi is a cipher. But with China¹s rise has
come a growing assertiveness in the region, and Mr. Xi will feel pressure
to go in that direction. He will be ³tougher in terms of protecting
China¹s interests,² Mr. Li said. ³The fact that he does have some military
background gives him more confidence in decision making.²

There are signs that some generals believe they have Mr. Xi¹s ear. Last
year, Gen. Liu Yazhou, political commissar of the National Defense
University, sent a famously bellicose major general, Zhu Chenghu, to
Singapore to lead a study on that tiny nation¹s more flexible
authoritarian system. General Liu, who was promoted to full general by Mr.
Hu on July 30, planned to present it to Mr. Xi to make the case for a more
liberal one-party system as a means toward strengthening the state, said
one scholar who met with the group.

Liu Yuan (no relation to Liu Yazhou), another powerful figure in Mr. Xi¹s
network of princeling generals, is the son of Liu Shaoqi, who had been
picked by Mao to take over the post of supreme leader before being purged
and left to die in prison. In an essay published in 2002, Mr. Xi
reminisced about how he bonded with Liu Yuan when they were both given
county-level civilian postings in 1982.

³We agreed with each other even before we talked,² Mr. Xi wrote. ³Both of
us wanted to take the road of integrating with workers and peasants.²

Despite his favored position, Gen. Liu Yuan came under pressure this year
from party authorities because of his connections to Mr. Bo. Indeed, the
Bo affair put civilian officials on heightened alert for such collusive
links. When the scandal began to unfold in February, Mr. Bo alarmed some
party leaders by flying to Yunnan Province to visit the headquarters of
the 14th Group Army, the unit once commanded by his father.

Some say that the scandal damaged Gen. Liu Yuan¹s prospects for promotion.
But his popularity was evident in April, when he earned top marks in a
poll of senior officers, according to a party intellectual close to him.
To guard his career, the general distanced himself from Mr. Bo and made a
declaration of support to Mr. Hu, who had earlier promoted him to full
general.

It was one of many ways that Mr. Hu, analysts say, has tried to corral
officers from elite families and that could allow him to extend his
influence into retirement.

Edward Wong reported from Beijing and Singapore, and Jonathan Ansfield
from Beijing. Patrick Zuo contributed research.