

“THE MONEY-CHANGERS LASHED OUT OF  
THE TEMPLE OF THE PEOPLE”?:  
SINGLE-INTEREST GROUPS AND  
DIRECT LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA

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Big business, the interests, the Southern Pacific, the grasping and greedy public service corporations, the unclean and the vile in politics and in social and in commercial life—these no longer dominate in the halls of legislation.

The money-changers—the legions of mammon and Satan—these have been lashed out of the temple of the people.<sup>1</sup>

In 1913 many Californians, including *Sacramento Bee* publisher Charles K. McClatchy, were optimistic about California’s future. For decades, the Southern Pacific Railroad had dominated state politics. But by 1913, vigorous Governor Hiram Johnson had reformed state government to adapt to the industrial age. Today, California’s prospects do not look as bright as they did a century ago. Even before the global economic downturn of 2008, state government suffered from major problems: political gridlock, late budgets, and mounting deficits. In 1913, government had become more efficient and better-protected workers with new methods to

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keep government clean, open, and accountable to the people. Today, the legislature is unable to tackle the complex problems facing the state—issues such as insurance reform, pensions, property taxes, and environmental regulation. A century ago, direct legislation was in vogue. California instituted a proposition system. The voter-proposed initiative and legislature-checking referendum were seen as the ideal way to return to voters what the Southern Pacific political machine had so long denied. Yet in recent history the initiative has become a popular alternative to decisive legislative action—an easy way to “pass the buck.” In 1978, that buck-passing produced Proposition 13, which radically altered the state tax system. It lowered property taxes, centralized control of tax dollars, and implemented a two-thirds rule for raising taxes, which made it difficult to raise revenue. Following on Proposition 13’s reduction of revenue flexibility, Proposition 98 (1988) severely limited expenditure flexibility, as it mandated that the state commit 40 percent of revenue to schools and community colleges.<sup>2</sup> Both of these measures, along with many other adopted propositions, attempted to solve the large, complex problems looming over the state. Through spending rules and funding formulas, they put state government on autopilot. Elected officials no longer craft policy annually to fit the state’s needs. The budget is dictated by the approved propositions of California’s past. It is ironic that the initiative, the strongest of all methods of direct democracy, has been used to create policies that are so rigid, untouchable, and unaccountable. Direct democracy aims to make government more responsive to the changing desires of citizens. Yet this has not been the case in California. The state is indefinitely subject to past popular whims set in stone through the proposition system.

Direct legislation came about in a wave of reform following the rise of Hiram Johnson and the California Progressives in 1910—a great victory for “the people” over the machine politics of the Southern Pacific Railroad. Yet that victory depended upon a coalition of support from varying single-interest groups. They were united in their belief in reform, and eager to take their case to voters, rather than the legislature. Thus direct legislation—the

initiative and referendum—came about by and for single-interest groups eager to advance their own agendas. The problem was that direct legislation trapped Californians in a single-interest state of mind, in which they could not see the interconnectedness of issues essential for crafting and implementing effective policy.

Single-interest groups rose out of public dissatisfaction with conventional political parties, which had been subjugated by railroad interests. From the earliest days of transcontinental railroad construction in 1863, the Central Pacific Railroad, and its successor, the Southern Pacific, sought to control the state through the political parties. This meshed conveniently with one of California's earliest desires—what put the state in the Republican column was not its stance on slavery, but on intercontinental railroads. California's population was eager for an easier journey to the East Coast of the United States. That is exactly what was promised in the 1856 Republican Party platform. Beginning with the administration of Governor Leland Stanford in 1861, state government and railroad interests became inextricably linked. Stanford served simultaneously as Governor of California and President of the Central Pacific Railroad. Stanford used his power to benefit the Central Pacific. He convinced the legislature to appropriate \$15 million toward railroad construction. State geologists under his office's supervision confirmed what Stanford had long suspected—that the Sierra Nevada mountain range began at the banks of the Sacramento River. Consequently, for every mile of track laid in the Central Valley east of the river, the federal government would loan the Central Pacific \$48,000, instead of \$16,000.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the federal government awarded the Central Pacific 10 square miles of land adjacent to the right of way for every mile of track constructed. This amounted to 11,500,000 acres of California land awarded to the Central Pacific Railroad by 1880.<sup>4</sup> The Central Pacific also constructed major repair shops in Sacramento. California was isolated from the industrial centers of the East—the shops provided for all of the railroad's needs. By 1890, more than 2,700 men labored at the West Coast's greatest industrial complex, in which the railroad invested over \$1.25 million, and held \$1 million in supplies.<sup>5</sup> The Central Pacific Railroad

was the most powerful institution in the State of California. It was the largest landowner, taxpayer, and employer in the state.<sup>6</sup>

That influence continued as the Central Pacific became the Southern Pacific Company in 1885. The Southern Pacific developed a powerful statewide political machine. At the time all candidates for office needed political affiliations, and political parties selected candidates by convention. The Southern Pacific machine seized control of these nominating conventions, securing the power to choose the candidates for nearly every office in the state.<sup>7</sup> To ensure that the elected officials followed orders, the Southern Pacific set up a powerful political bureau. The Southern Pacific's chief consul, William F. Herrin, ran the bureau. From San Francisco, he oversaw operatives statewide. His first lieutenant, Walter F.X. Parker, ran operations in Southern California. Parker paid particular attention to Los Angeles, and the representatives sent to Sacramento.<sup>8</sup> The goal was to evade rate regulation and taxes. Combined with the apathy of new residents focused on settling their families, and the railroad's tremendous monopolistic power to punish, the Southern Pacific held the state throughout the 19th century and into the first decade of the 20th century.<sup>9</sup>

Yet that power began to wane as Californians became more politically aware of, and economically threatened by, the Southern Pacific machine. The Mussel Slough Tragedy of 1880, a squabble over land in the Mussel Slough country, transformed into a mythic land war between honest, hard-working settlers and the Southern Pacific Railroad.<sup>10</sup> The cover of a pro-settler pamphlet blared a soon-common sentiment: "The Grasping Greed of the Railroad Monopoly."<sup>11</sup> The railroad was greedy—and discriminatory towards small farmers, manufacturers, and merchants. A 1907 investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission found that 103 firms had favorable rate discriminations on the railroads of California. Most were big shippers, like cattle titan Miller & Lux, Inc. The Southern Pacific made favorable deals with oil companies, transporting petroleum at discounted rates in exchange for cheaper fuel for their trains.<sup>12</sup> In 1892, Collis P. Huntington led the Southern Pacific in an attempt to convince Congress to sup-

port a Los Angeles harbor at Santa Monica—where Huntington and the Southern Pacific-owned land—rather than at San Pedro. It sparked a rush of support for the San Pedro Harbor, as a Santa Monica harbor threatened the sovereignty of Los Angeles shipping.<sup>13</sup> It angered local businessmen. Along with discriminated-against small oil producers, ranchers, farmers, and settlers, these businessmen became increasingly frustrated with the Southern Pacific machine.

Even more frustrating was political parties' unresponsiveness to the voters' disgust with the Southern Pacific. The Republican Party was wholly infected with the Southern Pacific bug. Herrin and Parker's operatives swarmed through the ranks. The Democratic Party was not a potent force, but was infiltrated whenever necessary.<sup>14</sup> Splinter parties, such as the Union Labor Party in San Francisco, would ultimately be integrated into the statewide political machine. In response, Californians (particularly Southern Californians with mid-western, populist roots<sup>15</sup>) embraced new single-interest groups—the Anti-Saloon League, California Federation of Women's Clubs, Asiatic Exclusion League, and the Free Harbor League to name just a few—that concentrated on specific areas for change and reform.

Molding those groups into a potent political force would be the work of Dr. John Randolph Haynes. Haynes spent his early childhood in the anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania, and moved to Philadelphia in 1863 when he was 10. Within four years, his father lost the small fortune that brought the Haynes family to Philadelphia, and John left school to work. Hard labor left him with inflammatory arthritis, but he kept working and saved his money. By the fall of 1871, he had saved enough to attend a full year of medical school at the University of Pennsylvania without working.<sup>16</sup> He studied medicine for three years, while concurrently pursuing a then-unfamiliar degree, Doctor of Philosophy. This pursuit exposed him to new branches of science, such as zoology and botany. For Haynes, more significant was the study of literature and history. While his M.D. informed a scientific approach to healing, his Ph.D., with its study of the humanities, led him to

ponder social and cultural methods of healing.<sup>17</sup> His first practice in Philadelphia served the Port Richmond neighborhood. It was home to poor Irish and Jewish immigrants.<sup>18</sup> Surely this experience had Haynes thinking about ways to improve his patients' lives and the general condition of America's poor: "as a physician I was obliged to depend on pills when I knew only too well that the real medicine my patients needed was good nourishing food, proper living conditions, freedom from financial worry, rest, and change. All these were denied them because they belonged to the working class."<sup>19</sup>

Seeking better weather for his own feeble health, Haynes moved to Los Angeles in 1887. He set up one of the largest private practices in the city. He dabbled in real estate speculation and became a millionaire. In his first decade his pursuits were mainly social, cultivating friends and potential business partners. His medical practice helped—he was the personal physician to many of Los Angeles's most prominent citizens, such as *Los Angeles Times* publisher Harrison Gray Otis.<sup>20</sup> During the 1890s, reform organizations such as the "League for Better City Government" became a popular pastime for Haynes' social circle. His involvement in these organizations, however, did not become significant until January 1898, when he met Reverend William D.P. Bliss. Bliss preached "Christian socialism," the gradual evolution of society to economic equality. He made his case in a revivalist style that uplifted Haynes's pessimistic view of class conditions, and motivated him to take a leading role in reform. Bliss's program also included an activist organization, the Union Reform League, with which Haynes could immediately involve himself in reform work.<sup>21</sup> Bliss particularly appealed to Haynes because of his gradual view of economic transformation. It would not preclude or punish his tremendous wealth—another major impetus for political involvement.<sup>22</sup> By the late 1890s, Haynes served on the board of directors of many corporations, including the California Hospital Company, Conservative Life Insurance Company, Quartette Mines, Simi Crude Oil Company, Sinaloa Land and Water Company, and Pan American Gold Dredging Company.<sup>23</sup> Clearly, it was in his moral,

social, and economic interest to become involved in the reform movements that were gaining steam in Los Angeles.

There certainly were many reform movements in Los Angeles—generally, in two categories. Social reformers such as women’s suffragists, single-taxers, proponents of public utilities ownership, prohibitionists, and labor advocates sought to use government to improve conditions and expand opportunities for varying constituencies. These reformers leaned to the left. There were also middle and upper class structural reformers. They wanted to restructure government, to make it efficient and accountable. In contrast to reformers of the left wing, structural reformers sought “government by expert.” They relied on appointed professionals rather than elected officials—who could be subject to the dangerous whims of the popular masses.<sup>24</sup> The genius of John Randolph Haynes was to corral social reform groups around a structural reform: direct legislation.<sup>25</sup> None of these groups could successfully navigate the machine-dominated state legislature alone. Direct legislation—the initiative and referendum—would offer all reform groups an easier road to success by avoiding machine politics. It could also be used, as Haynes would use it, to forge a coalition of reformers able to take on Walter F.X. Parker and the Southern Pacific machine in Los Angeles.

Haynes first became involved in the Union Reform League effort to insert the initiative and referendum into the new Los Angeles city charter proposed in 1898. They were accepted (though the recall proposal was not), but the required signature count for the initiative was raised to such a level that the Union Reform League ultimately worked toward defeating the charter.<sup>26</sup> Haynes took the lead in the 1900 effort to incorporate direct legislation into a new city charter. He was selected as a member of the Board of Freeholders, a testament to his reputation throughout Los Angeles. Once on the Board, he maneuvered to have his good friend, William A. Spalding (former editor of the *Los Angeles Herald*) selected as chairman. He worked with Spalding to craft a palatable committee to draft a direct legislation proposal—on this committee Haynes would lobby intensely for the initiative, referendum, and

recall.<sup>27</sup> Haynes later recounted, with reference to one committee member, that “I worked on him for an hour, at the end of which time he surrendered unconditionally, fearing perhaps, that if he did not I might follow him to his hotel further to torment him.”<sup>28</sup> The board approved the committee proposals, spurring Haynes to create the Direct Legislation League of Los Angeles. It would work toward voter approval of the direct legislation amendments. Unfortunately, the legitimacy of the Board of Freeholders was thrown out in the courts, and the City Council refused to put the charter amendments on the ballot. This did not stop Haynes.<sup>29</sup> He fought on, and eventually found success in December 1902, when the initiative and referendum amendment was approved by more than six votes to one, and recall passed by more than four and a half votes to one.<sup>30</sup> Los Angeles was the first municipality in the country to embrace all three of these reforms.<sup>31</sup>

With victory in Los Angeles, Haynes embarked in June 1902 on a mission to bring direct legislation to the entire state. He founded the Direct Legislation League of California. As in Los Angeles, Haynes convinced single-interest groups to support direct legislation as the best tool to advance their agendas. Prohibitionists could rid the state of alcohol, suffragists could win the vote, and single-taxers could achieve radical changes in the tax structure that no legislature, vested with the corporate interests of the Southern Pacific, would dare touch. But the statehouse was firmly under Southern Pacific control. After a long meeting in 1903, Haynes prevailed upon Walter F.X. Parker to support direct legislation—in the state Senate. It passed 65 to 1, then met sudden death in the Assembly.<sup>32</sup> State politics was still firmly in the grasp of the Southern Pacific machine. Yet Haynes had much to hope for: the fight for direct legislation forged his coalition of single-interest groups into a social reform force to be reckoned with. In Los Angeles, that reform coalition would seize control of city government in 1906, under the leadership of a successful young attorney named Meyer Lissner. With victory over Walter F.X. Parker and the Southern Pacific machine, Lissner wrote Progressive leader Robert La Follette, exalting that “the general sentiment seems to be that we have gotten the machine on the



run and with this beginning...we ought to be able to carry the state."<sup>33</sup>

Implementing Progressive reforms statewide would be the eventual work of robust San Francisco attorney Hiram Johnson. Johnson was raised in Sacramento. His father, Grove Johnson, was an attorney and politician. Grove moved to Sacramento in 1863, leaving behind his native Syracuse, New York. At the time it was still a rugged, Gold Rush mining camp. It offered a welcome escape from the East—where Grove had been indicted for falsifying endorsements on two promissory notes, each valued at \$250. His options were prison or California, where he could evade the law while raising the funds to pay his debts. He soon paid these off and saw the charges dropped, but it would not be the last time he ran into trouble with the law.<sup>34</sup> Grove entered politics in 1866, as the swamp land clerk of Sacramento County. He did not always play by the rules: in 1867, while campaigning for county auditor, Grove entered the names of 61 nonexistent men into the register of eligible voters for Granite Township, hoping to boost his chances of electoral success.<sup>35</sup> His arrest and charge for violating campaign election laws did not limit his propensity for unorthodox campaigning. During his run for State Senate in 1871, it was found that counterfeit ballots had been printed, with invisible ink that caused the name of his opponent, James Duffy, to disappear within a few hours, leaving Grove Johnson as the sole candidate.<sup>36</sup> This was the political world in which Hiram Johnson was raised. It was the kind of world in which, when confronting a local party boss, “Grove Johnson, a well-known attorney in the town, [would walk] in with his two sons, Albert and Hiram, both little more than boys, and both carrying revolvers,” muckraker Lincoln Steffens recollected.<sup>37</sup> Hiram grew up surrounded by the rough-and-tumble of California politics. He was continuously exposed to the corruption that he would soon fight against. Yet he stood by his father, entering into a law partnership with him in 1888, and managing his campaign for Congress in 1894.<sup>38</sup> The fissure came in 1896, when Hiram advised his father not to run for reelection. Hiram felt that Grove’s support of the Southern Pacific Railroad made reelection impossible. Though he would vote for

his father, Hiram refused to take the active role he often assumed in his father's campaigns.<sup>39</sup> It destroyed Hiram's relationship with his father, who went down in defeat. With this relationship in tatters, Hiram left the law partnership. His father moved to San Francisco. They would butt heads ferociously in 1901, as Hiram campaigned for and Grove against George H. Clark, Sacramento's reform-minded mayor. At one rally, Grove was reported to have declared, in reference to his sons, "Children make mistakes: the old man never does!"<sup>40</sup> He later described his sons as "one Albert, full of booze, and one Hiram, full of egotism."<sup>41</sup>

With that, Hiram had his fill of the gruff, gun-slinging politics of Sacramento, and departed for the West's grandest metropolis in 1902. San Francisco offered Hiram and his brother Albert exciting new opportunities.<sup>42</sup> They set up a prosperous law practice, representing major businesses, prominent citizens, and powerful unions. Hiram gained a reputation for his quick mind. Garrett McEnerney, head of the San Francisco Bar Association, was astounded by "how Johnson's cross-examination could be conducted, particularly in view of the rapidity with which he asked questions and his total lack of reference to any notes of any kind."<sup>43</sup> Hiram became known for his violent tendencies—"I will meet you outside anytime Mr. Williams so long as you come in front!" he once promised a defendant on the stand after retrieving a dagger from the man's jacket, and receiving a violent threat.<sup>44</sup> Yet Hiram's string of dramatic, highly-publicized victories in court were besmirched by a major defeat at the hands of political boss Abraham Ruef. As an attorney in a million-dollar will dispute, Ruef did not offer a closing argument. Yet the jury found in favor of his client, and against Johnson's, within 10 minutes. Infuriated, Johnson declared to his son, "I will even the score with that man if it takes me the rest of my life."<sup>45</sup>

That moment came in October 1906, when Hiram Johnson joined the "graft prosecution." He would assist in the prosecution of Union Labor Party boss Abraham Ruef, Mayor Eugene E. Schmitz, and several members of the Board of Supervisors. Abraham Ruef had become increasingly powerful since his last

encounter with Johnson, in 1902. In November 1905, his Union Labor Party swept municipal elections, conquering the mayor's office as well as the Board of Supervisors. This was not what Boss Ruef was expecting. He had not given much thought to his candidates for the Board of Supervisors.<sup>46</sup> Yet the 18 that he selected won their elections. They knew nothing about their role other than that it would offer them the opportunity to take bribes, as had been the norm throughout the Gilded Age.<sup>47</sup> Ruef facilitated their transactions with major corporations. They included the Union Railroads, which operated street railways in the city, and the Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company, a major utility. As Supervisor James L. Gallagher testified, with regard to one payment to the Board from the Union Railroads, "I think it was about \$20,000...that payment just mentioned was in currency and the bills were one, two, five, ten, and twenty dollars and it made quite a large package, 12 or 14 inches in height."<sup>48</sup> Ruef also took substantial slices for himself—such as a \$125,000 bribe from the Home Telephone Company to allow them to enter into competition with the Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph.<sup>49</sup> Ruef also used his power to gain clout in the California Republican Party. He allied himself with William F. Herrin—chief council and political boss for the Southern Pacific. His men threw their support behind Southern Pacific-backed candidates and platform planks at state Republican conventions. Through his cooperation, Ruef hoped to become a United States Senator.<sup>50</sup> If the prosecution had its way, he would go to San Quentin, not Washington. Johnson worked with District Attorney William H. Langdon and lead prosecutor Francis J. Heney as they prepared to take on San Francisco's dominant political hierarchy. Originally, District Attorney Langdon intended to make Johnson lead prosecutor, but ultimately selected the more experienced Heney.<sup>51</sup> Johnson still played a major role, however, and received wide media attention for his brilliant opening and closing arguments at Mayor Schmitz's trial. The Los Angeles *Herald* reported that his closing argument was "masterly in argument and in eloquence. Mr. Johnson avoided anything like an attempted resume of the evidence...He selected rather the main peaks and steering by them endeavored to pilot

the jury over a short course to conviction.”<sup>52</sup> For all the media attention, these trials were incredibly frustrating for the prosecution. Defense attorneys stalled jury selection, in one instance questioning 2,370 veniremen to select 12 jurors.<sup>53</sup> After jury selection, swarms of defense attorneys and detectives encumbered the prosecution’s ability to speak with witnesses or find evidence. The home of a key witness, former Supervisor James L. Gallagher, was dynamited in April 1908.<sup>54</sup> The defense subsidized friendly local newspapers.<sup>55</sup> The breaking point came when, on November 13, during the trial of Boss Ruff, former convict Morris Haas shot prosecutor Francis J. Heney in open court.<sup>56</sup> It is not clear if this was organized by Ruff’s political machine, but when Johnson was called in to finish the prosecution, he did so with a palpable hatred of Ruff. In his closing arguments he would thunder of Ruff, “here was a man who had been honored by the people—taking the bills that were worn and frayed and tattered and had the tears of the senders upon them—as a bribe to betray his city.”<sup>57</sup>

Johnson’s well-received trial performance catalyzed his rise in California politics as a leading warrior against corruption. The *San Francisco Call* told readers that “never before in the history of criminal jurisprudence in San Francisco has there been voiced in any court a more terrific denunciation of any man than the lashing given Abe Ruff by Hiram W. Johnson yesterday morning.”<sup>58</sup> The *Los Angeles Herald* referred to Johnson as “one of the foremost criminal lawyers of the state.”<sup>59</sup> Yet for Johnson, more significant was what occurred in the trials that followed. The prosecution intended to convict business leaders that had bribed government officials. They intended to stop corruption at its source, going after such men as Louis Glass and Theodore Halsey of the Pacific State Telephone and Telegraph Company. But business leaders were untouchable. Their armies of attorneys, through appeal upon appeal, were insurmountable. Johnson became so enraged that he resorted to blows with a defense attorney during the trial of Halsey, and was fined \$25.<sup>60</sup> Johnson came to recognize that corporate interests were too strong and too enmeshed in government. For government to serve the people, it would need to be directly controlled by the people.

Hiram Johnson was not alone in concluding that state government needed reform. Though John Randolph Haynes took no credit, in January 1907 he organized a dinner featuring muckraker Lincoln Steffens as a guest speaker. Two of his guests were Edward A. Dickson of the *Los Angeles Express* and Chester Rowell of the *Fresno Republican*.<sup>61</sup> The two began correspondence. Both were concerned with Southern Pacific machine domination of state politics. In August 1907, the two newspaper editors formally launched the Lincoln-Roosevelt League of Republican Clubs.<sup>62</sup> The group intended to retake California government, bringing “purer politics in the state and demanding the elimination of corporation influences from the affairs of the [Republican] party.”<sup>63</sup> They intended to challenge the Southern Pacific machine up and down the ballot. Though not directly connected to Haynes’ apparatus in Southern California, the Lincoln-Roosevelt League stood for similar principles, and was assisted by their Southern Californian supporters’ well-developed organizations. Public dissatisfaction with the machine was high. It led the League to win half of the delegates at the state Republican convention in 1908, and control just as many seats as the machine in the upcoming 1909 legislative session in Sacramento.<sup>64</sup>

His stature enhanced by his role in the prosecution of Abraham Ruef, Hiram Johnson became a statewide advocate for reform. Johnson and Haynes came together in January 1909. Johnson traveled to Sacramento to appear before the State Senate Committee on Election Laws on behalf of Haynes’ Direct Primary League.<sup>65</sup> Their goal was to give the power of selecting party candidates to voters, instead of party bosses. It would make nominating conventions obsolete, breaking Southern Pacific control. Johnson’s conservative father, Grove, chaired the senate committee. Though Grove fought the direct primary, Progressives succeeded in passing the measure, which became law in March. California would have direct primaries in the upcoming 1910 gubernatorial election. Short of vote tampering, the Southern Pacific machine could no longer control party nominations. Meanwhile, in November 1909, Johnson became a vice president of the Lincoln-Roosevelt League.<sup>66</sup> His name floated as a candidate for governor. Initially,

he refused to run. He had built a beautiful house on Russian Hill in San Francisco, with magnificent views of the Bay and looming Marin Headlands. He was enjoying the quiet—and highly lucrative—life of a private attorney. His wife, Minnie, furthermore, would have nothing less than the United States Senate. Chester Rowell had to promise her that the governorship would serve as a stepping-stone to the Senate.<sup>67</sup> It also took a promise from Lincoln-Roosevelt League leaders to Hiram: that the campaign would be about one issue, and one issue only. It would be about breaking the Southern Pacific machine. Johnson's experiences in state politics had convinced him that no progress could be made on any front unless large corporations like the Southern Pacific were systemically inhibited from political involvement.

With that promise extracted, Johnson began a vigorous campaign. He charged up and down the state, reaching out to voters in small communities that rarely received gubernatorial candidates' attention. As W. Russell Cole reported for the *San Francisco Call*, "Johnson has met with such a reception as might be accorded a nation's hero returning victorious from battle."<sup>68</sup> He was their hero—the man who would vanquish the long-oppressive Southern Pacific, and return to the people fair rates on the rails and a government responsive to their needs. Johnson won a plurality in the Republican primary in August with 101,666 votes—only 12,273 less than the combined total of his four opponents.<sup>69</sup> Yet to assure victory, Johnson would need to forge a broad coalition of support. Albert J. Wallace served as Johnson's running mate. He was a Southern Californian, president of the Anti-Saloon League of California, and was deeply involved in the affairs of small oil producers.<sup>70</sup> All three of these groups were important to Johnson. Central Valley landowners were frustrated by the Southern Pacific's manipulative rates, and Johnson could garner their support with his strong anti-railroad stance.<sup>71</sup> Prohibitionist sentiment was particularly strong in Southern California—which Johnson swept, undoubtedly, because he was running with the president of the Anti-Saloon League.<sup>72</sup> Daniel M. Gandier, legislative superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League, convinced many church organizations

to support Johnson, without making too much of a spectacle as to concern the northern “wets” that Johnson would also need for victory.<sup>73</sup> Johnson also depended upon business leaders who were not part of the Southern Pacific’s chosen industrial elite. To businessmen Johnson declared, “I have no quarrel with honest business interests of any kind; my warfare is upon successful dishonesty.”<sup>74</sup> This coalition would grow to include the California Consumer’s League, which sought better working conditions, and suffragists organized through the California Federation of Women’s Clubs.<sup>75</sup>

Johnson’s coalition also included another important voting bloc: John Randolph Haynes. In mid-March, Haynes inquired as to whether, as a gubernatorial candidate, Johnson would support the initiative, referendum, and recall. When Johnson responded in the affirmative, Haynes made a point of publicizing it in Direct Legislation League literature. But he played no active role in the campaign. He left for Europe in mid-May, and would not return until just after Johnson’s November victory.<sup>76</sup>

Yet direct legislation would secure more than just Haynes’ support. Within Johnson’s broad coalition of single-interests, all sought the demise of the Southern Pacific machine. Planks in the party platform promised that the Progressive government would meet the needs of each. Direct legislation promised something extra—that prohibitionists could go straight to voters with a “local option” initiative, suffragists could take their case straight to the men, and any reform group, should the Lincoln-Roosevelt League fail them in the legislature, could go straight to the people with their proposal. In an age in which an effective, responsive legislature was unprecedented, direct legislation was quite a proposition.

After more than 600 speeches in the primary, and several hundred more before the general election, Johnson achieved victory with 177,191 votes—22,000 more than his opponent, Theodore Bell.<sup>77</sup> With a particularly healthy margin in Los Angeles County, Johnson undoubtedly benefited from the Progressive organizations that men like John Randolph Haynes had built—and the popular support that Southern Californians gave to their local reforms, and were now eager to see statewide. Voters were con-

vinced that Johnson was the man to rid government of Southern Pacific operatives. Yet it is somewhat ironic that in his first inaugural address Johnson would refer to the evils of “private” and “special” interests no less than eight times, in descriptions of his “design to eliminate special interests from the government and to require from our officials the highest efficiency and an undivided allegiance.”<sup>78</sup> Where did the special needs of the single-interest groups of his coalition fit into this? Were they not special interests just as focused on their specific agendas as the Southern Pacific? It is true that theirs were not as greedily self-serving, but they still represented special concerns that every official elected under the Lincoln-Roosevelt League banner had to consider.

All of Johnson’s single-interest groups sought the initiative and referendum. The Republican State Central Committee, now under the control of the Lincoln-Roosevelt League Progressives, created a Committee on Direct Legislation to draft direct legislation amendments and strategize their passage. John Randolph Haynes served on the committee, which was staffed heavily by, and consulted frequently with, Haynes’ Direct Legislation League.<sup>79</sup> Committee chairman Lee C. Gates introduced the amendments to the state Senate. Hiram Johnson cajoled reluctant legislators, reminding them that they were duty-bound by the Lincoln-Roosevelt platform to vote for the amendments.<sup>80</sup> After passage by the legislature, they were signed by Governor Johnson and put on the ballot for a special election on October 10, 1911, as Proposition 7, or Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 22. The amendment to the state constitution created three new methods of direct democracy in California. The first was the referendum. With a petition signed by registered voters equal to 5 percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial election, any measure could be put to a popular vote. Voters could use the referendum to strike down bad legislation. In the words of the 1911 Voter’s Guide, the referendum would “[give] to the people the power to arrest, and prevent the taking effect, of viscous or objectionable acts of the legislature.”<sup>81</sup> In addition to the referendum, Proposition 7 empowered Californians with two types of initiatives. This was uncharted territory—Californians had voted on measures in the



past, but never before had they the power to originate them. The less bold of the two was the indirect initiative. Any measure that had the support of registered voters equal to 5 percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial election would be put to a vote in the legislature. If the measure failed, the legislature was obliged to propose an alternative, and put it on the ballot alongside the original, defeated proposal. The more radical was the direct initiative. With the support of registered voters equal to 8 percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial election, Californians could propose statutes or constitutional amendments for statewide vote. With a simple majority, measures would take full force—without the input of the legislature or the governor. Furthermore, these initiatives could not be repealed by the traditional legislative process—only by another proposition.

All three were highly controversial, and Haynes quickly mobilized the Direct Legislation League, and substantial personal funding, to ensure the proposition's passage. Haynes went on a 30-day automobile tour of the state, advocating vociferously for direct legislation.<sup>82</sup> Supporters lauded the measures, which would “give the people power to control legislation of the state, and make it to represent what the law should always reflect, the will of the people.”<sup>83</sup> Yet their arguments also alluded to the needs of the single-interests within the Lincoln-Roosevelt coalition. They argued that the initiative “[would] give men who think differently on general party affairs, but who agree on a particular measure, the chance to vote upon such a measure.”<sup>84</sup> The initiative would serve single-interest groups, allowing them to surmount the party structure by going straight to voters. That could be a benefit for voters, as well. They would no longer be constrained by the platforms of candidates for elected office.

Many in California did not see it that way. Grove Johnson reminded Californians, “the voice of the people is not the voice of God, for the voice of the people sent Jesus to the cross.”<sup>85</sup> The *New York Times* railed against direct legislation, presciently observing, “the new method is proposed as a check on the machines. But the strength of the machines lies in the inattention and the indifference of the voters, and the voters are sure in the long run to

be more inattentive and indifferent in proportion to the number of questions forced upon them at one time.”<sup>86</sup> Even sharper, in his reasonable arguments against direct legislation, state Senator Leroy Wright reminded voters, “[initiatives’] ramifications often extend beyond the vision of the wisest. Well meaning laws not infrequently bring about results not contemplated.”<sup>87</sup>

Yet for all of the well-reasoned arguments against the initiative and referendum, proponents lambasted detractors as “without exception the servants of special interests,” “those who profit through special legislation,” and “political aristocrats who distrust and scoff at the people.”<sup>88</sup> Even Lee Gates—chairman of the committee that drafted the amendments and a major proponent of the reforms—expressed concern that as population, and thus the required signatures, increased, direct legislation would only be possible with substantial financial backing, making it much easier prey for corporate goliaths like the Southern Pacific.<sup>89</sup> But with the state’s mightiest political force, Governor Hiram Johnson, in favor of the reforms, it would be almost impossible to stop.<sup>90</sup>

Proposition 7 passed on October 10, 1911. The vote was 168,744 to 52,093.<sup>91</sup> California’s experiment with direct democracy had begun.

Early propositions performed as promised. They brought single-interest groups, and their concerns, to voters’ attention. In 1914, there were 17 initiatives on the ballot. Voters approved Proposition 11, authorizing \$1.8 million in bonds to expand facilities at the University of California at Berkeley. Also approved was Proposition 20, which banned prizefighting in the state.<sup>92</sup> There were many other, albeit unsuccessful, single-interest initiatives on the ballot. Yet the initial excitement would not be matched in 1916—there were only four initiatives on the ballot that year. The 1918 ballot contained only six. In fact, that record would not be surpassed until 1990. In the interim, the number of initiatives declined through to the 1960s. Why were California’s single-interest groups not taking advantage of the initiative and referendum?

With the success of the Lincoln-Roosevelt League, good government finally came to Sacramento. The initiative and refer-

endum were not necessary when the legislature worked effectively. But the state legislature had been the hostage of the Southern Pacific for so long, and California was relatively so young, that it was incomprehensible for the legislature to be anything other than the Southern Pacific machine's hostage. This perspective was evident in the 1911 Voter Information Pamphlet, where proponents of the initiative and referendum described the legislature as enacting "vicious or objectionable" laws, "[bargaining] with private interests," and "[violating] people's rights."<sup>93</sup> Single-interest groups were pragmatic in seeking alternative routes to making their proposals law—it had been impossible in the legislature of Herrin and Parker. The elections of 1910 changed everything. The Progressive insurgents claimed dominant majorities in both houses. With those majorities, the legislature became a tool for reform. The Johnson Administration enacted all of the proposals in the 1910 platform—thus rendering initiatives unnecessary. Direct legislation was not necessary once the unfixable, the legislature, was finally fixed. In the first week of the 1911 session, 156 Senate bills and 159 Assembly bills were referred to the appropriate committees, which were busy with reform.<sup>94</sup> It would be among the most productive sessions ever, with reform in railroad regulation, public utilities, government organization, election rules, women's suffrage, direct election of U.S. Senators, direct legislation, labor laws, conservation efforts, and alcohol regulation.<sup>95</sup> The success of these reforms was remarkable—railroad regulation saved travelers, shippers and consumers more than \$2 million in 1912.<sup>96</sup> Even with regulation, the Southern Pacific prospered, while the firms and consumers of the railroad's services enjoyed greater prosperity, as well.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, improvements in government efficiency and organization made by the new Board of Control led the state budget from a \$250,000 deficit in 1910 to a \$4.5 million surplus in 1917.<sup>98</sup> Good government had arrived in Sacramento. The initiative and referendum were no longer necessary to surmount the state capital. The legislature was no longer an obstacle.

Yet the stunning success of the Progressive movement in California came to be its own undoing. It propelled California Progressives to the forefront of national attention. The popular-

ity and success of Governor Johnson's reforms proved the merit of Progressive proposals nationwide. Surely, Johnson had successfully harnessed industrial capitalism for the public good, as Theodore Roosevelt hoped to do for the United States as a whole. In January 1912, Johnson became a founding charter member of Robert La Follette's National Progressive Republican League. In February he travelled east to Oyster Bay to meet with former President Theodore Roosevelt. With Meyer Lissner and Chester Rowell, he planned to persuade Roosevelt to run for President in November.<sup>99</sup> In June, as a delegate to the Republican National Convention, Hiram Johnson led nearly 350 delegates out of the convention to establish the new Progressive Party. He served as its temporary chairman, and was later nominated as its candidate for Vice President.<sup>100</sup> He spent the coming months campaigning with Theodore Roosevelt, who would state, "of all public men in this country, [Hiram Johnson] is the one with whom I find myself in most complete sympathy."<sup>101</sup>

Involvement in the national Progressive Party kept California leaders like Hiram Johnson, Chester Rowell, and Meyer Lissner out of close involvement in state politics. Their absence, combined with the stunning success of the 1911 legislative session, led to reform fatigue among many in the Progressive coalition. Some still sought further reform—particularly labor interests—and some reform was crafted in the 1913 legislative session. The general mood, however, was to wait and watch, to see which reforms would ultimately prove successful, which otherwise, and then act. Johnson expressed this sentiment when, upon his reelection in 1914, he declared, "at this moment, it is not my purpose to set forth to you any definite program...In the biennial message some few recommendations are made...None of this is to be done hastily in ill-considered, or half-understood legislation."<sup>102</sup> In comparison to the barnstorming legislation of his first term, little would be done in the 1915 legislative session. Johnson would be elected to the United States Senate in 1916. During Johnson's campaign for Governor in 1910, Chester Rowell had cautioned Meyer Lissner: "Johnson is the strength of this campaign. He is winning it, not we."<sup>103</sup> The same could be said in 1916. When Johnson left for

Washington, he took with him the core of the Progressive movement in California. Combined with the coming world war, the Progressives and their coalition of single-interest groups became less important in state politics. The fall of these groups brought the disuse of their beloved initiative and referendum.

Though Progressive single-interest groups did not use the initiative as they had planned, it did find other users after the end of World War I. In 1920, the People's Anti-Single Tax League (PASTL) succeeded in putting Proposition 4 on the ballot. The proposal would have raised the necessary signatures to put a tax-related initiative on the ballot from 8 to 25 percent of voters in the last gubernatorial election—something only the best-financed political organizations could muster.<sup>104</sup> PASTL's backers, leaders in the banking, transportation, oil, and real estate industries, worried that proponents of Henry George's "single-tax" on the rental value of unused land, designed to inhibit the amalgamation of large property holdings, would be approved by voters as an initiative—even though it had been voted down by increasing majorities in 1912, 1914, and 1916. Furthermore, the proponents aimed to link direct legislation with the single-tax, and thus discredit it as equally radical.<sup>105</sup> To counter this attack, John Randolph Haynes created the League to Protect the Initiative in February 1920. He spent thousands of dollars building the organization, and appealed to interest groups including organized labor, single-taxers, and teachers, to join the coalition against restrictions on direct legislation.<sup>106</sup> Haynes was successful in 1920, and repelled a similar advance in 1922. Even in the "return to normalcy," Haynes would not have the power of direct legislation—in particular its effect on revenue—encumbered by the work of a single-interest group, even when that required organizing opposing single-interest groups towards a proposition's defeat. In the coming decades, the proposition system would ebb and flow as the state developed through the 20th century. The 1930s saw law enforcement reforms that brought Alameda County District Attorney Earl Warren to statewide prominence, and eventually to be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. In the 1940s, World War II kept the state humming with industrial growth, and many proposi-

tions focused on serving the state's changing economic needs. The 1950s showed the first signs of contention. Proposition 4 of 1956 prompted a major fight between competing oil firms, and the "Right to Work" Proposition 18 prompted massive, statewide union mobilization. Yet the proposition system would not reach Progressive era frenzy until the late 1970s.<sup>107</sup>

In 1920, John Randolph Haynes opposed limits on the initiative and referendum concerning taxation because he *wanted* voters to be free to *raise* taxes on the wealthiest individuals and corporations in the state. How different the conversation was in 1978, when an initiative on the ballot, Proposition 13, aimed to *inhibit* voters and lawmakers from raising taxes, while leaving it as easy as ever to *lower* them.

In 1978, irreverent tax activist Howard Jarvis teamed up with soft-spoken political operative Paul Gann to put an initiative on the ballot that would have all property assessed based on the value at acquisition, and require a two-thirds vote of approval from the legislature to increase taxes. This was not Jarvis' first attempt—he had tried, and failed, in 1972 and 1976. But he was determined. Jarvis once told a reporter, "I'm going to stay in this tax thing 'till it either wins or I die."<sup>108</sup> With Gann's voter lists, he would find success.<sup>109</sup>

By 1978, Jarvis was a senior citizen. He had a long career in business and running for elected office. He also engaged in some questionable political fundraising. In 1964 he raised \$115,000 for Barry Goldwater—not a dime of which went to the Goldwater campaign, but rather to Jarvis' fees and expenses. Goldwater eventually sued to have the operation shut down. A similar program was set up to "support" Senator S. I. Hayakawa.<sup>110</sup> But at present, Jarvis was managing the properties of apartment house owners. Property values were skyrocketing—ratcheting up their tax bills. Landlords could pass on the expense to lessees. Retired Californians on fixed incomes had no such option. Between 1974 and 1978, the average value of a California home shot up from \$34,000 to \$85,000. Retirees worried that they would lose their homes because they could not pay the property taxes.<sup>111</sup> At the

same time, many worried that a decrease in property tax revenue would affect public school funding dramatically, leading to a sharp drop in the quality of public education. Jarvis remained unfazed: “The initiative is to cut property taxes in California and to save a couple of million people from losing their homes. They are a lot more important than twenty thousand schoolteachers.”<sup>112</sup>

In his fight against taxes, Jarvis revolutionized the initiative business. Jarvis would need to conduct substantial fundraising—eventually over \$2 million—to fight for Proposition 13. The entire state establishment, recognizing the mortal danger to public education, was firmly against the proposition. A coalition representing government, unions, and major corporations came together because they recognized, as John Randolph Haynes would have, that Jarvis was taking advantage of the proposition system. Jarvis turned to Bill Butcher and Arnold Forde, Newport Beach campaign consultants.<sup>113</sup> They developed an extremely effective direct mail campaign. Targeting older homeowners, Butcher and Forde sent out mailings that looked like those from tax collectors, often labeled “Important Tax Information Inside.” Within, they would provide recipients with an easy way to prevent the government from raising their taxes. A campaign contribution would suffice.<sup>114</sup> The campaign raked in millions, demonstrating the feasibility of large-scale, professionally-managed initiative campaigns. The tremendous 62.6 percent victory convinced many single-interests that with the right strategists they could convince the people of California to adopt their proposals, too, regardless of their implications. Proposition 13 had major ramifications. Instantly, local property tax revenues declined by roughly \$7 billion, amounting to, on average, a 50 percent cut in school district funding.<sup>115</sup> The end of property value reassessment would reshape the business climate, giving an advantage to older businesses and people who owned their homes for longer. It also tilted the balance of land development towards sales-tax generators—retail and car malls—rather than office buildings or manufacturing centers. It centralized fiscal policy, leading to an invasion of Sacramento by lobbyists eager to advance their agendas. Now lobbying could be

efficient, not one school board and water district at a time.<sup>116</sup> All of these were unforeseen consequences, not fathomed fully by voters with only a single interest in mind: keeping property taxes low.

This was a watershed moment for the initiative. Proposition 13 demonstrated voters' willingness to make big decisions themselves, and the effectiveness of the developing "initiative industrial complex" at swaying voter opinion. It continues to play an important role in state politics today.<sup>117</sup> In the decade before Proposition 13 (1978), 22 initiatives qualified for the ballot. In the coming decade 46 qualified, and Californians adopted 21 propositions—more than had been adopted in the previous four decades combined.<sup>118</sup> In 1984, Scientific Games of Atlanta spent \$2.3 million to convince Californians to adopt Proposition 37, creating a state lottery.<sup>119</sup> Proposition 116's proponents (1990) received \$500,000 from none other than the Southern Pacific Railroad. The railroad had much to gain with a right-of-way through Los Angeles to the Port of San Pedro, courtesy of the \$2 billion rail project in Proposition 116.<sup>120</sup> Not all single interests were businesses. The failed Proposition 223 of 1998, which would require 95 percent of local school funding to go "to the classroom" (the bargaining table), was put on the ballot by the United Teachers of Los Angeles. It only lost 45 percent to 55 percent.<sup>121</sup> Voters developed a tendency to send mixed messages. In the 1996 election, voters approved Proposition 218, which limited taxes. They also approved Propositions 210 and 215, raising the minimum wage and legalizing the use of medical marijuana.<sup>122</sup>

Clearly, raising the minimum wage and lowering taxes are measures advocated by two distinctly different economic camps. Issues surrounding medical marijuana are also politically polarizing. A position on medical marijuana would come into overall ideological conflict with at least one side of the minimum wage versus lower taxes debate. How, then, could the same voters in California approve all three measures? They represent such conflicting views of government's role in society. It suggests that Californians looked at each of these measures in isolation, much



like their single-interest coalition Progressive forbearers. They failed to grasp the wider, often conflicting, long-term implications of their decisions. For all that Hiram Johnson railed against special interests, and advocated direct legislation as the best means to advance the interests of “the people,” direct legislation always has been and always will be dependent upon a group of people to make a concerted effort to advance a single proposal. Direct legislation was born in California as a means to unite a diverse set of single-issue reform groups. They did not represent “the people” all of the time. Since its birth, direct legislation has been the tool of choice for narrow interests.

Single interest groups developed out of the traditional political structure’s unresponsiveness to voters’ needs. These groups were brought into the California Progressive coalition because it offered them a new, more attractive method to advance their agendas. The proposition system institutionalized the structure of Progressive Era political activism, institutionalizing the single-issue mentality. At elections, Californians are asked to vote for eight statewide officeholders who have complete agendas, covering the full array of political issues. On that same ballot, voters are then asked to make five, maybe 10, perhaps 15 specific policy decisions, as reflected in the propositions. The long-term effect of this has been to engender a single-issue mindset in Californians, who consequently view policy narrowly, and in isolation. This makes it difficult to see the interconnectedness all policies share with each other, and thus the broader long-term ramifications of policy decisions. This is not new: present focus on issues such as global warming, immigration, and gay marriage is similar to the focus on the Southern Pacific that consumed California in the early 20th century. The difference is that now single-interests have the proposition system. It is a powerful tool by which single-interest groups can make themselves heard and reinforce their legitimacy. Ultimately, if California is to break this pattern, there must be a shift in political culture. As California grapples with the multitude of challenges it faces, the state must be less concerned with specific issues in isolation. Stakeholders and leaders must focus on the interconnected nature of all issues facing the state.

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<sup>4</sup> Spencer C. Olin Jr., “Hiram Johnson, the Lincoln-Roosevelt League, and the Election of 1910,” California Historical Society Quarterly 45, no. 3 (September 1966): 232

<sup>5</sup> John H. White Jr., “The Railroad Reaches California: Men, Machines, and Cultural Migration,” California Historical Quarterly 52, no. 2 (Summer 1973): 139

<sup>6</sup> Tom Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992) p. 85

<sup>7</sup> Michael A. Weatherson and Hal W. Bochyn, Hiram Johnson: Political Revivalist (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1995) p. 21

<sup>8</sup> Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive, p. 86

<sup>9</sup> Spencer C. Olin, California's Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911–1917 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968) p. 2

<sup>10</sup> “The Settlers’ Appeal,” Daily Alta California (San Francisco), (May 15, 1880)

<sup>11</sup> Settlers’ Grand League, The Struggle of the Mussel Slough Settlers for Their Homes!: An Appeal to the People (Visalia, California: Delta Printing Establishment, 1880), quoted in William Conlogue, “Farmers’ Rhetoric of Defense: California Settlers versus the Southern Pacific Railroad,” California History 78, no. 1 (Spring 1999) p. 40

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<sup>13</sup> Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive, p. 22

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68

<sup>15</sup> George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (1951; repr., Chicago, Illinois: Quadrangle Books, 1963) p. 7

- <sup>16</sup> Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive, p. 6
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7
- <sup>19</sup> John Randolph Haynes, *Haynes's Autobiography Notes*, John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation Office, Los Angeles, quoted in Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive, p. 188
- <sup>20</sup> Tom Sitton, "California's Practical Idealist: John Randolph Haynes," California History 67, no. 1 (March 1988) p. 6
- <sup>21</sup> Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive, pp. 26–27
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14
- <sup>24</sup> Olin, California's Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911–1917, p. 43
- <sup>25</sup> Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive, p. 43
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37
- <sup>28</sup> John R. Haynes, "The Introduction of the Initiative, Recall, and Referendum to Los Angeles" (Keynote Speech, University Club, 1909), quoted in Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive, p. 38
- <sup>29</sup> Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive, p. 39
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42
- <sup>31</sup> Sitton, "California's Practical Idealist: John Randolph Haynes," p. 6
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<sup>38</sup> Weatherson and Bochin, pp. 7–8

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

<sup>40</sup> Sacramento Record-Union (October 17, 1901), quoted in McKee, "The Background and Early Career of Hiram Warren Johnson, 1866–1910," p. 22

<sup>41</sup> Chester Rowell, Typescript of Rowell Interview with Ida Tarbell (April 28, 1911), Rowell Papers, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, quoted in Weatherson and Bochin, p. 11

<sup>42</sup> McKee, p. 23

<sup>43</sup> Hiram W. Johnson Jr., Drafts of Portions of a Biography of Senator Johnson, C-B 581, Hiram W. Johnson Papers, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, quoted in Weatherson and Bochin, p. 13

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11

<sup>46</sup> Walton E. Bean, "Boss Ruef, the Union Labor Party, and the Graft Prosecution in San Francisco, 1901–1911," Pacific Historical Review 17, no. 4 (November 1948) p. 445

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<sup>49</sup> Bean, p. 446

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 448

<sup>51</sup> McKee, p. 24

<sup>52</sup> "Begs Jury to Convict E. E. Schmitz," Los Angeles Herald (June 13, 1907)

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<sup>54</sup> McKee, p. 27

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<sup>60</sup> "Attorneys Johnson and Schlesinger Exchange Blows in Courtroom and Former Is Fined," San Francisco Call (August 7, 1907)

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<sup>93</sup> Gates and Clark

<sup>94</sup> Olin, California’s Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911–1917, p. 35

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 55

<sup>96</sup> Weatherson and Bochin, p. 36

<sup>97</sup> Olin, California’s Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911–1917, p. 40

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 43

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 59

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., pp. 62–63

<sup>101</sup> Clifford B. Liljevist, “Senator Hiram Johnson: His Career in California and National Politics,” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1953) pp. 98–99, quoted in Olin, California’s Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911–1917, p. 69

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