



Public Affairs and Public Choice

Public Affairs 8055
Spring 2021

Professor Edward (Ned) Hill

Office: 310-P Page Hall

Preferred means of communication is eMail: : Hill.1973@osu.edu

Course is online, Monday 3 PM to 5PM; There will be an on-line set-up PowerPoint most weeks

Office Hours: by appointment and on Zoom

Prerequisite: Intermediate Microeconomics

Syllabus date: January 4, 2021

Course Description

Public Affairs and Public Choice is designed to introduce graduate students to a series of largely non-mathematical public economics and public choice models. The course is built around a series of powerful small thought models and economic concepts that have important implications for public policy analysis. Material is drawn from public sector economics, public choice theory, and public budgeting and public finance. This class is a survey of public choice models that can be applied in a variety of contexts.

Course Objectives and Learning Outcomes

After taking the course, students should be able to approach public policy issues rigorously by:

- Understanding economic models
- Understanding the role of small models in public policy research
- Being able to apply public choice models of behavior to understand the process of policy formation particularly as it relates to public budgeting and finance.

How to register and what number to register under

Public Affairs 8055 is a new course.

Meetings

We will meet on-line on Mondays from 3 PM to 5PM. Most weeks I will post an on-line setup PowerPoint presentation before the class meeting (I will try to get it posted on Friday) that will fill out the remaining course time.

Required Books

Rodrik's *Economics Rules*. Of particular importance are pp. 1-82; 147 to 176; and 213-216. We will be discussing the book during the fourth week of class.

Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* which is discussed in week 7.

Rodrik, Dani. 2015. *Economics Rules*. Norton. Paperback: ISBN: 978-0-393-35341-9. The Kindle version that was selling for \$10 when I checked in October.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Harvard University Press ISBN 9780674276604

Buchanan, James M. and Richard A. Musgrave. 1999. *Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State*. MIT Press. ISBN electronic: 9780262269476
<https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/2423/Public-Finance-and-Public-ChoiceTwo-Contrasting> Note: I am working with OSU's library to get access to the e-version of the book for us.

Butler, Ian. 2012. *Public Choice—A Primer*. London. Institute for Public Affairs.

This book is a free download. <https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IEA%20Public%20Choice%20web%20complete%2029.1.12.pdf>

Supplemental book: I will be using Randall G. Holcombe, 2016. *Advanced Introduction to Public Choice* to preparing my lectures on public choice. It is published by Elgar. The book's ISBN numbers are: Paperback: 978 1 785536 206 4 and eBook ISBN: 978 1 785536 206 4

Grading

There are four components of a student's grade:

- **Class participation**, Weight: 20%. Class participation does not mean presenting opinions, it reflects making positive contributions to class discussions. This includes asking each other questions in ways that reflect knowledge of the readings and are a thoughtful reflection on the literature as well as interacting with class participants in a respectful manner.
- **Presentation of reading materials**, Weight: 20%. Successful presentations reflect a thoughtful and complete discussion of the selected reading. The presentation should reflect all portions of the rubric that is discussed in the seminar. Your notes will be shared with others in the class.
- **Take-home midterm**: 20% of your grade.
- **Term Paper**: 20% of your grade. There are two choices.
 - Select a **public policy issue** that you are interested in and examine it from the perspective of small economic or public policy modeling while incorporating the literature. I do not expect math modeling.
 - Select a **federal agency or department** and analyze its legal foundation and **unwritten constitution or charter** and then analyze how it has responded to a major change in its traditional policy direction and staffing under the Presidency of Donald Trump.
- **Final examination**: 20% of your grade.

Teaching Method: I will prepare a set-up lecture most weeks and present the model that is the subject of the day's discussion. This will be followed by a student presenting each assigned reading. Once the student's presentation is complete a general discussion of the assigned material will take place. Participation is required.

Grading

93 – 100	A	80 - 82	B-	68 – 69	D+
90 – 92	A-	78 - 79	C+	64 – 67	D
88 - 89	B+	73 - 77	C	63 & below	E
83 - 87	B	70 - 72	C-		

There is no grade of "D-" at Ohio State. For a narrative explanation of what constitutes an "A," "A-," etc. see faculty rules: <http://trustees.osu.edu/rules/university-rules/rules8/ru8-21.html>

Course materials and communications with students will be done on Carmen

- Assigned readings, with the exceptions of material that is in one the of the books assigned in the course, will be posted on Carmen and the folders will be organized by class meeting or week.
- I will communicate with the class through the announcement function on Carmen. You can contact me the same way or email me directly at Hill.1973@osu.edu

- All assignments will be submitted through Carmen
- Your notes on the articles that you present to the class will also be submitted to me and distributed to the class through Carmen.

Course Technologies-Required Equipment

Computer: current Mac (MacOS) or PC (Windows 10) with high-speed internet connection

Webcam: built-in or external webcam, fully installed and tested

Microphone: built-in laptop or tablet mic or external microphone

Other: a mobile device (smartphone or tablet) to use for BuckeyePass authentication

Software

CanvasCarmen

Zoom and will be recorded. The recording will be posted.

Use Microsoft's PowerPoint for presentations. All written assignments will be submitted in MS Word.

FERPA and Privacy in CarmenZoom

Video and audio recordings of class lectures will be part of the classroom activity. The video and audio recording is used for educational use/purposes and may be made available to all students presently enrolled in the course.

University, College and Course Policies

Grade Appeals

The assigned grade is designed to show the overall quality of work performed by each student. If you believe that any grade was not properly assigned you may write a letter explaining why you believe the grade was incorrectly assigned within one week of receiving the graded assignment back. Each appeal will be considered, and if a re-grade is performed, the entire assignment will be re-graded. The final grade may be greater, less, or equal to the original grade.

Attendance

Discussion of the material is an essential component of learning and attendance is expected. However, if you are sick and cannot participate in a session let me know as soon as possible. If your illness prevents you from attending at the class meeting time you can access the recording of the session and view it at another time.

COVID-19 and respiratory etiquette in the event there is a face-to-face meeting

- All students and members of the teaching team will wear a face mask that fully covers your nose and mouth and wear it at all times they are on campus. The exception is when a person is using an office, is alone, and the door is closed. Halloween masks or paper cups placed over your nose are not acceptable.
- All students, faculty and staff are required to comply with and stay up to date on all university safety and health guidance (<https://safeandhealthy.osu.edu>)
- People will maintain a safe physical distance at all times. This means 6-foot social distancing while entering and exiting the classroom, while seated, and when interacting with the teaching staff and each other.
- The university strives to make all learning experiences as accessible as possible. In light of the current pandemic, students seeking to request COVID-related accommodations may do so through the university's [request process](#), managed by Student Life Disability Services. See the next paragraph.
- If students are sick and cannot attend an on-line session please notify as soon as you can.

Covid-related accommodations

Students seeking to request COVID-related accommodations should use the university's [request process](#), managed by **Student Life Disability Services**. If you anticipate or experience academic barriers based on your disability (including mental health, chronic, or temporary medical conditions), please let me know immediately so that we can privately discuss options. To establish reasonable accommodations, I will request that you register with Student Life Disability Services. After registration, make arrangements with me as soon as possible to discuss your accommodations so that they may be implemented in a timely fashion. SLDS contact information: slds@osu.edu; 614-292-3307; slds.osu.edu; 098 Baker Hall, 113 W. 12th Avenue.

Academic Integrity/ Academic misconduct (oaa.osu.edu/coamfaqs.html#academicmisconductstatement)

The Ohio State University and the Committee on Academic Misconduct (COAM) expect that all students have read and understand the University's Code of Student Conduct and that all students will complete all academic and scholarly assignments with fairness and honesty. Failure to follow the rules and guidelines established in the University's Code of Student Conduct may constitute "Academic Misconduct." Sanctions for the misconduct could include a failing grade in this course and suspension or dismissal from the University.

In the Ohio State University's Code of Student Conduct, Section 3335-23-04 defines academic misconduct as: "Any activity that tends to compromise the academic integrity of the University or subvert the educational process." Examples of academic misconduct include (but are not limited to) plagiarism, collusion (unauthorized collaboration), copying the work of another student, and possession of unauthorized materials during an examination. Ignorance of the University's Code of Student Conduct is never considered an "excuse" for academic misconduct.

If you have any questions about the above policy or what constitutes academic misconduct in this course, please contact me.

Other sources of information on academic misconduct (integrity) to which you can refer include:

- The Committee on Academic Misconduct web page: <http://oaa.osu.edu/coam.html>
- Ten Suggestions for Preserving Academic Integrity: <http://oaa.osu.edu/coamtensuggestions.html>
- Eight Cardinal Rules of Academic Integrity: www.northwestern.edu/uacc/8cards.html

Diversity and values statement of the John Glenn College of Public Affairs

The Glenn College is committed to nurturing a diverse and inclusive environment for our students, faculty, staff, and guests that celebrates the fundamental value and dignity of everyone by recognizing differences and supporting individuality. We are dedicated to creating a safe space and promoting civil discourse that acknowledges and embraces diverse perspectives on issues and challenges that affect our community.

Mental Health Statement

Students may experience a range of issues that can cause barriers to learning, such as strained relationships, increased anxiety, alcohol/drug problems, feeling down, difficulty concentrating and/or lack of motivation. These mental health concerns or stressful events may lead to diminished academic performance or reduce a student's ability to participate in daily activities. The Ohio State University offers services to assist you with addressing these and other concerns you may be experiencing. If you or someone you know is suffering from any of the aforementioned conditions, you can learn more about the broad range of confidential mental health services available on campus via the Office of Student Life Counseling and Consultation Services (CCS) by visiting ccs.osu.edu or calling 614-292- 5766. CCS is located on the 4th Floor of the Younkin Success Center and 4th Floor of the PAES Building. 24-hour

emergency help is also available through the National 24/7 Prevention Hotline at 1-800-273-TALK or at suicidepreventionlifeline.org

Accommodation

“Accommodation Policy

The University strives to make all learning experiences as accessible as possible. If you anticipate or experience academic barriers based on your disability (including mental health, chronic or temporary medical conditions), please let me know immediately so that we can privately discuss options. To establish reasonable accommodations, I may request that you register with Student Life Disability Services. After registration, make arrangements with me as soon as possible to discuss your accommodations so that they may be implemented in a timely fashion. **SLDS contact information:** slds@osu.edu; 614-292-3307; slds.osu.edu; 098 Baker Hall, 113 W. 12th Avenue.”

Syllabus
Course Structure – Topics Covered

1. Introduction
 - Review of diagrammatic exposition of a private market equilibrium
 - Thinking like a market: Economics and public policy advice
 - Public choice economics: Normative ideology or a collection of positive analytical tools?
 - Public economics as a field of study in public affairs
2. Small models and public policy
 - Small models: Tools in the toolbox
 - The human capital model: An example
 - Voting with your feet and Baumol's cost disease
 - Tiebout's pure theory of public expenditure
 - Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*
 - Baumol's cost disease
3. Transactions costs: Small models with implications for public administration & policy
4. The public choice toolbox; rational decision-making based on individual benefit-cost calculations
 - Rent-seeking and the cost of rent-seeking
 - Rational ignorance
 - Redistributive coalitions: Concentrated benefits with diffuse costs
 - Bureaucracy
 - Government and market failures
5. Public choice theory and public finance: Two theories about public expenditures
6. A theory of collective action: When communitarian values enter
7. Can there be a theory of budgeting? Does a model exist?

Week	Date	Topic	Description
		1.0	Introduction
1	11-Jan	1.1	Review partial equilibrium
2	18-Jan	1.2	Economics and public policy advice
3	25-Jan	1.3	Public choice economics
4	1-Feb	1.4	Public economics and Institutions
		2.0	Small models and tools in the tool box
5	8-Feb	2.1	Small models: Tools in the toolbox
6	15-Feb	2.2	Human Capital
7	22-Feb	2.3	Tiebout model
8	1-Mar	2.4 & 2.5	Exit, Voice & Loyalty & Cost disease
9	8-Mar	3.0	Transactions Costs
		4.0	Public choice tool box
10	15-Mar	4.1 & 4.2	Rent-seeking & Cost of rent-seeking
11	22-Mar	4.3 & 4.4	Rational ignorance & Redistributive coalitions
12	29-Mar	4.5 & 4.6	Bureaucracy & Government and market failures
13	5-Apr	5.1	Public choice choice & public finance
14	12-Apr	5.2	Public choice choice & public finance
15	19-Apr	6 & 7	Collective action & Budget theory

Readings

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Review and Rubric **Week 1**

Equilibrium in a private market and interpreting areas under supply and demand curves

Thinking through general equilibrium (not mathematical)

Rubric for class presentation

Lecture only; no reading.

1.2 Thinking like a market: Economics and public policy advice ~ **Week 2**

Markusen, Ann R. 1999. "Fuzzy concepts, scanty evidence, policy distance: The case for rigor and policy relevance in critical regional studies," *Regional Studies* 33(9): 869-884.

Vaughan, Roger J. 1988. "Economists and economic development," *Economic Development Quarterly*. 2(2): 119-123.

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2013. "Economics versus politics: Pitfalls of policy advice." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. Spring 27(2): 173-192.

1.3 Public Choice Economics: Normative Ideology or A Collection of Positive Analytical Tools? **Week 3**

Lemieux, Pierre. 2004. "The public choice revolution. *Regulation*." (Fall): 22-29

Buchanan, James M. 1987. "The constitution of economic policy: Nobel Prize Lecture." *American Economic Review*, June, 77(3): 243-250.

Butler, Chapters 1-3, *Public Choice—A Primer*

Ch 1 What is public choice? pp. 21-29

Ch 2 Public choice—the biography pp. 30-38

Ch 3 Who needs government? pp. 40-48

Ch 10 The role of constitutions pp. 95-102

Further reading:

Holcombe, Ch 1 Public choice and public policy, *Public Choice*, pp. 3-10

Holcombe, Ch 3 Institutions: proportional versus plurality; parliamentary versus presidential, *Public Choice*, pp. 24-31.

1.4 Public Economics and Institutions as Fields of Study in Public Affairs ~ **Week 4**

Musgrave, Richard. 1985. "A brief history of fiscal doctrine." Aurbach, A. and M. Feldstein [eds.] *Handbook of Public Economics*. Elsevier Press.

Oates, Wallace. E. 1999. "An essay on fiscal federalism." *Journal of Economic Literature*, September, 37(3): 1120-1149.

Buchanan, James M. 1975. "Public finance and public choice." *National Tax Journal*, December, 28(4): 383-394.

North, Douglas C. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(1): 97-112.

North, Douglas. 1993. "Institutions and Credible Commitment," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 149(1): 11-23.

2. Small Economic Models

2.1 Small models and tools in a toolbox ~ **Week 5**

Rodrik, Dani. 2015. *Economics Rules*. Norton. Of particular importance are pp. 1-82; 147 to 176; and 213-216.

Varian, Hal R. 1997. "How to build an economic model in your spare time." *The American Economist*, Fall, 41(2): 3-10.

2.2 Human Capital ~ Week 6

Nobel Brief on the work of Gary Becker, 1992.

Becker, Gary. 1993. "The economic way of looking at behavior," *Journal of Political Economy*, June, 101(3): 385-409. [Nobel Address]

Oi, Walter, 1962. "Labor as a quasi-fixed factor," *Journal of Political Economy*, December, 70: 538-555.

Popular writing

Gary Becker's Obituary, *New York Times*, *The Economist* May 2014

"Gary Becker's concept of Human Capital," *Six Big Ideas from 2017*, *The Economist*

2.3 Tiebout Model, Voting with your feet part 1 ~ Week 7

Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. "A pure theory of local government expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy*: 416-424. [In *The Tiebout Model at 50* pp. xi-xxi]

Fischell, William A. 2006. "Footloose at fifty: An introduction to the Tiebout anniversary essays." *The Tiebout Model at Fifty*. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy pp. 1-20.

Oates, Wallace E. 2006. The many faces of the Tiebout model, and Inman's commentary, *Tiebout at 50*, pp. 21-54.

2.4 Exit Voice and Loyalty, Voting with your feet part 2 ~ Week 8

Academic work

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Harvard University Press

Hirschman, Albert O. 1980. "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty further reflections and a survey of recent contributions." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society*, 58(3): 430-453

Gehlbach, Scott. 2006. "A Formal Model of Exit and Vocie." *Rationality and Society*. 18(4):395-418.

Popular articles

Albert Hirschman. Obituary. *The Economist* 2013.

Press, Eyal. January 4, 2018. "Reading Albert Hirschman (and Michael Wolff) in Trump's Washington. *New Yorker* Blog. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/reading-albert-hirschman-and-michael-wolff-in-trumps-washington>

Further reading:

Mueller, Dennis. *Public Choice III*, Ch 9 Exit, voice and disloyalty. pp. 182-206.

2.5 Baumol's Cost Disease ~ Week 9

Baumol, William J. 1963. "Urban services: Interactions of public and private decisions." In Howard G. Schaller [ed.] *Public Expenditure Decisions in the Urban Community*. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

Baumol, William J. 1967. "Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth." *American Economic Review*, June: 57(3): 415-42

Baumol, William J., et al. 1985. "Unbalanced growth revisited: Asymptotic stagnancy and new evidence." *American Economic Review*, September 74(4):806-817.

Wolf, Edward N., William J. Baumol, and Anne Noyes Saini. 2014. "A comparative analysis of education costs and outcomes: The United States vs. other OECD countries." *Economics of Education Review* 39: 1-21.

Popular articles

Surowiecki, James. 2003. "What ails us." *New Yorker*:

Roberts, Sam. 2003. "When cities go broke, the options are few." *New York Times* (April 20, 2003).

Further reading:

Mueller, *Public Choice III*, pp. 510-511, 531.

3.0 Transactions costs: Small model with implications for public administration & policy ~ Week 9

Nobel Economic Sciences Prize Committee. 2009. Economic Governance, Scientific Background Paper, pp. 1-8

Coase, Ronald H. 1992. "The institutional structure of production," Nobel Lecture. *American Economic Review*, September 82(4): 713-719.

Williamson, Oliver E. 2010. "Transaction cost economics: The natural progress," Nobel Lecture. *American Economic Review*, June 100: 673-690

Coase, Ronald H. 1988. "The nature of the firm: Influence." *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization*, Spring 4(1): 33-47.

Williamson, Oliver E. 1981. "The economics of organizations: The transactions cost approach." *American Journal of Sociology* 87(3): 548-577.

Williamson, Oliver E. 2002. "The theory of the firm as governance structure: From choice to contract" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (3): 171-195.

Popular writing

The Economist. September 7, 2013, The man who showed why firms exist

July 27, 2017, Coase's Theory of the firm

September 18, 2017, Why do firms exist?

Further reading:

Holcomb, Chapter 7, Transactions costs and political exchange in *Public Choice*, pp. 63-72.

On Transactions Costs:

Coase, Ronald H. 1937. "The nature of the firm." *Economica* 4(16): 386-405.

On the Coase Theorem:

Coase Theorem, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coase_theorem

Mueller. *Public Choice III*, pp. 27-34.

Farrell, Joseph. 1987. "Information and the Coase Theorem." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1(2): 113-129.

4.0: The Public Choice Toolbox; Rational decision-making based on individual benefit-cost calculations

4.1 Rent-seeking ~ Week 10

Butler, Ch 7 Political profits: rent-seeking, *Public Choice—A Primer*, pp. 75-81

Holcomb, Chapter 8: Political markets: Interest groups, rent-seeking, and regulatory capture, *Public Choice*, pp. 73-84.

Tullock, *The Rent-Seeking Society*, pp. 3-100

Ch 1 Rent-seeking: An overview pp. 3-84

Ch 2 More on efficient rent-seeking pp. 85-100

Further Reading: Muller, Dennis. Chapter 15, Rent seeking, *Public Choice III*, pp. 333-355;

4.2 The cost of rent-seeking ~ Week 10

Tullock, *The Rent-Seeking Society*, pp. 102-258

Ch 3 The environments for rent-seeking pp. 103-202

Ch 4 The cost of rent-seeking pp. 203-258

Further reading: Mueller, *Public Choice III*, Ch 22 Government size & economic performance, pp. 535-560.

4.3 Rational Ignorance ~ Week 11

Downs, Anthony. 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action," *Journal of Political Economy* 62(2): 135-150.

Butler, Ch 4 How to win elections, *Public Choice—A Primer*, pp. 49-57

Further reading:

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper

Holcombe, Chapter 6, Why do people vote? Rational ignorance, expressive voting, rational irrationality, *Public Choice*, pp. 50-59.

Mueller, *Public Choice III*, "Rational voter hypothesis," 303-304.

4.4 Redistributive Coalitions: Concentrated benefits with diffuse costs ~ Week 11

Butler, Ch 5 The tyranny of the minorities, *Public Choice—A Primer*, pp. 49-57

Olson, Mancur .1984. *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. (Yale University Press) Chapters 1-3, pp. 1-74

Chapter 1 The questions and the standards a satisfactory answer must meet

Chapter 2 The logic;

Chapter 3 The implications

Rosser, J. Barkley. 2007. "The Rise and Decline of Mancur Olson's View of "The Rise and Decline of Nations" *Southern Economic Journal*. July. 74(1): 4-17.

Hill, Edward W. 2020. *Regulation, Redistributive Coalitions, and Captive Regulation. Opposition Testimony to the Proposed Electric Security Plan of Dayton Power and Light*.

Further reading:

Stigler, George T. 1970. Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, *Journal of Law and Economics* 13(1): 1-10.

Holcomb, Chapter 11: Political entrepreneurship, *Public Choice*, pp. 106-120

Ch 12 Constitutional and post-constitutional decision-making, *Public Choice*, pp. 121-129

Mueller, *Public Choice III*, Ch 20 Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying, pp. 472-500

4.5 Bureaucracy ~ Week 12

Butler, Chapter 8, "Payday for politicians," *Public Choice—A Primer*, pp. 82-87

Chapter 9, "Motivating bureaucrats." *Public Choice—A Primer*, pp. 88-94.

Further Reading:

Holcomb, Chapter 9, "Bureaucracy," *Public Choice* pp. 85-93.

Mueller, *Public Choice III*, Ch 16 Bureaucracy, pp. 359-385 and Ch 21 The size of government, pp. 501-562.

4.6 Government and Market Failures ~ Week 12

Stiglitz, Joseph. 1998. "The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 12(2):3-22.

Stiglitz, Joseph. 2008. Government failure versus Market Failure: Principles of Regulation. draft

Datta-Choudhari, Mrinal. 1990. "Market Failure and Government Failure." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 4(3): 25-39.

Grand, Julianle. 1991. "The Theory of Government Failure," *British Journal of Political Science* 21(4):423-442.

Further reading:

Holcomb Ch 13 Interest groups and constitutional evolution, pp. 130-137.

CH 14 Checks and balances: elites and masses, pp. 138-144.

5.1 and 5.2: Public Choice Theory and Public Finance: Two philosophical views **Week 13-14**

Buchanan and Musgrave. 1999.

Day 1: Origins of their philosophy and thinking. pp. 1-62.

Day 2: Fiscal tasks; pp.63-106.

Day 3: Political action ~ Public Choice; pp. 107-154.

Day 4: Fiscal Federalism; pp. 155-204

Day 5: Morals, politics, & institutional reform; pp. 205-258.

6.0 Theory of Collective Action: When communitarian values enter ~ Week 15

Academic work

Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. "Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems," Nobel Lecture. *American Economic Review*, June 100: 641-672.

Nobel Economic Sciences Prize Committee. 2009. Economic Governance, Scientific Background Paper, pp. 8-19

Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. "Collective action and the evolution of social norms." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3): 137-158.

Granovetter, Mark. 2005. "The impact of social structure on economic outcomes." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(1): 33-50.

Popular article

Rowley, Sylvia. April 19, 2016. How dwindling fish stocks got a reprieve. *New York Times*.

Further reading:

Cox, Michael et al. 2010. "A review of design principles for community-based natural resource management." *Ecology and Society*. 15(4): 38.

7.0 Can there be a Theory of Budgeting? Does a model exist? ~ Week 15

Key, V. O. 1940. "The Lack of a Budgeting Theory." *American Political Science Review*, December 34(6): 1137-1141.

Lindblom, Charles E. 1959. "The science of muddling through," *Public Administration Review*, 19(2): 79-88.

Lewis, Verne B. 1952. "Toward a Theory of Budgeting." *Public Administration Review*, winter 12(1): 42-54.

Rubin, Irene S. 1990. "Budget Theory and Budget Practice: How Good the Fit." *Public Administration Review* 50(2): 179-189.

Kelly, Janet M. 2005. "A Century of Public Budgeting Reform: The 'Key' Question." *Administration and Society*, March 37(1): 89-109.